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Abstract 
 
The Career background of politicians is an issue that could potentially have profound implications for 
the functioning of democracy, yet it has only received sporadic and lukewarm attention from 
political scientists. Based on the hypothesis that the experience and skills an MP acquires throughout 
his or her career is going to affect the MP’s performance in the future, this dissertation seeks to 
explore if the career background of MPs, both professional and political, influences their 
parliamentary career trajectory and behaviour when they enter parliament. By utilizing a new 
dataset compiled from the biographical information of all new MPs elected in the 2010 British 
general election, this dissertation shows that the amount and nature of MPs’ pre-parliamentary 
careers has a profound impact on the allocation of seats among MPs as applicants, their prospects of 
frontbench promotion, their voting behaviour, as well as their participation in parliamentary 
debates. These results show that the pre-parliamentary careers of MPs do affect the way they 
conduct their duties as representatives. These results also suggest that the background of MPs 
shapes the composition of parliament in terms of the occupation and political experience, which has 
an important influence on how representative democracy works. 
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Introduction 
When she entered this House just 13 short months ago, she rapidly used her deep 
knowledge to champion the dispossessed. 
- Andrew Mitchell MP, paying tribute to Jo Cox in parliament 
 
In the wake of Jo Cox’s assassination, among the numerous tributes paid to the late MP, 
there were two unmistakable themes. First, before she was elected, Cox had been an aid 
and humanitarian worker in Oxfam. Not only did her professional background influence her 
dedicating her office to the cause of humanitarian aid to refugees and third world countries, 
but it also brought her the expertise and knowledge that contributed enormously to the 
parliamentary deliberation and public debate on the subject. Secondly, she was a dedicated 
local MP, born and raised within her constituency and genuinely admired by her 
constituents. The fact that her tragic death happened when she was holding her weekly 
constituency surgery only served to highlight her commitment to the community that she 
called home. 
 
A knowledgeable ‘policy expert’ and a true ‘local hero’, Cox seems to have embodied our 
ideal representative. Her professional background informed her work in Westminster and 
her local roots committed her service to constituents. If there was a silver lining to her 
untimely demise, it may be how her story has, at least temporarily, vanquished the rampant 
contempt and disillusionment over politics, the political class and Parliament that have 
plagued our society since the expense scandal. The #ThankyourMP on Twitter, inspired by 
Cox, has turned peoples’ attention to the works and contributions of their MP. Overcoming 
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the cynical stereotype of politicians being self-serving, power-hungry, unqualified careerist 
that have never had a ‘real job’, people began to realize that many of them were in fact 
accomplished individuals who had decided to dedicate their life to service of their 
community. 
 
However, does MPs’ experience truly matter? How does MPs experience prior to their 
election affect their political career and behaviour once elected? Do skills and knowledge 
acquired in professional and political pre-parliamentary career facilitate MPs performing 
their tasks and responsibility? Do different professional or political experiences bring 
forward different behavioural patterns among MPs? And in the end, is Cox’s inspiring story 
of utilizing her professional, political and personal background in becoming an effective 
representative, both in Westminster and her constituency, the norm or exception among 
MPs? These are some of the questions that I intend to explore through this thesis. The 
answer to these questions will serve to further our understanding on the skills and quality 
required for effective representatives as well as the growing trend of ‘professionalization’ of 
politics in the UK and around developed democracies, both of which are issues that have a 
profound impact on the functioning and representativeness of democratic government. 
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Quality of Representatives 
They have no idea that the true navigator must study the seasons of the year, the 
sky, the stars, the winds and all the other subjects appropriate to his profession if 
he is to be really fit to control a ship 
- Plato, The Republic. 
 
Leadership matters, but what makes a good political leader? This has been a fundamental 
question asked by scholars of politics for millennia. From Plato to Weber and beyond, the 
temperament and skills that constitute effective leadership, and how to bring individuals 
with these qualities into position of power, has been the cornerstone in the study of politics. 
Regardless of the form of polity, the competence and aptitude of political leaders will have 
profound implication on the functioning of government, the delivery of public services and 
people’s wellbeing. The importance of studying the skills, knowledge and experience that 
make an effective political leader is self-evident. Yet, the issue of quality among political 
leaders appears to be in the state of dereliction as it has largely failed to capture the 
attention of contemporary political scientists. The reason for this neglect, I believe, 
stemmed from the two fundamental questions with regard to this issue and the difficulty in 
conceptualizing and studying them. 
 
First and foremost, what do we mean when we talk about quality and effectiveness among 
political leaders and representatives? The underlining difficulty in answering this question 
lies in the fact that the proper function(s) of an elected representative is multifaceted and 
often ill defined. Elected representatives are often faced with a wide variety of tasks they 
are expected to perform and multiple, sometimes conflicting, principles to whom they are 
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responsible to. Political scientists have long noticed the diverse responsibility of legislators. 
The multiple purposes of legislators within the assembly and in politics and society in 
general have led to diverging patterns legislative behaviour in terms of how legislators focus 
their attention on the various tasks and responsibilities they are expected to perform (For 
example Barber 1965, Dietrich et al 2012, Payne 1980, Rush 2001, Searing 1994, Wahlke et 
al 1962). 
 
Given the multiple responsibilities of representatives and the variety of ways that they 
engage with these responsibilities, it would perhaps be a crude generalization to speak of 
performance of MP as a unidimensional concept. Unless we are to adopt a prior normative 
judgement on a singular proper role of legislators in representational democracy, it would 
be impossible to say if a legislator who focuses on drafting and making of legislation is in 
anyway more, or less, effective or having better, or worse, performance than their 
colleagues who pay attention to providing constituency services, promoting a particular 
policy or party positions on mass media or scrutinizing conduct of the government in 
committee room. In the end, quality and effectiveness of political leaders and 
representatives is perhaps best conceptualized as a multi-dimensional notion that 
encompass their capacity and performance in the variety of tasks and responsibilities that 
they need to fulfil. An effective MP need not to be an all round jack-of-all-trade that excels 
in each and every one of these dimensions. Instead, the collegial nature of parliament, 
parliamentary parties and government means that the division of labour among 
representatives with different expertise and skills is not only possible, but desirable.  
 
Introduction 
16 
 
Secondly, how and from whom do representatives learn their trade? The most obvious and 
straight forward way of doing so is on-the-job training through socialization and adaptation, 
once MPs are elected to Westminster. The issue of legislative socialization has been 
thoroughly studied in a number of assemblies across the world and the impact of seniority 
and tenure on politicians’ effective and performance has long be noted in the literature 
(Miquel and Snyder 2006, Rush and Giddings 2011, Schiller 1995). There has also been an 
expanding body of research with regards to the practice and outcome of formal program of 
training and induction that is being offered to new parliamentarian across different 
countries (Coghill et al 2012, Donohue and Holland 2012, Fox and Korris 2012, Simpanba 
2012). However, the effects of MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers and experiences on aptitude 
and performance have received considerably less attention from scholars of legislative 
studies. 
 
The lack of understanding of pre-office career of political leaders and its consequences is 
perhaps due to the difficulty in studying and conceptualizing politicians’ prior career. As a 
profession, politics is unique in the sense there is neither a clear and concise career path nor 
aptitudinal criteria for a person to progress within the profession. In most professions, one 
would usually begin at a junior position, learning the ropes of how to perform and excel in 
various tasks, acquiring the necessary skills, knowledge and professional credentials, proving 
ones’ ability before earning a promotion to a higher office. However, the same thing cannot 
be said with regard to politics as a profession. While there are more usual and travelled 
paths than others, the fact remains that representatives do hail from all walks of life, and 
there are good reasons for this. If we look at the background of the cohort of MPs first 
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elected in the 2010 general election, there were some usual suspects - lawyers, teachers, 
bankers, publicists etc. However, there was also a bricklayer, a pastor and a GP receptionist. 
While this certainly complicates how we conceptualize MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers, the 
variety of experiences and professional background of MPs also means that they bring with 
them a wide range of skills, knowledge and expertise to parliament. The consequence of 
these diverse backgrounds on their behaviour is indeed intriguing. 
 
Given these the multitude of MPs’ responsibilities, and the variety of their previous careers, 
while we are presented with a considerable methodological challenge in understanding 
them, a better approach in conceptualizing the effect of pre-parliamentary experiences on 
quality and competence of legislators might be to think of different strands of pre-
parliamentary experiences are facilitating legislators in the formation of legislative roles and 
adopting different patterns of legislative behaviours. Hence, it is not that MPs with certain 
pre-parliamentary backgrounds are of better quality or more effective as an MP per se, but 
rather their pre-parliamentary experiences provide them with certain skill sets or knowledge 
which either allows them to outperform their colleagues in particular aspects of their 
responsibilities, or to make certain aspects of their tasks and responsibilities a more 
attractive course of action, which in turn diverts their efforts to the area where they can 
make the most contribution or impact. The result of these would be observable, distinct 
patterns of behaviour among MPs with different sets of pre-parliamentary experiences, 
dependent on their ability in performing the various tasks and responsibilities of an MP. 
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Professionalization of Politics 
Being an MP is a vast subsidized ego-trip. It's a job that needs no qualifications, it 
has no compulsory hours of work, no performance standards, and provides a 
warm room, a telephone and subsidized meals to a bunch of self-important 
windbags and busybodies who suddenly find people taking them seriously 
because they've got the letters 'MP' after the their name. 
- Sir Humphrey Appleby, Yes Prime Minister 
 
In exploring the consequences of MPs’ pre-parliamentary career, not only will that enable us 
to further our understanding of how quality among representatives ought to be defined and 
nurtured, but it also allows us to explore the implication of the general trend in the changing 
landscape of politics that is professionalization.  
 
In recent decades, there has been an observable trend of MPs being drawn from an ever 
restricting pool of talents who, in the words of Max Weber, not only live ‘for’ politics, but 
also live ‘off’ politics (Weber 1994). At the expense of people of working class or other 
professional backgrounds, parliamentary seats are increasingly occupied by ‘professional’ 
politicians and political operatives who worked extensively, if not exclusively, in one of the 
professions that was deemed as ‘politically related’, such as law, journalism, trade unionism 
etc. (Cairney 2007, King 1981, Norris and Lovenduski 1995, Riddell 1993). The narrowing of 
MPs’ societal and economical background was greeted with certain degree of animosity 
among the general populace and became the focal point of populist fury. In such a 
narrative, professional MPs have been accused of being ambitious careerists who care only 
about attaining political power, have never held a job outside of politics, permanently stuck 
within the ‘Westminster Bubble’ - not only were these themselves ‘unrepresentative’, but 
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they also lacked the experience and understanding of ‘real world’ problems and issues that 
people are faced with every day. As a result, they are oblivious of peoples’ genuine and 
legitimate concerns. The results offered by this research shall serve to further refine our 
understanding of the professionalization of politics. 
 
Firstly, to what extent has professionalization changed the composition of parliament in 
terms MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers and experience, and consequently the skills, 
knowledge and expertise they bring to Westminster? I would argue that the way pre-
parliamentary careers and the notions of ‘political professional’ are found in the existing 
literature have some fundamental shortcomings that hamper a comprehensive 
understanding on MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers and the professionalization of politics. 
More specifically, the lack of distinction between professional and political aspect of MPs’ 
pre-parliamentary careers has masked the true picture of MPs’ professional and political 
credentials at the time of their election. 
 
Secondly, what are the consequences of professionalization in terms of MPs performance 
and behaviour? In other words, do MPs with extensive experience in one of the ‘politically 
related’ profession behave differently from those who do not? As noted by Rush (2001), 
professionalization is a response to political chances which makes the office of MP ever 
more demanding to an individual. The increasing role of MPs in scrutinizing government 
conduct, deliberation on policies and participate in public debate through mass and social 
media all required special knowledge and skills set to perform. If that is the case, we ought 
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to expect a ‘professional’ MP, equipped with more relevant experience, to outperform their 
more amateurish colleagues. 
 
On the other hand, some of the skills and knowledge necessary for effective representative 
are by no means exclusive to ‘politically related’ professions and can be earned in non-
political professions as well. Experience and expertise from non-political professions may 
prove useful, if not essential to the functioning of parliament. Sector specific knowledge and 
perspectives provided by former practitioners elected as MPs may be vital and beneficial to 
the formation of government policies. Could non-political occupations provide similar 
benefits in terms of skills and knowledge to ‘amateur’ politicians and give rise to similar 
patterns of behaviour? Could experience from different professions be responsible for a 
distinct set of behaviour? Moreover, ‘professional politicians’ is by no means a clear and 
concise concept, as many MPs were involved in politics in a part-time capacity while having 
a successful non-political career parallel to their participation in politics. So, how does MPs’ 
pre-parliamentary professional and political experience interact with each other and what 
are their consequences on MPs’ behaviour when we take both dimensions of their prior 
career into account? 
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Representational consequences 
Now I know that virtually none of you have ever done a proper job in your life, or 
worked in business, or worked in trade, or indeed ever created a job. 
- Nigel Farage MEP, speaking at the European Parliament after the Brexit 
Referendum 
 
Answers to the above questions are, I believe, not only of great importance in itself, but will 
also shed light on the impact of the professionalization of politics and changing occupational 
composition of the parliament on the representativeness of our democracy as well. It has 
been suggested that the identity of representatives and composition of parliament is an 
important factor in its representativeness. This particular line of argument usually begins 
with the idea that all social groups ought to be represented by politicians who belongs to 
such groups in the parliament and the composition of parliament ought to mirror the 
society it is supposed to represent. The normative case for such ‘descriptive representation’ 
is both symbolic and substantial; it signifies the inclusive nature of our democracy and 
acceptance of various groups by the society. Representatives who actually belong to certain 
social groups might be more effective in relaying the grievances and addressing concerns of 
the groups, because they can better relate to the everyday life problems and difficulties 
encountered by ordinary members of the group, hence becoming better advocates for their 
respective group in the parliament.  
 
While most literature on the normative case for more descriptive representation focuses on 
the representation, or the lack thereof, for women and ethnic minorities (Ashe et al 2010, 
Cutts et al 2008, Hill 2013, Mcllveen 2009, Shaw 2001), some research has suggested that 
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similar line of argument could be extend to other social groups. More descriptive 
representation based on socio-economic conditions has long been argued for since the 19th 
century. The Labour Representation Committee, the forerunner of currently Labour Party, 
was founded in 1900 with the distinct purpose to secure and increase representation of 
industrial workers within parliament. The idea of representation based on occupational and 
functional groups have also been found in pluralist and corporatist model democracy. The 
case for descriptive representation along geographical and locational divide has also been 
put forward. Indeed, electoral arrangements of most contemporary democracies have some 
sort of geographical element in the sense that some, if not all, representatives are elected 
to represent certain geographical area such as ridings, constituencies or states. Childs and 
Cowley (2011) have suggested that locale ought to be considered as a social group that 
merits descriptive representation. Particularly, for areas of a country which have been 
traditionally disadvantaged from the rest, they would have a particularly strong case for 
demanding representatives coming from their communities. It has also been found that 
there are widespread public support and demand for representatives who reside or have 
deep roots within their community. 
 
Professionalization of politics and the changing pre-parliamentary background of MPs would 
affect the representativeness and nature of representation of the parliament in two 
different ways. The most obvious of which is how these changes affect the composition, and 
hence the degree of descriptive representation, of the parliament. As political professionals 
from ‘political related’ occupations increasingly dominate the Commons, representation 
from other occupations, in particular working class labour, continued to dwindle. People no 
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longer felt that their MPs could represent them and speak for them in parliament because 
their life experience was so drastically different from the rest of the populace. Moreover, 
while it appears that professionalization is providing an alternative pathway of recruitment 
from the traditional route that has been discriminating against women and minorities. 
However, women and minority candidates that have gone through this professional path 
into parliament are also distinctively different from the wider group that they are supposed 
to represent, which puts their claim for descriptive representative of their respective social 
group into jeopardy. Durose et al (2012) have argued that ethnic minority candidates 
selected as candidates are mostly ‘acceptably different’ to the selectors. Other than being 
non-white, these ‘acceptable different’ candidates mostly conform to the ‘archetype’ 
candidate - middle class, university educated and professional.  
 
Moreover, and with more relevance to the study of MPs’ pre-parliamentary career is the 
question of how the difference in skills and knowledge among MPs with diverging 
occupational background affect their performance and effectiveness in Westminster, hence 
giving rise to the issue of substantiveness of descriptive representation. If certain 
professional credential or political experience does indeed affect MPs performance and 
behaviour, making them more formidable in parliamentary debate, more able to convey 
their idea through mass media or more likely to catch the eyes of party leaders at times of 
cabinet reshuffle, then, even if the composition the parliament does reflect that of the 
country, the discussion within parliament and policy formulation process will nevertheless 
still be dominated by some MPs by virtue of their superior skills and knowledge. In other 
words, if professional politicians do enjoy an edge over their amateur colleague in terms of 
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their effectiveness and performance due to their pre-parliamentary career, the ideal of 
descriptive representation would not be reached even if we were to increase the number of 
non-professional MPs in parliament. Instead, the real solution may lies in not merely 
increasing their numbers, but either enhancing their capacity as an effective legislators, or 
devising changes to parliamentary procedure to better accommodate and utilize the other 
skills and expertise that non-professional MPs bring to Westminster. 
 
Plan for the thesis 
This dissertation is divided into two parts. Chapters One and Two deal with the theoretical 
background as well as introducing the research design. Chapters Three through Seven then 
present the analyses of MPs’ pre-parliamentary professional and political careers as well as 
provide the empirical evidence of how diverging prior experiences of MPs affect both their 
career trajectory in parliament and their behaviour in Westminster. 
 
Chapter One lays out the theoretical foundations for the entire dissertation. I follow up with 
the brief discussion on the main issue mentioned in this introductory section. Specifically, a 
detailed review on existing literature with regard to professionalization and impact of MPs’ 
prior experience is given. The focus is on how pre-parliamentary careers are conceptualized 
in the literature and how it may affect MPs behaviour once elected. I argue that there is a 
gap in existing literature, namely the lack of dialogue between the study of MPs pre-
parliamentary careers and research on MPs’ behaviour. Moreover, the way scholars have 
conceptualized and measured MPs’ prior experience have certain fundamental 
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shortcomings that hampered research in this area by masking the true nature of their pre-
parliamentary careers. Toward the end of this chapter, I summarize the lessons we could 
draw from existing literature by presenting my own take on the way MPs’ pre-parliamentary 
careers ought to be conceptualized, as well as several hypotheses with regards to how MPs’ 
pre-parliamentary careers may affect their behaviour as well as political fortune in 
parliament. I argue that the professional and political dimensions of pre-parliamentary 
experience ought to be treated separately when we conceptualize MPs’ prior careers, and it 
is the nature as well as the amount of MPs’ pre-parliamentary experiences that would affect 
their political trajectory and behaviour in parliament. 
 
Chapter Two is devoted to presenting the research design of this thesis. Following with what 
we have learnt from the existing literature and my own take on the subject, I demonstrate 
how the research design address the methodological shortcoming of existing literature as 
well as how it embodied the direction I have presented in Chapter One. Since existing data 
was not able to address some of the methodological concerns, I have constructed my own 
database of MPs’ pre parliamentary career for the purpose of this research. The database is 
compiled from biographical information of all MPs first elected to the House of Commons in 
the 2010 general election found in Who’s Who and Dods Parliamentary Companion. It 
contains the length and nature of every position that MPs have held during their 
professional and political pre-parliamentary career. The data on MPs’ professional 
background is then operationalized and coded in accordance to the SOC2000 occupational 
classification devised by the ONS while their political experience is coded with a scheme I 
have devised myself. I also provide further justification to as well as the limitations of the 
Introduction 
26 
 
research designs, in particular the utilization of cohort study, the sources of information and 
the practice of coding the database in this chapter.  
 
Chapter Three is devoted to descriptive analysis of the data collected and found in the 
database. This chapter serves three purposes. Firstly, it presents some of the descriptive 
results of the 2010 cohort with regards to their pre-parliamentary careers. Not only do I 
present the occupational composition of the cohort, but I also compare this with results 
from previous studies on MPs’ occupational background and analyze both how this cohort 
differs from previous parliaments as well as how the utilization of new method in 
conceptualizing MPs pre-parliamentary career affected the results when compared to 
existing research. Secondly, I further explore the relationship between professional and 
political dimension of MPs’ pre-parliamentary career. I test some of the arguments found in 
professionalization literatures with regards to how these two dimensions relate to each 
other as well as some of my own hypothesis on the subject. Lastly, I present how I construct 
a four categories schematic of MPs’ pre-parliamentary political routes into parliament. 
Utilizing the information collected in the database, I use the clustering method of Latent 
Class Analysis (LCA) to discover four political routes MPs have followed before entering 
parliament - ‘Career Changer’, ‘Local Hero’, ‘Carpetbagger’ and ‘Party Animal’. These 
political career groups are to be used in our analysis in the latter part of this thesis. 
 
Chapter Four explores how MPs pre-parliamentary careers relate to the electoral security of 
the constituency that they will eventually represent. Using electoral result of the previous 
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general election (2005), I have discovered how diverging pre-parliamentary career affect 
their chances of being selected to contest in safe or marginal constituency when these MPs 
were still candidate applicant. This analysis will further our understanding of how party 
recruiters and gate keepers perceive applicants with different professional and political 
credential at the time of candidate selection. The results also allow us to contemplate how 
recent changes and reforms in the main parties’ recruitment process, which tends to 
emphasize centralization of candidate selection with the stated purpose of improving 
quality of candidates and increase ethnic and gender representation, may affect the 
professional and political credential of candidates and MPs selected by the process. In the 
end, analysis in this chapter has found that increasing prior professional experience in 
financial services, the military and as full-time governmental officials is associated with 
representing safer constituencies while MPs with in-constituency local government 
experience are more likely to represent marginal seats. 
 
Chapter Five looks at how MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers affect their chances of becoming 
frontbench member of their party. I first explore how MPs’ experiences affect the 
probability for them earning a promotion onto any frontbench position, after which we will 
focus particularly on how their prior career may facilitate or hinder their chances of 
becoming either a government minister or shadow cabinet member. Results from these 
analysis serves to further our understanding the criteria and considerations when Prime 
Minister or party leaders making frontbench appointment. It also tests some of the existing 
arguments in the literature with regards to the importance of political experience and 
connection in the process or if MPs’ aptitude and ability may have also played a role in their 
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appointment as frontbencher and minister. The results show that while there is indeed a 
divide in frontbench promotion prospect between MPs who followed the local government 
route and national politics route into parliament, professional experience in finance and 
mass media appears to be conducive to MPs ministerial ambition even when their prior 
political experiences are taken into account. 
 
Chapter Six explores how MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers affect their voting behaviour in 
parliament. I focus on two issues with regards to the way MPs vote in parliament. Firstly, 
how often does an individual MP vote in accordance with or rebel against the position of 
their own party, and to what extent is that affected by their pre-parliamentary career? 
Particular attention is paid on how diverging prospect for frontbench appointment, as 
discovered in Chapter Five, may play a role in MPs’ decision to vote for or against their 
party’s position during divisions. Secondly, I look at how MPs’ previous experience and 
occupation may lead to special positions or priorities with regard to a specific policy issue. 
Using Euroscepticism among Conservatives and a string of divisions on the issue of Europe 
as a case, I demonstrate that Conservative MPs’ pre-parliamentary profession do seem to 
have an impact on their tendency to rebel against their party on the issue of Europe. It is 
found that professional experience that is associated with higher prospects of frontbench 
appointment, such as financial service and mass media, is also explaining increase 
rebelliousness when these MPs were on the backbench. Moreover, prior experience in the 
military is also associated with increased rebelliousness. However, this latter observation 
could be partially explained by increased Euroscepticism among ex-military officers as they 
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are found to be more rebellious in division with regards to the issue of UK-EU relations, 
while former workers in financial services among Conservative MPs are more Europhilic. 
 
Chapter Seven looks at how MPs’ prior experience affects their tendency to speak during 
parliamentary debate. The ability in effective communication and public speaking have been 
an alleged skill important to a parliamentary career, this analysis will enable us to see if MPs 
with prior experience in occupations that emphasize communication and public speaking 
skills do indeed speak more often in parliament. Using data from parliamentary records and 
calculating the number of occasions each of them have spoken in parliamentary debate for 
the duration of the entire parliament, the analytical results enable us to know how varying 
pre-parliamentary career may affect MPs’ participation in parliamentary debate and 
possibility the broader public political discourse. The results have shown that MPs’ pre-
parliamentary experience in the legal profession is associated with increasing speech counts 
during debates, while those who worked in mass media speak less. Since participating and 
speaking in parliamentary debate is merely one aspect of the array of tasks and 
responsibilities of being an MP, they would have to prioritize these different responsibilities. 
Diverging pattern of debate participation in accordance to their pre-parliamentary career 
may also indicate the latter’s effect on how MPs prioritize various legislative tasks in 
accordance with their skills and knowledge earned prior to entering parliament. 
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Chapter One – Conceptualizing MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers and 
theorizing its’ effect  
1.1 Introduction 
In the introductory section, I have laid out the main research question of this dissertation: 
How do MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers affect their behaviour and career trajectory within 
parliament? This chapter will follow up on those discussions by focusing on what we can 
learn from the literature and what is the gap in the literature?  
 
This literature review focuses on two sets of literature. Firstly, how have political scientists 
conceptualized and understood politicians’ careers before they attain their office? Special 
attention is to be placed on literature that discusses the general trend of professionalization 
of politics across developed democracies. Secondly, how pre-parliamentary experiences 
may affect legislators’ behaviours? I argue that the lack of understanding of the 
consequences of MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers lies in the lack of dialogue between the 
two sets of literatures. Borrowing ideas from occupational psychology and organizational 
studies, I argue that the bridge between literatures on politicians’ prior careers on one 
hand, and their behaviour on the other, lies in the skills, knowledge and experience they 
earn from their pre-parliamentary careers, which ought to play an important role in 
determining their behaviour once elected. Moreover, the way scholars have conceptualized 
and measured MPs’ pre-parliamentary career has certain limitations that have hampered 
research on the subject. Towards the end of the chapter, I am going to present my take on 
how MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers ought to be understood and several hypotheses with 
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regard to MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers and its potential impacts on their behaviour once 
elected. 
 
1.2 How are political leaders selected? 
The issue of how political leaders emerge or are selected from society has intrigued social 
and political scientists for generations. The literature on politician’s prior careers and 
political recruitment are essentially tackling two interrelated questions: How do political 
leaders arrive at their positions? And who, from among society, would emerge from the 
process? For Joseph Schlesinger (1966) the former question was an easy one - by individual 
choice. More specifically, it is by the circumstances in which individuals have found 
themselves and the extent that it is favourable for them to seek leadership positions and 
political offices. Schlesinger denoted this system of diverging opportunity and prospects for 
political promotion faced by occupants of lower positions in the political hierarchy the 
structure of political opportunity. The main argument here is rational choice by nature; all 
politicians are assumed to be rational beings that seek to maximize their payoff, in this case 
the pursuit of higher office along the political ladder. If one’s present position favours one to 
seek certain office on the political hierarchy, then one would be more inclined to throw 
one’s hat into the ring and pursue for promotion to said office, whilst those who are in a 
position that limits their prospects for successful promotion would be discouraged from 
seeking higher office and more inclined to stay put. It is through individual career decisions 
that the structure of opportunity determines who among the lower echelon of the political 
hierarchy would be promoted and to which position they would be promoted to.  
Chapter One 
 
32 
 
This notion that political promotion is determined by structure of opportunity and the 
rational choice of the individual has been highly influential and has served as the intellectual 
genesis of an array of research that seeks to explore the variables that determine the 
opportunity structure of various political offices. Studies that follow this tradition have 
largely found that factors such as the level of overlapping of electorates between different 
political offices (Squire 1993, Hibbing 1993), opportunity costs for giving up their current 
office for seeking a higher one (Hibbing 1993), remuneration of offices(Best and Gaxie 
2000), the age of politicians (Squire 1993, Hibbing 1993, Lascher 1993), the apparent 
vulnerability of the incumbent of the desired office (Hibbing 1993), and even politician’s 
level of satisfaction derived from their current position (Lascher 1993) were related to a 
politician’s ambition and career decision. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the appeal of Schlesinger’s ambition theory due to its simplicity and 
compelling evidence, there remain several issues where ambition theory is unable to 
provide satisfactory answers. Firstly there is the assumption that the aim of all politicians is 
that of ‘Office Maximizer’ and that the seeking of higher offices is the sole motivation 
behind their behaviour and career decisions. Despite the popular stigmatization of 
politicians as being power hungry, there are diverging motivations behind politicians’ 
behaviours. Barber’s (1964) study on state legislators in Connecticut has, for example, 
discovered several patterns of behaviour among them and has suggested the underlying 
cause behind them is not the differing prospect for promotion, but rooted in their 
personalities and psychological predispositions. Moreover, although most legislators in the 
same state legislature face arguably similar prospects for promotion to higher offices, there 
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are nevertheless clear diverging patterns of ambition and aspiration for promotions, which 
Barber contributes to the different sense of self between types of legislators. This casts 
doubt on the notion that all politicians are ‘Office Maximizers’. Secondly, while ambition 
theory appears to be able to explain some of the movement, or the lack thereof, it is unable 
to provide an explanation as to why someone would become politically active in the first 
place and enter the realm of politics while others did not. Prewitt’s (1970) study on 
Councilmen in California suggested two major factors that determined people’s initiation 
into the politically active realm - social bias and socialization. The latter is referring to early 
life experience such as familial influence and participation in student and youth politics that 
leads some to become politically active while the former refers to the inherited bias on 
social status such as education, class or gender in the process of choosing political leaders. 
 
1.2.1 Social bias in political recruitment 
The fact that political leaders’ social backgrounds are distinct from the people they rule over 
has long been established. Putnam (1976) hypothesized a fundamentally different 
perspective from ambition theory for understanding political recruitment. He suggested that, 
instead of being a process of self-selection driven by the rational choice of ‘Office Maximizer’ 
and the differing circumstances of office holders, as ambition theory had suggested, political 
recruitment is a process of social stratification, that is, a small number of people among the 
general population are being selected to enter the rank of the political elites. Under this 
process, those who aspire to become political leaders would have to first go through certain 
channels of recruitment, such as political parties or local government. Afterward, a set of 
gatekeepers from the existing political elite would determine who among the candidates in 
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these recruitment channels shall be initiated into the ranks of the political elite. Because the 
decisions of initiation are made by gatekeepers, they would have the power to shape the 
composition of successful applicants based on their own prejudices on the kind of social 
background, qualities and experiences that are deemed desirable. In other words, the 
gatekeepers’ power of selection allows existing bias for or against certain type of person 
becoming part of the political elite to perpetuate. 
 
Putnam’s idea of political recruitment as a process of selection from gatekeeper appears to 
be more applicable in capturing the political reality in European democracies than ambition 
theory. With the relatively weak party structure and prevalence of primary election as the 
method of choosing candidates for general elections, participation in the electoral process 
in the United States is practically self-nominating. Hence, American politicians can be 
conceptualized as political entrepreneurs whose only concern is to accumulate resources 
relevant for career advancement such as support networks and campaign contributions. In 
contrast, the relatively well structured and organized parties in European democracies have 
maintained their role in determining the nomination of candidates and access to the 
electoral process. By doing so, European political parties have retained their role as the 
gatekeeper in the political recruitment process. The existence of party as gatekeeper in 
European countries introduces aspiring politicians on this side of the Atlantic to a different 
set of variables that complicates the cost and benefits of their career decisions. If ambition 
theory is to be used under these contexts, it has to take into account the different reality, 
especially the existence of gatekeepers and their attitude and prejudices in selecting 
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candidates for election and appointment for executive positions (Norris and Lovenduski 
1995). 
 
In order to reconcile ambition theory and the presence of gatekeepers and so introduce the 
factor of bias for, and prejudice against, certain types of person in the pursuit of nomination, 
Norris and Lovenduski (1995) introduce an element of anticipation of social bias from the 
gatekeeper into the cost and benefit calculus of prospective candidates. They conceptualize 
the recruitment process of candidates as determined by supply and demand for certain 
types of personnel. Under this understanding of political recruitment, the gatekeepers 
represent the demand side while individuals aspiring for political offices represent the 
supply side. Gatekeepers would demand certain types or qualities of candidates that they 
want to field in elections while aspiring politicians control the supply of personnel by their 
decision of whether to throw their hat into the ring or not. The demand and supply side of 
recruitment, instead of operating independent of each other, would interact with the 
opposite side since decisions made by either side would affect the attitude and outcome on 
the other side. The anticipated bias and prejudice of the gatekeeper against certain types of 
individual could discourage people with such qualities from pursuing nomination in the first 
place and keep them from putting their name forward for consideration, hence reducing the 
supply of candidates with such qualities. On the other hand, besides anticipated prejudice 
for or against certain types of candidates, the circumstances that facilitate or hinder 
potential a political career or candidacy, such as financial resources amount of free time, 
also influence an individual’s decisions of whether to seek nomination for offices. Moreover, 
changes in supply of candidates with these ‘undesirable’ or ‘political career hindering’ 
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qualities could in turn further limit the choice of gatekeepers and reinforce their existing 
prejudice against certain types of candidate, hence intensifying existing bias.  
 
1.3 Professionalization of Politics 
Given the power to introduce selection bias by recruiter and gatekeepers during the 
candidate recruitment process, it is perhaps not surprising that political elites and politicians 
appear to have more resemblance with one another than with the general populace. 
Numerous research has been carried out on the social bias in the composition of political 
elites (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, Putnam 1976). Nevertheless, the social bias in 
recruitment and selection has always been dynamic. Some kinds of credentials fall out of 
favour, while societal changes and rise of new groups lead to new prejudices and 
preferences among gatekeepers. In recent years, there has been a general trend of 
professionalization that has been observed by political scientists across most developed 
democracies. 
 
Professionalization of politics as a trend has long been suggested and thoroughly explored 
among the literature of political science. In general, among the literature that explores the 
issue of the professionalization of politics, there are two different conceptions of 
professionalization. On one hand, the professionalization of politics could be understood in 
a post-election sense as the holding of political offices being increasingly seen as 
incompatible with having a non-political career simultaneously. Due to reasons such as the 
expansion of the functions of both the government and representative assemblies, the 
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responsibilities that fall on the shoulders of a political office holder have drastically 
increased. This means that the holding of political offices is becoming much more 
demanding on politicians, both in terms of the skills and knowledge required, as well as the 
time and effort needed to fulfil the responsibilities that come with offices. Increasingly, the 
holding of political offices is seen as a proper profession in its’ own right, instead of 
something that people pursue on the side of, or complimentary to, a fully-fledged career in 
the non-political sector. Instead of being merely a part of many aspects of one’s professional 
life, holding offices should be something that occupies the undivided attention of individuals. 
Since the political office, and the responsibilities and powers that come with it, become the 
entirety of one’s professional live (Rush 2001). 
 
Alternatively, the professionalization of politics could also mean the increased distinction 
between politics as a career track vis-a-vis other professions and the resulting 
compartmentalization of politics as a profession from the society as whole. Under this 
conception of professionalization, politics as a profession is understood in the pre-
parliamentary sense. Instead of being a viable choice of career change for people who have 
had a long and non-political career prior to entering politics, there is a decrease of mobility 
between politics as a profession and the wider professional world. In the pre-parliamentary 
phrase, the institutionalization of standards and values prevalent within the political realm, 
and its increasing role as criteria for recruitment and promotion, means that those who seek 
a successful career in politics would have to begin at a relatively young age and pass through 
several pre-defined channels of promotion in order to have a realistic chance of attaining 
certain political offices. Similarly, the increasing sense of politics as a distinct career track 
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also means that politicians are more likely to stay in offices for longer period of time, since 
the holding of political offices is no longer seen as merely a phrase in an otherwise non-
political career nor a stepping stone for success outside of politics. The extension of 
politicians’ tenure in office also allows for the development and cultivation of relevant skills 
and expertise among office holders, further enhancing the professional credential of those 
in office. 
 
Although conceptually distinct, the two conceptions of professionalization of politics could 
have some causal relation. Most notably, political developments that made political offices 
increasingly demanding on politicians could lead to professionalization in both senses. The 
increased workload that comes with political offices requires politicians’ undivided 
dedication in the duration of their term, while the increased sophistication of the 
responsibilities means that politically relevant skills and knowledge shall be increasingly 
important criteria for candidate recruitment and voter choice of representatives. Hence, the 
two conceptions of the professionalization of politics could be spuriously related. 
 
1.3.1 Changing Political Careers in the UK 
The changes of political careers in the UK, in particular the professionalization of it, in both 
conceptions of the word, have long been observed among scholars (Cairney 2007, Cowley 
2012, King 1981, Mellors 1978, Rush 2001, Rush 2005). Rush (2001)  adopted a historical 
approach in understanding the causes behind professionalization of MPs. Focusing on the 
changing roles of British MPs during the previous century, he argued that the change of 
Chapter One 
 
39 
 
roles and subsequent professionalization of MPs is largely a response to two fundamental 
developments in British politics: the institutionalization of parliamentary government and 
the growth of government functions. As the modern British government is dependent on 
the confidence and supply from the House of Commons, the need to command a majority 
among MPs translates into the construction of centralized and disciplined political parties to 
support or oppose the sitting government, depending on the result of elections. This 
imposes, among other responsibilities, a partisan role upon MPs, which requires MPs to 
‘support the party under whose label he or she was elected’. After the notion of 
parliamentary government was well established in the late 19th century, ideological shift 
and socio-economic changes during the 20th century have greatly expanded the 
functionality of government. As government is taking over responsibilities and tasks that 
were either non-existent or fulfilled by non-governmental organizations, the burden of work 
that falls on the shoulder of government ministers and the parliament as a whole have 
drastically increased. The most striking evidence of this is the expansion of ministerial rank 
to handle these tasks, the increasing amount of legislation being passed by the parliament 
and the institutional changes, such as increasing number of parliamentary staff and the 
expansion of the committee system to facilitate the passing of legislations and other 
government businesses. Both the need to support their respective party and the ever 
increasing workload mean that being an MP is increasingly seen as a full-time job instead of 
a part-time responsibility. As increasing hours are needed for MPs to handle both 
parliamentary and constituency matters, it is no longer possible for MPs to have a parallel 
professional career. The increasingly full-time nature of being an MP is also exemplified by 
the increase in salary and allowances paid to MPs. This is to substitute the loss of income 
from lack of a parallel career outside of parliament. MPs salaries have risen from £400 a 
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year in 1912 to almost £50000 a year in 2000 (Rush 2001, 123). This has also led to changing 
careers patterns of MPs within parliament, as contemporary MPs tend to serve longer than 
their historical counterparts (Mellors 1978, Rush 2001, Rush 2005). 
 
Concurrent to the post-election professionalization of MPs, the pre-parliamentary 
professionalization of politics has also transformed the socio-economic composition of the 
House of Commons. Since the early 19th century, both the institution of recruiting 
candidates for MP as well as the criteria used in the selection of candidates has undergone 
drastic changes which result in changing patterns of socio-economic and pre-parliamentary 
professional backgrounds of MPs. In the early 19th century, the House of Commons was 
dominated by landed interest. Societal changes caused by the industrial revolution gradually 
increased the representation of industrial, commercial and professional interest at the 
expense of the landed elite. The demise of landed interest in parliament is particularly 
salient among Liberal MPs (Rush 2001). With the rise of the Labour party, which was 
committed to both representing the rapidly expanding and newly enfranchised working-
class, as well as getting workingmen elected to parliament, there was a sudden increase in 
the number of MPs with working-class and manual labour backgrounds in the House of 
Commons. During the interwar period, between 1922 and 1935, a majority of Labour MPs 
were of working-class background (Rush 2001, 104). Yet the composition of parliamentary 
Labour party (PLP) has gradually changed since the end of the war. Industrial workers were 
gradually displaced by professionals such as lawyers, lecturers and school teachers. In 1945, 
working class MPs still made up a quarter of the PLP, by the mid-70s, this had halved, with 
just 12% of Labour MPs being from a working class background (Mellors 1978). 
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The demise of working class representation is an exemplar of the larger trend of pre-
parliamentary professionalization of politics, not just within the PLP, but the entire House of 
Common and the British political elite as a whole. King (1981) noticed the continual increase 
in the proportion of MPs who have past occupations that facilitate subsequent political 
careers, such as lawyer, journalists and teachers. These ‘politics-facilitating’ occupations 
typically have flexible schedules and long holidays which made involvement in politics 
compatible with their professional life. Moreover, typical ’politics-facilitating’ occupations 
usually involve the use of, and opportunity to practice, politically-relevant skills such as 
writing and public speaking. Not only are these ‘professional’ politicians, who have 
previously worked in ‘politics-facilitating’ occupations, occupying more seats in parliament, 
MPs with ‘professional’ background are also more likely than their ‘non-professional’ 
colleagues to receive frontbench and ministerial appointment (Allen 2013, 2014).  
 
1.3.2 What is ‘Political Professional’? 
In order to refine King’s notion of ‘politics-facilitating’ occupations, Cairney (2007) argued 
that there are two possible explanations for occupations to be beneficial to pursuing a 
political career. First of all is the ‘brokerage’ explanation – certain occupations, such as legal 
professions and education, provide opportunity for individuals to develop relevant skills, 
provide flexibility in working hours and possible political contact that facilitates pursuing a 
political career. On the other hand, there are occupations that are valuable for the politically 
ambitious due to their instrumental value, by providing a clear link to politics and could be 
seen as a stepping stone toward electoral offices. ‘Instrumental’ occupations include 
journalist, public relations, trade union and NGOs officials, full-time local councilors, party 
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workers, MPs and ministerial assistant and think tank researchers. He further argued that 
the benefit which these ‘politics-facilitating’ occupations provide is not uniform across the 
two subtypes, as the post-war professionalization of British politics has been mostly the 
expansion of MPs with background in ‘instrumental’ occupations at the expense of MPs with 
other occupations, including those with ‘brokerage’ occupational experiences. 
 
Despite the interest from scholars on the professionalization of politics, both in Britain and 
other developed democracies, the concept of ‘professional politician’ or ‘political class’ 
remains ill-defined, used casually to capture a variety of problems associated with 
representativeness of our democracies and the apparent distance between the public and 
their representatives (Allen and Cairney 2015). The cohort of MPs that can be vaguely 
described as ‘professional’ is in reality a very diverse group of individuals in terms of their 
pre-parliamentary experience. Studies conducted by Cairney (2007), King (1981), Norris and 
Lovenduski (1995) and Riddell (1993) have each identified no less than half a dozen 
individual occupational categories, some of them overlapping across studies, that were 
described as ‘political professional’ or ‘politics-facilitating’. Each of these individual 
occupational categories might impact the future political career of their occupant in 
different ways. Numerous researches have shown diverging patterns of behaviour and 
political fortune among politicians that can be broadly described as ‘politics professionals’. 
Allen (2013) has shown that among MPs with pre-parliamentary political experience, the 
political fortune between MPs whose political experience lies exclusively at local 
government and those who have worked in ‘instrumental’ occupations is drastically 
different as the latter is much more likely to receive frontbench or ministerial positions 
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earlier and are likely to attain higher offices at pinnacle of their parliamentary careers. 
Because different occupations under the broad umbrella of ‘politics professional’ would 
bestow upon future politicians with diverging skillsets and opportunity to cultivate political 
relationship and networking, politicians who have followed different career paths under the 
broad definition of ‘politics professional’ could exhibit different behaviours and promotional 
patterns after their election to parliament. The diverse nature of the broadly defined 
‘politics professional’ ought to be appreciated in any study of the impact and implication of 
the professionalization of politics. 
 
Complicating the definition of ‘political professional’ further is the fact that its boundary is 
as blurred as it is internally diverse. While some occupations, such as full time local 
councillor, trade union officials and party workers are more unambiguously political, there 
are a lot of ‘political professional’ positions that falls into the grey zone between the 
political and non-political realm. Responsibilities in jobs such as researchers in non-partisan 
think tanks or officials in non-governmental organizations, while having a political overtone, 
could hardly be described as ‘political’ in the strictest sense of the word. Moreover, the 
alleged benefits of ‘politics professional’ occupations - the training in politically relevant 
skills and the opportunity to nurture political network, are not exclusively found in 
occupations that have been deemed ‘politics professional’. The need for effective 
communication is found in a wide range of careers, both in the political realm and private 
sector. It is also common for people working in the private sector to have to contact and 
develop relationships with political figures when dealing with government or policy lobbying. 
In other words, the alleged benefit of ‘politics-facilitating’ occupations are rarely found 
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exclusively in those professions and it remains possible that professions beyond those 
considered ‘politics-facilitating’ may provide individuals with similar benefit with respect to 
their future political pursuits. 
 
Despite the difficulty in defining and identifying ‘politics professionals’, the trend of 
professionalization and changes in the occupational background of MPs is indisputable, the 
question remaining is its implication on the functioning of British politics and parliament. 
Primarily the relation between experience and the performance of MPs. The opportunities 
to acquire and develop political relevant skills and knowledge have been regarded as an 
important aspect of ‘politics-facilitating’ occupations (Cairney 2007, King 1981). If the 
professionalization of politics and the changing occupational patterns of MPs are indeed the 
response to the changing role of MPs and the increasing workload in parliament and 
government, then we should be able to observe ‘professional’ MPs, however defined, 
outperforming the ‘non-professional’. 
 
1.4 Pre-parliamentary careers and quality of representatives 
Any discussion on the quality and competence of MPs would have to begin with defining 
clearly the functions and responsibilities of MPs. However, political scientists have been 
struggling to come up with a clear and comprehensive job description of MPs, since it is 
notoriously difficult to establish what exactly an MP does. This is because of the 
multifaceted nature of the responsibilities of an MP, the ever-changing nature of MPs and 
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its place in parliamentary government and the relative degree of freedom afforded to MPs 
that enable them to from a combination of these different and sometimes conflicting roles. 
 
Earlier research on the roles of legislators has focused on the attitudinal origin of the 
patterns of legislator behaviours. Wahlke et al (1962) in their comparative study of several 
state legislatures in US identified five purposive roles of legislators which are based on 
legislator’s self-characterization of their job as legislators. These purposive roles include 
Tribunes, who seek to find out and represent the interests and concerns of the people; the 
Inventors, who focus on finding policies to solve problems; the Brokers, who focus on 
balancing conflicting interests and negotiating a resolution acceptable to different 
stakeholders; the Ritualists, who focus on the non-law-making functions of legislators, such 
as checking on the executive and investigative power of the assembly, and lastly, the 
Opportunists, who perform a mixture of the aforementioned purposes. Barber (1965), who 
was more interested in the psychological reason behind diverging patterns of legislators 
behaviour, has conceptualized the their behavioural patterns into four types of legislators; 
the Spectator and Reluctant, who are largely inactive in the assembly, but for different 
reasons; the Advertisers, who focus on promoting themselves because of their ambition for 
a successful political career beyond the state legislature, and the Lawmakers who are much 
more active in the actual making of laws and policies.  
 
 
 
Chapter One 
 
46 
 
1.4.1 Roles of British MPs 
In the British context, when reviewing the pay and allowances of MPs, the Review Body of 
Senior Salaries has identified no less than seven different principle accountabilities that can 
be roughly divided into three scopes. Within the Parliament, both in the main chamber and 
committee rooms, MPs are expected to ‘monitor, stimulate and challenge the Executive’ to 
influence and change the conduct of government and to ‘initiate, seek to amend and review 
legislation’. On behalf of their constituency, MPs ought to “establish and maintain a range of 
contacts throughout the constituency, and proper knowledge of its characteristic, so as to 
identify and understand issues affecting it” and advance its interests where possible while 
“Provide appropriate assistance to individual constituent” through their knowledge and 
contact of local and national government to resolve their problem. And, toward their party, 
not only are MPs supposed to “help furnish and maintain Government and Opposition” in 
the parliament, they are also expected to “contribute to the formulation of party policy” 
and “promote public understanding of party policies” (Review Body of Senior Salary 1996). 
 
Although the extensiveness and complexity of the responsibilities faced by MPs are indeed 
enormous, they are also afforded a relatively high degree of freedom and discretion to 
prioritize between these various tasks. Former Leader of the House of Commons John Biffen 
MP once said, “There is no such thing as an average Member of Parliament. That is an 
abstract concept. We have … 650 people who adopt completely different approaches to 
work.” (Radice et al, 1990) There are numerous sources of these different patterns of 
dedication to these various responsibilities. On one hand it is depended upon MPs personal 
preferences to focus their time and energy on tasks which they deemed would better 
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advance their own ambition or political goals. There are also circumstantial factors, such as 
the size, majority and distance of one’s constituency from London, whether one’s party is in 
government or opposition, could force MPs to focus on certain aspect of their 
responsibilities at the expense of others. Lastly, and  that which is most closely related to 
the central argument of this research and shall be further elaborated in the latter part of 
this chapter, is the amount of resource, which includes the level of skills and knowledge of 
MPs, at their disposal. 
 
Given the variety of patterns of how MPs balance and dedicate their attention and energy 
to their various tasks and responsibilities, scholarly effort has been made to conceptualize 
these patterns of MPs’ behaviour in a framework of various roles of MPs. Donald Searing 
(1994) framed the role of backbenchers into four distinct roles: Policy Advocates, who check 
on the executive; Ministerial Aspirants, who provide a pool of talent for executive 
appointment; Constituency Member, who redress constituents’ grievances and provide 
constituency services; and Parliamentary Man, who are responsible for maintaining the 
institutional structure and tradition of parliament. On top of these backbencher roles are 
the leadership roles, which Searing called ‘positional roles’ which are more closely related to 
the duty and responsibility that comes with executive offices and party leadership, in 
contrast with the preferential origin of the backbencher roles. The typology of MPs’ roles 
proposed by Searing is largely underpinned by the various institutional tasks that each role 
seeks to fulfil. 
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Rush (2001) argued that MPs rarely perform just one of the various roles, and that by fitting 
all MPs into a number of ideal types, the approach of Searing had failed to take into account 
the multiplicity of roles. Instead of conforming to one of the ideal types, most MPs in fact 
perform a combination of these various roles. The divergence of MPs’ behaviour, both 
across individual and through time, would be better conceptualized as a varying emphasis of 
these different roles. Instead of focusing on the tasks MPs perform, Rush’s categorization of 
MP roles emphasized the multiple, sometimes conflicting, responsibility of MPs. 
Traditionally, the parliament is responsible for holding the government to account, which 
requires MPs to scrutinize the action and behaviour of the executive. Yet, because of the 
principle of parliamentary government and the fact that an overwhelming majority of MPs 
are elected mostly on the basis of their party affiliation, MPs are simultaneously expected to 
provide the support for their party’s manifesto and policies within the parliament. Moreover, 
since British MPs are elected by single member constituency, they are expected to be 
responsive to the grievances of their constituent, be the representative of local interest in 
Westminster and provide constituency services. The multiple responsibilities of MPs gave 
rises to the three Roles of MPs as proposed by Rush - Scrutiny, Partisan and Constituency 
Role. These three roles are by no mean mutually exclusive, and are occasionally 
complimentary to each other.  
 
1.4.2 Skills and knowledge of MPs 
The extensive list of tasks and responsibilities and the variety of roles that they could take 
on, both within and away from the parliament, means that the skill set required of MPs are 
equally difficult to determine. Each of the tasks and responsibilities of the loosely defined 
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job description of MPs require very different skills and knowledge for MPs to perform well. 
Coghill et al (2012) outlined several important skills required of parliamentarians in terms of 
the various roles or functions of parliament. For one to be an effective representative of 
their constituency, not only would one need to be familiar with the formal and informal 
rules of parliamentary proceeding, but also the ability to represent the community through 
both traditional mass media as well as, due to recent technology development, social media. 
The role of representing the community also involves listening skills – the ability to pay 
attention and understand the concerns of constituents. On the other hand, to fulfil the 
scrutiny role of parliament requires the parliamentarian to have a certain level of research 
skills, allowing them to obtain relevant information about the actions and performance of 
the executive. Some knowledge of the system of law, ideally formal training on the 
profession, is also desirable when parliamentarians take up the role of legislators. 
 
King and Allen (2010), in their analysis of appointment and dismissal of British cabinet 
ministers, outlined several criterions Prime Ministers considered when they decided on the 
appointment of cabinet members. Although these criterions are most relevant in the 
context of executive appointment, they nevertheless have some relevance in the discussion 
of the skills and knowledge required of MPs. First and foremost, under the system of 
parliamentary government, virtually all the members of the executive are drawn from the 
rank of parliamentarian. With the diminishing presence of members of the House of Lords in 
government, the ranks of MPs have become the most important pool of talent from which 
ministers are drawn. Given the importance of prospective executive appointment on MPs’ 
role formation (Searing, 1994) and the inevitable connection between MPs competence as 
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ministers and their prospect for ministerial appointment, skills and knowledge relevant to 
being a member of government would inevitably affect MPs’ behaviour in parliament. 
Secondly, there is a certain overlap between the competences required for ministers and 
MPs. This is particularly the case for opposition MPs since the skills and knowledge required 
to be an effective minister would also enable MPs to be a vigorous critic and informed 
scrutinizer of the conduct of government ministers when they sit on the opposition benches.  
 
The most important of all criteria for ministerial appointment is governmental competence, 
that is if one has the capacity to handle a ministerial portfolio and run a government 
department. This involves the ability to master a brief, deal with Whitehall officials and to 
contribute to departmental and cabinet discussion. A potential minister would also require 
certain level of presentation skills, this involve the ability to effectively represent the 
government in both the parliament and in the media. Ministers are required to explain 
government policies and decisions to MPs and the general public, as well as defending them 
against scrutiny from the opposition and journalists. Lastly, the political skills of a potential 
minister, that is his or her ability to forge alliances and rally support for government policy 
within parliament and construct and cultivate one’s standing among the general public and 
bring this political constituency in support of the government are a factor in the 
appointment of a minister (King and Allen, 2010). 
 
One of the less studied aspect of the skills required of MPs are those involving campaigning, 
especially at the constituency level. This may include knowledge of local specific issues, 
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fostering networking with local groups and organizations, establishing a presence and 
rapport in the constituency, as well as building a personal connection with voters. While 
some of these are similar with the aforementioned competences required in parliament and 
in government, in particular communication skills, it is likely that the skills involved to be an 
effective communicator in parliamentary debate and mass media events are very different 
from the skills needed when MPs communicate with individual voters. The oratory skills 
required for making legislative speeches in parliament might not endear a candidate with 
voters; the ability to canvass effectively during election might not be helpful when MP’s 
scrutinize government conduct or legislative bills in committee. This indicates a possible 
mismatch between the skills MPs requires to be an effective representative and campaigner 
at the national and local level. 
 
1.4.3 How MPs acquire skills and knowledge 
The importance of quality and effectiveness of MPs and how their skills and knowledge are 
involved in enhancing their performance naturally leads to the question of how MPs acquire 
the skills and knowledge required to effectively perform their tasks. Schiller (1995) has 
found that tenure of US senators affects their effectiveness in legislative activities as the 
number of bills they sponsored increased with the number of terms they had served. The 
effect of on-the-job training also makes a difference in the broader sense of legislative 
effectiveness beyond law making; Miquel and Snyder (2006) used expert ranking of 
legislator’s overall effectiveness and found that tenure of state legislators had a positive 
effect on  said ranking.  In the case of the House of Commons, for most of its history, this 
informal training has been the most important, if not the only, way for the majority of 
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British MPs to become familiar with the life of a parliamentarian. Through observing the 
behaviour, and imitation of their fellow more experienced members, newly elected MPs 
gradually learn the rules and procedures of the legislature, adopt to its norms and their role 
as a member of the assembly and so begin to converge with the larger body of the legislator 
in terms of their behaviour both in and out of Westminster (Rush and Giddings, 2011). 
 
Although informal training through socialization remains one of the major ways for British 
MPs to learn the ropes of being a parliamentarian, there has been increasing effort in recent 
years, on the part of the Parliament, political parties and other groups, to provide formal 
and more structured orientation and training regimes for new MPs. Various research has 
touched upon the issue and argued for formal training for parliamentarians to enhance their 
skills and efficiency in discharging their functions as legislators and representatives (Coghill 
et al 2012, Donohue and Holland 2012, Fox and Korris 2012, Simpanba 2012). The trend of 
increasing technical support for new MPs is largely a response to the apparent 
ineffectiveness of the existing informal approach of training. MPs have reported that the 
previous informal approach of orientation for new MPs was less than satisfactory, and their 
attendance is rather low, which hinders their performance in parliament, especially in their 
early days in Westminster (Fox and Korris 2012, Steinack 2012). In general, most MPs have a 
positive response to the principle of increasing the emphasis on formal orientation and 
training provided to new members, which is particularly helpful in terms of informing MPs 
of the procedures and practices of the house, as well as the logistics involved in establishing 
and staffing their operation both in Westminster and their constituency.  
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Alternatively, besides acquiring the necessary skills and knowledge after their election, MPs 
might also acquire them during their pre-parliamentary careers. It is rare for individuals to 
receive party nomination and win a seat in parliament immediately after completion of their 
education (with the notable exception of Mhairi Black, who, aged 20 when elected, had not 
even graduated from university before entering parliament after winning her seat in the 
2015 general election). The foremost hypothesis of this thesis is that during the long pre-
parliamentary careers of MPs, the experiences MPs gained could have an impact on their 
behaviour and the decisions they make once elected to Westminster. 
 
1.4.4 Experience and performance 
Studies in management, organizations and employment have long established that the 
experiences one gains throughout their career  have an impact on the employability, 
performance and behaviour in their subsequent employment. Experience is here defined in 
the widest sense of the word as possible, which includes the more tangible and measurable 
elements, such as skills and knowledge acquired during work, as well as the relationships 
and networks with other people or organizations one develops in various positions. 
 
It is no surprise that experience enhances employees’ performance, as it allows workers to 
acquire skill, techniques, method and familiarity with their duties thus allowing them to 
work more efficiently. (Schmidt et al, 1986 citation) However, as the contemporary 
employment market moved from the traditional model, where employees stayed in a single 
firm for a prolonged period and career advancement meant promotion within the company, 
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toward one where employees follow diverse careers where they change not only the firm 
they work for, but the sector or industry they work in as well, there has been an increasing 
body of research dedicated to how career change affects employees behaviour, in particular, 
how the previous experience of employees in other firms affects their behaviour and 
performance after career change. In other words, if, and to what extent, are experiences 
between different firms or different industries interchangeable or adaptable after a change 
in career trajectory. One of the major ways that employees adapt after career change is that 
they seek to draw on pervious experience that is similar or relevant to their new role to help 
them adjust to the environment and responsibilities of their new position (Beyer and 
Hannah 2002, Dokko et al 2009). 
 
DeFillipe and Arthur (1994) suggested that prior experience facilitates employees’ 
performance by informing them on three aspects: the know why, know how and know 
whom. The first aspect of know why is concerned with the ‘sense of purpose, motivation 
and identification’ which developed in their earlier career and which affects their sense of 
achievement and forms the psychological determinant of their behaviour in the latter career. 
The know how encompasses ‘relevant skills and job related-knowledge’ that facilitates 
adaptation and enhances performance when an employee moves to a new position. The 
know whom aspect concerns the ‘career relevant networks’ and ‘how people contribute to 
inter-firm communication’, which means the interpersonal relationships the employee built 
through their experiences, as well as the ability to communicate and form these 
relationships with others once they move into a new position.  
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However, previous experience may have both positive and negative impact on employees’ 
performance. Dokko et al (2009) have conceptually disentangled prior experiences into two 
components - task-relevant knowledge and habits and routines from prior experiences. 
Empirical results have shown that the former do indeed have a positive impact on workers’ 
performance. However, the positive result became much more questionable after 
controlling for the effect of prior habits and routine, which hinders the worker’s adaptation 
to their new position. All in all, it could be concluded that prior experiences are indeed 
relevant to workers’ performances; people do draw from their prior experience when they 
find themselves in new positions and the impact of prior experience on performance 
depends on the relevance and interchangeability of that experience between positions. 
 
Moreover, the effects of prior experience on current performance, be they positive or 
negative, appear to have a relationship with the amount of the experience, or the length of 
time spent in the previous positions. As experiences, in particular skills and knowledge, are 
accumulated through time, the longer the time one spent in a certain position, the more 
skills and knowledge relevant to the said position one would have acquired, and this in turn 
would increase the impact of this prior experience on present performance (Dokko et al 
2009, Schmidt et al 1986). Moreover the relationship between length of employment and 
acquisition of knowledge is not necessary linear. As the amount of time one person spends 
in a position increases, the amount of skills and knowledge acquired will accumulate to the 
point of saturation, where there is nothing further to be learnt from performing the same 
task (Schmidt et al 1986). Hence, not only is the presence of experience on one’s resume a 
determinant on  performance, but so is the amount of time spent in each position.  
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1.4.5 Political experience and legislative performance 
If we are to accept that, just like any jobs or position found in other sectors, experience also 
plays a role in determining the performance and effectiveness of legislators, then it should 
be no surprise that the amount of pre-parliamentary experience would be one determinant 
of legislators’ behaviour once elected. As MPs are elected and get settled into the unfamiliar 
environment and are faced with new responsibilities, they will most certainly draw on their 
pre-parliamentary experiences to inform their decisions in office. The impact of personal 
experiences on legislators’ behaviour has been well documented (Burden 2007, Geys and 
Mause 2014, Goodwin 2015, Ono 2014). As the literature in career and organizational study 
suggested, the relation between legislator’s pre-parliamentary careers and their behaviour 
in office is determined by both the compatibility between their prior experience and the 
responsibility of being a legislator, as well as the amount of experience the legislator have 
acquired before entering the assembly. However, this poses another methodological 
challenge as there is no position out of parliament that is perfectly analogous with that of 
being an MP. 
 
The most straightforward starting place in searching for pre-parliamentary experience that 
may contribute to MPs work in parliament would be in elected positions in sub-national 
assemblies or government. Junior positions on the political ladder have long been seen as 
the breeding ground that prepares an individual for higher offices. Prewitt (1970) has 
suggested that junior political positions could be seen as an apprenticeship for higher offices. 
Individuals who aspire to one day occupy higher political offices can familiarize themselves 
with the norms and practices of politics, which prepares them for the responsibility once 
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they are promoted to more important positions. It also provides them the opportunity to 
exhibit their abilities to legitimize their candidacy for higher offices. Empirical evidence has 
supported the notion that political experience at lower level has an impact on legislator’s 
effectiveness and behaviour. Little and Moore’s (1996) study on the effect of state 
legislative experience on congressional members’ behaviour found that such former 
members of state legislatures are not particularly more active in terms of introducing bills 
and making speeches, and only marginally more successful in terms of promoting their 
legislative agenda. A similar study conducted by Francis (2014) also showed similar results; 
that while members of congress with state legislative experience do not introduce or 
cosponsor more legislation than their colleagues. However, their legislative contributions 
are likely to be more substantive, in comparison to their colleagues without such experience, 
who are more likely to introduce symbolic legislations. Little and Moore (1996) suggested 
that this might be due to their experiences in state legislature, which have provided training 
in areas such as networking and coalition building, which are non-quantifiable. Outside of 
the US, Ono (2014) found that when members of the Japanese Diet have local political ties, 
which encompasses both legislative and executive experience, this increases the number of 
locally related private member bills that they introduce. Although he contributed his 
findings to members with local ties trying to build on and maintain their reputation as 
champions of regional interest by providing pork to their constituents, it nevertheless shows 
that political experience at lower level of government does facilitate certain types of 
behaviour in higher office.  
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Moreover, not all experience of lower levels of government provides similar experiences 
and training to those serve in them. Berkman (1993) made the distinction between the 
different levels of professionalization of state legislature, determined by salary paid to state 
legislator, length of session, use of committee and influence over budget. He found that 
Members of Congress with experience in professional state legislatures are more likely to 
serve in policy or other prestigious committees and maintain their committee membership 
throughout their tenure. He suggested that this is because experience in professional state 
legislature, being more similar to the Congress than their less-professionalized counterparts, 
provides a member of congress with ‘Institutional Mastery’, which involves familiarity with 
the procedure and norms of the legislature and the skills to be a successful legislator, and 
‘Policy Mastery’, which is the development of specialized knowledge and intense interest in 
a certain policy area. The similarity between their experience in state legislature and their 
responsibilities in Congress allows them to extrapolate these two ‘masterys’ and apply them 
in their work as a member of Congress. This provides further support to the idea that 
similarity between pre-parliamentary experiences and the work of an MP would affect the 
degree to which the former affects the effectiveness of the latter. 
 
1.4.6 Non-political experience and legislative performance 
While an increasing number of MPs have entered the parliament with a substantial amount 
of political experience (Cairney 2007, King 1981), there remains a significant portion of MPs 
who have no formal political involvement prior to their election. Also, even among those 
enter the parliament as seasoned politico, a prolonged career outside of the political realm 
is not uncommon. Some MPs who are deemed professional politicians have nevertheless 
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have enjoyed successful non-political careers either before their involvement in politics or 
maintain a professional day-job while participating in politics in a part-time capacity. If the 
relationship between pre-parliamentary experience and legislative behaviour lies in the 
compatibility and relevance between the two, then it is conceivable that careers and jobs 
out of the proper political realm could provide aspiring politicians with skills that are 
relevant to becoming an MP, such as organization and communication skills, which in turn 
determine their effectiveness and behaviour once elected. Indeed, studies of post-
parliamentary careers of MPs has found that experience as MP has a direct effect on the 
post-parliamentary salary of these individual even when they serve in private companies 
(Mattozzi and Merlo 2008). This indicates a certain level of overlapping between the skill set 
or experiences, such as industry or sector specific knowledge or personal relationships and 
networking, which is required both in the private sector and parliament.  
 
Empirical evidence has suggested that experiences in occupations that are commonly 
considered non-political could have a positive impact on the effectiveness or performance 
of holders of political offices, particularly in the responsibility or capacity that is most similar 
or relevant to their non-political prior careers. Experience as lawyer has been most 
prominently featured in existing literature. The legal profession has long been seen as fertile 
ground for political recruitment and a major route to a successful political career. 
Historically a substantial portion of seats in the House of Commons were occupied by MPs 
who have once been lawyers (Kings 1981, Norris and Lovenduski 1995, Rush 2001). Similar 
patterns have also been observed in other legislature, most notably the US congress. One of 
the most intuitive advantages of a background in the legal profession and its training 
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provided to legislators is their substantial understanding of the language and practice of the 
law. Since one of the major responsibilities legislators is making and amending laws, 
experience in legal profession ought to prepare them well in this aspect of life in the 
legislature. Indeed, it has been found that members of the Japanese Diet with experience in 
the legal profession have been more active in proposing private member bills and 
participation in committee meetings. Moreover, the private member bills that they 
submitted and committees that they in mostly concern public interest, as opposed to those 
that are pork related (Ono 2014). Moreover, some lawyers often argue their case in court 
before the judge and jury, such experience ought to provide them with the oratory skills and 
confidence for making public or parliamentary speeches should they pursue a career in 
politics. Similarly, professions which could foster skills in relation to public speaking and 
communication, such as education and journalism, have been seen as another suitable 
starting point of successful political career (Cairney 2007). Given the increase of the 
importance of media in contemporary politics, the benefit of having background in 
journalism or public relation is also notable. Studies have shown that politicians with 
professional communication staff have enjoyed increased press coverage and exposure (Van 
Aelst et al 2010). It is therefore plausible that MPs who themselves have extensive 
professional experience in media or public relations might enjoy a similar advantage in 
terms of attention from media. Even professions that are seemingly apolitical, such as 
military officers, have been shown to have a positive effect on politicians’ performance in 
crisis management and public persuasion (Simon and Uscinski 2012). 
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1.4.7 Pre-parliamentary experience and patterns in legislative behaviour 
Nevertheless, as we have discussed earlier, when dealing with concepts such as ‘quality’ and 
‘performance’ among representatives, given the multifaceted nature of their responsibilities, 
it is perhaps more suitable to conceptualize them in a multidimensional fashion; that there 
were no ‘better’ MPs per se, but instead MPs who are more effective in certain aspects of 
their responsibilities, which manifests as patterns of observable behaviours. 
 
The underlying roots of diverging patterns of legislative behaviours and the representational 
role have been an important aspect of legislative study. One of the major explanations is 
that these patterns of legislative behaviours are caused by different psychological profiles or 
personality traits among individual legislators. Barber (1965) suggested that legislators’ 
behaviours, just like any other people, are largely driven by the need for self-approval. 
Hence their sense of self and the standards by which they judge themselves are the key to 
understanding the way in which they adopt to behave in the legislature. He argued that the 
four types of legislators or what he called ‘patterns of adoption’ are the result of differences 
in legislators’ sense of self. Those who have an impoverished ego and are full of self-doubt 
will become the Spectators in the legislative process. The Advertisers are those who are full 
of ambition for higher offices because they judge themselves by status and power. The 
Reluctants are more community minded and largely driven by a sense of duty and service 
toward one’s community. The Lawmakers largely judge themselves by their practical 
achievements and derive most enjoyment from problem solving.  
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Payne (1980), in his study of patterns of behaviours among US Congressmen, noted the 
difference between ‘Show Horses’ and ‘Work Horses’ within the House of Representatives. 
Given the finding shows that electoral incentives clearly favour the publicity hungry ‘Show 
Horses’, the mere presence of ‘Work Horses’ is a puzzle that needed to be solved. His 
hypothesis to reconcile this is the difference in  incentive structures, rooted in their goal 
orientation and values: ‘Show Horses’ enjoy publicity and get little satisfaction from the 
detailed examination and participation involved in the process of policy and law making, 
while the reverse is true for the ‘Work Horses’. Similarly, Dietrich et al (2012) looked at how 
personality effects the satisfaction legislators get from various kind of legislative tasks. By 
using the five-factor model to measure the personality trait of legislators from three US 
state legislature, they noticed that a legislator’s personality is a determinant on how much 
they enjoy a particular legislative activity: Extrovert and emotionally stable legislators are 
more likely to harbour progressive ambition while legislators who are open to new 
experiences derive more enjoyment from participating in committee hearings and work on 
legislation. They concluded that personality of legislators is indicative of their legislative 
behaviour. 
 
Besides psychological factors, pre-parliamentary experiences, in particular political 
experience, has been found to have a significant impact on the formation of behavioural 
patterns among legislators. There are several explanations for the relationship between 
prior experiences and patterns of legislative behaviours. Firstly, pre-parliamentary 
experience could cause an attitudinal shift on legislators’ conception of their own role 
within the assembly. Wahlke et al (1962) suggested that the more people are involved in 
Chapter One 
 
63 
 
governing, the higher their appreciation of the complexity involved in the affairs of 
government and policies, hence, the longer one served in different levels of government, 
the more likely that they see their representational role in the legislature as a trustee who 
must use their own judgement in pursuing the common good, rather than a delegate who 
simply relays the opinion of their constituents. Hence, legislators with experience of 
government, in particular legislative experience in local or lower level of government, are 
more likely to play a trustee instead of delegate role in the legislature. Bell and Price (1969) 
have, based on findings by Wahlke et al, found that the increased identification with the 
trustee role of legislator is not confined to prior-legislative experience, but shared with 
other forms of political activities such as activities in in political campaign or being members 
of political organizations.  
 
Secondly, the different skills and knowledge legislators acquire in their pre-parliamentary 
careers would also impact on their choice of participation in various legislative activities and 
patterns of behaviours. The variety of legislative activities legislators can participate in gives 
them a choice in the tools and channels used to pursue their own personal or political ends. 
However, they are also faced with some constraints on their choice of activities to engage 
with, in particular the time and effort which they can invest. Hence legislators are faced with 
the strategic choice of how much time and effort do they invest in using each of the various 
activities open to them in order to achieve the most benefit (Judge 1981, Strøm 1997). One 
key variable in the cost-benefit calculation of what activity to engage in is the skill set and 
knowledge of the legislator from their pre-parliamentary experience. If a legislator has more 
experience similar to certain legislative activity, and is hence more skilful at that aspect of 
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being a legislator, they will need less investment of time and effort to use that as a tool to 
pursue their own goals. For example, a seasoned journalist-turned-legislator may find that 
their understanding of editorial decision making and their network among other journalists 
from their earlier career might enable them to use the mass media to communicate their 
message to the public without significant investment in the skills and relationships 
necessary. Hence, conveying their view through mass media might be a more cost effective, 
and thus more attractive, channel for them to pursue their goals than other alternatives 
such as organizing their constituents or asking questions in parliament or committee room. 
In other words, differences in pre-parliamentary experience would change the cost- benefit 
analysis of various legislative activities in the eyes of individual legislators. Given the obvious 
constrain of limited time and effort they can invest into these activities, they would choose 
to focus their attention on the activities from which they could reap the most benefit with 
the least investment, which would then result in diverging pattern of legislative behaviour 
among legislators in accordance to their pre-parliamentary experience.  
 
In conclusion, existing research has given us enough evidence to believe that legislators’ 
pre-parliamentary careers, whether they are political or non-political, ought to have an 
impact on the formation of legislative roles as well as their choice of actions in parliament. 
Moreover, given the diverging patterns of MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers and the variety of 
legislative activities that they could engage in, we should expect that different sorts of pre-
parliamentary career would contribute to different kinds of legislative behaviour. 
Furthermore, based on our knowledge of organizational studies and occupational 
psychology, the relationship between pre-parliamentary career and patterns of legislative 
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behaviour would be determined by both the amount of experience an MP has in certain 
kinds of occupation as well as the similarity and applicability between the skills and 
knowledge acquired during their pre-parliamentary career and those needed to perform 
certain legislative activities. The more experience an MP has acquired in their pre-
parliamentary career and the more relevant it is to certain legislative responsibilities, the 
more likely that the MP will devote more of their time and energy on that responsibility. 
These finding from previous work on this topic shall be used to construct the hypothesis in 
the following section. 
 
1.5 Building on existing literature 
Given the state of the current literature, as I have reviewed above, I would argue that there 
is a gap in the literature due to the mismatch and lack of dialogue between research on 
political recruitment, professionalization and pre-parliamentary careers on one hand and 
literature on legislative behaviour on the other. I believe this can be attributed to two 
features of the current literature; the over-emphasis on the ‘How’ in studying political 
recruitment and the fragmented approach in defining ‘Who’ are selected by the process. 
 
1.5.1 The ‘How’ 
While existing literature on politicians’ pre-office careers has thoroughly explored the ‘How’, 
that is the mechanism through which political office holders have emerged or been selected 
from the general public, the literature remains rather silent and timid in tackling the equally 
important question: So what? What does this all mean to the functioning of our political 
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system? What kind of outcomes do the various regimes of political recruitment and patterns 
of recruits from the process produce? There appears to be a lack of dialogue between 
research on political career and recruitment on one hand and studies on the behaviour of 
political leaders on the other. The reason for these particular foci, I suspect, is that most 
prior studies on the subject of political recruitment, for all intents and purposes, were aimed 
at shedding light on the issues of representation. Their research question has been if, and 
how, the process of political recruitment favours or discriminates against certain parts of 
society. The research has aimed to discover the mechanisms through which political elites 
are created, the bias for or against social groupings that is embedded in this process, and 
the implication of all these factors on the power relationships within society as well as 
within representativeness of democracy. Hence, for the scholars behind this research, the 
outcome that they are interested in is the demographic composition of the elites that 
emerge through the process.  
 
It should be made abundantly clear that the purpose of this thesis is not to belittle prior 
work on political recruitment. The findings from the aforementioned research on political 
careers are significant since the importance of the representativeness of our democracy is 
both immense and self-evident, however it is my belief that there is much more to be said 
about the impact and implication of politicians’ pre-office careers, in particular how this 
shapes their behaviour once in office. The effect of political leaders’ backgrounds and 
experience on their aptitude and performance, which could, in turn, affect policy output and 
the functioning of the political institution as whole, is of equal importance to the 
demographic composition of political elites. The lack of evidence that shows politicians’ 
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background does affect their behaviour also casts doubt on the importance of 
representativeness. If changing the demographic composition of political elites does not 
produce any substantial and tangible changes, then why are they a legitimate concern and 
meaningful object for scholarly intrigue? Why should we bother to understand the 
mechanism of recruitment and its outcome (Patzelt 1999)? It is undeniable that experience 
and skills gained through politicians’ pre-office careers ought to have a significant impact on 
their quality and competence in performing their various responsibilities. There is also a 
noticeable and growing body of research that seeks to establish the link between political 
leaders’ backgrounds and their behaviour in office (Burden 2007, Geys and Mause 2014, 
Goodwin 2015, Ma 2016, Ono 2014). The intent of this thesis is therefore to use the 
experience and skills gained through their pre-office careers as a conceptual tool that seeks 
to bridge the presently missing link between studies of political recruitment and the 
behaviour of political leaders.  
 
1.5.2 The ‘Who’ 
Besides the issue of ‘How’, the issue of who is selected as political leaders is equally 
important in the study of political recruitment. While it is obvious from the study of ‘How’ 
that there indeed exists preferences for or biases against people due to their socio-
economic and other descriptive qualities in the process of political recruitment, the 
question of how do we conceptualize these differences remains a contentious subject 
among studies of political recruitment. More specifically, the following section seeks to 
address how previous studies on the subject articulate the patterns of political leaders’ prior 
careers. 
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The majority of research that has applied the rational choice paradigm to the study of 
political recruitment has focused exclusively on the political careers of leaders at the lower 
tier of government or inside the political party machine (Schlesinger 1966). This choice of 
only looking at the political side of political leaders’ prior political careers is understandable 
given the interest and major research questions of these studies because they mostly focus 
on the trajectory of politicians’ within the realm of politics and the variables that affect that 
trajectory. On the other hand, studies that focus on the social bias in the process of 
recruitment appear to be more interested in the professional, non-political aspects of 
political elites’ prior careers. For most of the time, the professional aspect of politician’s 
prior careers is treated as a proxy for their socio-economic status. Difference among the 
prior professions of politicians with the general public and thorough time are treated as 
testament of bias for or against certain socio-economic groupings and how these biases in 
recruitment process change through time (Mellors 1978, Norris and Lovenduski 1995, Rush 
2001). 
 
The literature on the professionalization of politics has taken a very different approach in 
articulating the meaning of politicians’ prior careers. Although much of the literature is also 
mostly looking at the professional aspect of politicians’ prior careers, instead of looking at 
their previous profession through the prism of socio-economic class, they instead focus on 
the political implications of this and the utility for pursuing political office of these 
professions. Instead of seeing the patterns of politicians’ prior profession as the result of 
bias against certain socio-economic class, these studies instead argued it is the possibility for 
developing certain relevant skills or the cultivation of necessary connections and networks 
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that explains the prevalence of politicians’ with certain types of professional background 
(Cairney 2007, King 1981). It has also been suggested that the apparent socio-economic bias 
can be explained by the privileged position of certain middle-class professions in terms of 
skills and political connections, that make them a natural and attractive starting point of a 
political career (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). 
 
Given the importance of political experience and connections in explaining the prevalence 
of political leaders with experience in professions that have been deemed ‘political 
professional’, Allen (2014) suggested that the focus in study of politician’s prior careers 
ought to be on its political aspects. He argued that previous literature on professionalization 
of politics has treated political experience as an offshoot of a politicians’ prior occupation. 
Instead of using politicians’ professional careers as a proxy for measuring the nature of their 
prior political involvement, political experience of politicians’ ought to be treated as a stand-
alone factor in the study of professionalization and recruitment. By distinguishing political 
experience that is earned from local and national levels, Allen has found that the British MPs 
who earn their political experience on the national level are more likely to receive executive 
appointment once they are elected, compared to their colleagues who earn their political 
experience at the local level, whom are more likely to remain on the backbench throughout 
their parliamentary careers.  
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1.5.3 Need for a holistic conception of pre-office careers 
These previous studies on politicians’ prior careers and the schematics they utilized in 
conceptualizing and measuring their professional careers and experience have certain 
shortcomings which make them unsuitable for the purpose of this thesis as they are not 
able to answer the main research question, namely the impact of skills and experience of 
political leaders on their behaviour in office. 
 
First and foremost, the way through which different professions and occupations are 
categorized is not reflective on the nature of skills and experience that people acquire 
through them.  Studies that focus on socio-economic stratification in political recruitment 
have put occupations with similar socio-economic standing, yet involving drastically 
different in skill sets and experience, into a single group. These broad grouping such as 
‘Business’, ‘Professional’ or ‘Worker’, while useful in illustrating the social standing of 
politicians, have little utility for the research question at the heart of this thesis. The 
concepts such as ‘Political Facilitating’, ‘Instrumental’ and ‘Brokerage’ occupations used in 
various literature on the professionalization of politics, which may appear to be at least 
partially capable of capturing the nature of political involvement and experience of 
politicians, have similar difficulties, as they are broad categories that comprise of a huge 
variety of occupations that are not necessary comparable in terms of the skill and 
experience gained by working in them.  
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At the other extreme, some research has achieved homogeneity by adopting an “isolated 
occupation” approach, by focusing on specific and narrowly defined categories of pre-office 
occupation. For example, Ono (2014) looks exclusively at the impact of having local 
government and legal professional background on the behaviour of Japanese legislators. 
Goodwin (2015) looks particularly at how training and experience in science affect British 
MPs’ voting behaviour when voting on issues that concern ethical questions in scientific 
research. These studies, while certainly able to show how a particular sort of prior 
experience affects the behaviour of political leaders, are nevertheless too narrow in scope 
to provide a broader picture of the general impact of pre-office careers and how different 
experiences affect various aspect of politicians’ responsibilities.  
 
On this particular issue, the occupational schematic used by Best and Cotta (2000) and 
Mellors (1978) appears to be better able to achieve intra-category homogeneity in terms of 
the skills and experience involved. Best and Cotta’s (2000) study identified thirteen 
categories of occupation that are prevalently represented in various European parliaments 
of the period and indicative of representatives’ social backgrounds, such as lawyers, 
teachers, journalist and writers, public sector employees and military. While this was mainly 
used to describe and explain the changing social background of parliamentary 
representatives in Europe from the late 19th to the end of 20th century, the way they 
categorize representatives occupational background has nevertheless maintained a certain 
degree of homogeneity in the skills and experience involved. However, the categories used 
by Best and Costa are neither mutually exclusive nor are they exhaustive among the wide 
variety of pre-office professions occupied by politicians. Also, given the time period they 
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examined stretched long into history, some categories, such as nobility, lose much 
significance and meaning when studying contemporary politics. Mellors (1978) devised a 
schematic on British MPs’ occupations that included no less than 35 categories of 
occupations. The richness of information as well as intra-category homogeneity is 
unmatched by any other research on the subject. It is unfortunate that he did not detail the 
coding method used in arriving at the data. Also, similar to Best and Costa, given that 
Mellors’s study is conducted in the 1970’s and was focused on the social background of MPs 
in the post-war period, the methodology used would surely need to be refined for capturing 
the reality of a 21st century job market.  
 
The second problem with the way the existing literature measures politicians’ prior careers 
is that they usually look only at occupations and experience that was deemed by the 
researcher to be politically related. This tendency of paying attention only to politically 
related experience is prevalent among research on the professionalization of politics as well 
as research that adopted the ‘isolated occupation’ approach. While professions that are 
politically related is of particular relevance to the study of politicians’ prior career, this 
approach will capture only a fraction of MP’s prior experiences. In fact, for those who have 
had long career in politically ‘irrelevant’ occupation, their apparently ‘irrelevant’ experience 
is arguably more influential on their behaviour, since they would have little experience in 
the political realm and would have to rely on these ‘irrelevant’ experiences and skills to help 
and inform their course of action, at least at the very beginning of their political career, and 
it would be interesting to see how these amateur politicians would utilize these apparently 
‘irrelevant’ resources to facilitate their adoption to live in politics. 
Chapter One 
 
73 
 
Finally, at present, virtually all of the research on politicians’ prior careers has treated their 
occupations as a categorical variable. They only measure whether an individual has worked 
in certain occupation or not. This approach is only able to capture a cross-session of an 
otherwise long and diverse prior career. Usually a researcher would choose certain 
timeframe in one’s career, such as the formative or penultimate occupation, which they 
would argue is most indicative of the politicians’ socio-economic background or experience. 
It is doubtful if such cross-sessional data is representative of an individual’s entire career. 
Cairney (2007) was well aware of this problem, and he sought to expand the scope of his 
data by coding the first, second and third occupation of British MPs. However, a more 
fundamental problem, that is of much more relevance to this thesis, is that by seeing 
occupations as categorical, it is unable to capture of the amount of skills and experience 
acquired over time of working in certain profession, which is the most crucial issue that this 
thesis seeks to understand. 
 
1.6 Duality of pre-office career 
1.6.1 Conceptually distinct 
Besides the way which prior careers are categorized and measured, another important 
feature to a holistic conception of pre-office careers, I would argue, is to note and 
appreciate what I shall call the duality of politicians’ former careers. Allen (2014) has rightly 
pointed out the inadequacy of looking only at politicians’ prior professional careers, and laid 
out some compelling arguments on their political involvement being a distinct dimension in 
their careers and suggested how the political dimension of pre-office careers affects MPs 
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future political prospects, such as securing constituency nomination and executive 
appointment. However, while the political aspect of politicians’ prior careers should be 
appreciated, as I have argued in the previous section, the effect of the professional aspect of 
politicians’ previous careers on their skills and knowledge, and hence their behaviour and 
performance, should also be taken into account in order to produce a complete portrayal of 
the impact of politicians’ prior careers.  
 
The duality of politicians’ pre-office careers refers to the two distinct dimensions of their 
previous occupations and experiences. On the one hand, as suggested by Allen, is the 
political dimension, which refers their prior participation and engagement in the political 
realm, which would have provided them with contacts and allowed them to network with 
other political actors. This includes, but is not limited to, the building of connection and 
publicity among the electorate and general public, as well as the cultivation of a rapport and 
reputation among political elites. The opposing aspect is the professional dimension, which 
encompass the skills and knowledge that one acquires through working in their respective 
occupation, which could potentially inform or affect the course of action, as well as the 
political goals of politicians. 
 
I would argue that only when we take both the professional and political dimension of 
politicians’ pre-office careers into consideration can we truly appreciate the impact of prior 
careers on politicians’ behaviour. There are two reasons that make appreciating the duality 
of pre-office careers necessary. Firstly, both political and professional dimensions 
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occasionally coexist in a single occupation. This is particularly applicable for jobs and 
positions that are arguably situated in the political realm, such as local council members, 
trade union representatives and party workers etc.  
 
For example, Priti Patel, Conservative MP for Witham, first elected in 2010 and who went on 
to become Secretary to the Treasury and Minister of State for Employment, had been 
William Hague’s deputy press secretary from 1997 to 2000, while the latter was serving as 
leader of the Conservative Party. Her experience as Hague’s deputy press secretary could 
conceptually situate on both professional and political dimension of pre-office careers. On 
one hand, professionally, as deputy press secretary, she would have gained plenty of 
experience in responding to questioning or demands for quotes from media, drafting press 
releases and liaising with members of the press. These experiences in public relations could 
have made her a more articulate and effective communicator, particularly when facing 
scrutiny from the press. This role could also have provided her with the opportunity to 
cultivate a network and rapport among members of the press which could be useful for 
being an MP or minister. On the other hand, being on the press team for the then party 
leader would provide her the political connection and capital upon which a successful 
political and parliamentary career could be built. By working in such proximity with the 
party leadership, she would have the opportunity to establish her reputation as a capable 
individual and loyal member of the party among the leaders. She could also use such an 
opportunity to develop her network within the party, which could inform her of opening 
opportunities and provide her with necessary resources to secure nomination from local 
parties. Such a case is analytically challenging if its duality is not taken into account. If we 
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are merely looking at the professional dimension, Ms. Patel would have been recognized 
together with MPs who have experience in public relation and communication in both 
public and private sector. Yet her experience on the party leader’s press team does have 
some fundamental differences, when compared with those worked as public relation 
manager in private corporations, in terms of the political nature of her job, which is in this 
case would not captured. On the other hand, should we only focus on the political 
dimension, the impact of her experience in public and press relation would have been 
omitted. It is only through appreciating both the political and professional dimensions of 
this experience can we fully explore its impact on Ms. Patel’s future political career.  
 
Secondly, it is very common for people to have both a professional occupation while 
participating in politics in some part-time manner. It is conceivable that one can maintain a 
full-time professional position during the weekday working hour while involved in a political 
party, local council, trade union or pressure groups in their free time. Labour MP for 
Streatham and Former Shadow Business secretary Chuka Umunna is one such example of an 
individual who had extensive professional and political career prior to entering parliament. 
On the professional dimension, he was a lawyer by training and had worked for various law 
firms as solicitor since 2004. During the same period, he was also exceptionally active in 
Labour politics. He had been a management committee member of Compass, a pressure 
group with connection to the Labour party, since 2003. He was the vice-chairperson of his 
constituency party between 2004 and 2008. He was also member of the trade union Unite 
and of the Fabian Society. Similar to the case of Ms. Patel, these two aspect of Mr. 
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Umunna’s former career ought to provide the necessary resources and skills that affect and 
inform his work as an MP, but in separate and distinct ways. 
 
Since both the professional and political dimension of their prior careers ought to have 
distinct impacts on their future behaviour, a complete portrayal of their pre-office careers 
ought to take both of these components into account. Yet this duality of politicians’ former 
careers has rarely been explored and fully appreciated in existing studies on the subject. 
Most of the literature on the professionalization of politics has morphed the two 
dimensions under banners such as ‘political facilitating’ or ‘instrumental occupation’. They 
are treated either as conceptually the same, or assumed to be so interrelated to each other 
to the point where they could not, or should not, be disentangled. Although the existence of 
these two dimensions has been, at least implicitly, acknowledged in some of the research in 
this area, most notably in the thesis by Allen (2014), their impact on politicians’ behaviour, 
independent of each other, has never been fully understood. While focusing on the impact 
of the political dimension, Allen did not take into account the effect of diverging 
professional experience on MPs prospect of executive appointment. These intertwined 
concepts could only be discerned and their respective effect on politicians’ behaviour can 
only be fully understood if we are able to conceptually separate the political and 
professional dimensions of politician’s prior careers. 
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1.6.2 Empirically correlated 
I would further argue that, not only should the duality of pre-office careers be recognized, 
but the two dimensions should also be analyzed besides one another, instead of separately. 
This is necessary, not only because we ought to be interested in their relative impact on 
politicians’ behaviour, but also due to the fact that the two dimension are empirically 
correlated with each other, a fact which puts the methodological validity of standalone 
studies of either dimension into question.  
 
Although the two dimensions of pre-office careers are conceptually distinct, it is undeniable 
that there is indeed a certain degree of interconnectedness between the two dimensions. 
While the distinction between the two dimensions has been masked by conceptually 
morphing them, literature on the professionalization of politics did provide a compelling 
case that experience in certain professions does indeed relate to certain experience on the 
political dimension. The idea of a ‘brokerage’ occupation; that certain professions, such as 
lawyer and teacher, are particularly conducive to political participation in a part-time 
capacity due to their flexible schedule, financial security and relevant skill set (Cairney 2007), 
provides a possible explanation for the connection between the two dimensions. An 
alternative explanation to the empirical link between the two dimensions is that for certain 
professions, such as policy research and public relations, a significant portion, if not the 
majority, of employment opportunities are found in the political realm.  
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Figure 1.1 Duality of pre-office careers 
Because of the empirical link between the two dimensions, there are two possible causal 
paths between professional careers on the one hand and the behavioural patterns of 
politicians on the other. Figure 1.1 provides a pictorial description of the two causal paths. 
On one hand, one’s professional career would affect the skill set and experience acquired 
throughout one’s career, which by itself has a direct impact on their legislative behaviour 
should they gain access to the Parliament. On the other hand, the relationship between 
professional careers and legislative behaviour could also be indirect, as one’s professional 
career also affects the amount and nature of one’s political experience, which would also 
give rise to certain pattern legislative behaviour when they become MPs. The existence of 
complex and multiple causal paths presents a unique methodological challenge that 
research focused on only either of the dimensions could not solve. For example, should we 
observe certain distinct behavioural patterns among MPs with experience in the legal 
profession, without knowing their prior political engagement, we could wrongly conclude 
that the behavioural pattern is caused by the skills and experience they earned as solicitors 
or barristers while the real cause is the political experience that they have, which is made 
possible because they are in the legal profession.  
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In short conclusion, the holistic conception of politicians’ pre-office careers would have to 
achieve several aims. It would have to encompass the widest possible array of occupations 
while keeping the grouping of professions analytically meaningful. It would have to capture 
the entire career of politicians instead of providing a snapshot at certain timeframe. Most 
importantly, in order to fully appreciate the duality of politician’s prior careers, it would 
have to capture both the professional and political dimensions of their former occupations. 
 
1.7 Hypotheses 
Based on the literature review and theoretical discussion up to this point, it is now possible 
for me to layout the key hypotheses of this dissertation which informs the methodological 
choice as well as analytical strategy of the coming chapters. 
 
1. The professional and political dimensions of pre-parliamentary careers are 
conceptually distinct, each exerting discrete effects on MPs’ behaviour, yet are 
empirically connected, and shall be considered simultaneously. 
 
This first hypothesis deals with how the pre-parliamentary career is conceptualized in this 
dissertation. This serves to inform how MPs pre-parliamentary career is to be 
operationalized and codified in the data collection strategy, which I elaborate on in the next 
chapter. This will then be applied in the latter chapters that will analyze the empirical 
finding since the interconnectedness of the two dimensions meant both professional and 
political experience ought to be taken into account together in the models. More specifically, 
I am going to argue the two dimensions of pre-parliamentary careers have a distinct effect 
Chapter One 
 
81 
 
on MPs’ behaviour. For professional experiences, it is dependent on the skills and 
knowledge that it provides to individuals; for political experiences, it is more a result of the 
kind of political connection, or the lack thereof, which it may afford to individuals. 
 
2. Pre-parliamentary careers affect both the roles given to MPs by their party, as well as 
their choice of actions in parliament. 
 
In other words, the second hypothesis means that a pre-parliamentary career affects both 
how their party gives different assignment to MPs, i.e. in accordance to their pre-
parliamentary career, as well as the how individual MPs prioritize among the various tasks 
and responsibilities of an MP. Pre-parliamentary careers determine the resources they have, 
such as skills, knowledge, networks and connections. Parties may give different assignments 
to MPs in accordance to their credentials and abilities in performing their assigned roles. 
Difference in the amount and kind of resources in MPs’ possession would constrain and 
affect their choice of action as MPs tend to choose the actions that they are most familiar 
with or most skillful at based on their pre-parliamentary career.  
 
3. Diverging pre-parliamentary careers among MPs give rise to distinct patterns of 
behaviour based on: 
 
a. The amount of pre-parliamentary experience an MP has acquired; and 
 
b. The similarity and applicability between the kind of pre-parliamentary 
experience and the type of legislative behaviour. 
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Given the diverse career background of MPs and the various roles and legislative activities 
that MPs could choose to perform, different kinds of pre-parliamentary experience would 
give rise to different patterns of legislative behaviour. How MPs’ pre-parliamentary 
experience is translated into patterns legislative behaviour is determined by two factors, 
which are mostly informed by literature from organizational studies and occupational 
psychology. Firstly, the strength of the effect from pre-parliamentary career on legislative 
behaviour is determined by the amount of experience MPs have acquired. As it has been 
shown that skills and knowledge from work are acquired through time, in other words, it 
means that the magnitude of the effect from pre-parliamentary careers ought to be in 
relation to the amount of time MPs have spent in certain type of positions. Should a certain 
profession or experience contribute to certain kind of legislative behaviour, the more time 
an MP spent of their pre-parliamentary career in that profession, the stronger the effect on 
their behaviour in parliament.  
 
Secondly, whether certain profession or experience has an impact on legislative behaviour 
and to what kind of legislative behaviour it may affect is determined by the similarity and 
applicability between the said kind of pre-parliamentary experience and the type of 
legislative behaviour. As reviewed in this chapter, the literature has consistently found that 
an employee’s experience is determinant of their performance, and that the relevance 
between experience and task is a key determinant on whether this effect is positive or 
negative. In the context of legislative study, given the variety of roles that legislator could 
adopt to and activities that they could engage in, instead of a unidimensional conception of 
performance, it would be more appropriate to adopt a multifaceted approach. When in 
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parliament, MPs are faced with the decision on how they approach their various 
responsibilities and set their priorities among them. Their choice is determined by the 
similarity and applicability of their prior experience. If an MP’s pre-parliamentary career has 
provided them with skills and knowledge similar or applicable to certain type of legislative 
activity, then the said type of activity would be a more attractive course of action for the MP 
as it would be less costly for them to utilize their existing skills and knowledge rather than 
investing time and effort to develop the skills and knowledge necessary for other aspect of 
their responsibility as an MP. Hence, an MP would tend to focus their effort on aspects of 
their work that is most similar to their pre-parliamentary career, where their prior skills and 
experiences are most applicable.  
 
It should also be noted that because of the lack of existing literature on pre-parliamentary 
career and legislative behaviour, in particular among non-political professions, the minor 
hypothesis that stems from hypothesis 3b and to be tested in the following chapter could be 
inductive and intuitive. In certain cases, such as the effect of legal profession and prior 
political experience on legislative behaviour, which is relatively well documented, the 
hypothesis and inference would be more deductive. Yet when dealing with other aspects of 
MPs’ pre-parliamentary career, the hypothesis would inevitably be more inductive. 
Moreover, the inference from an empirical result could be bi-directional in the sense that 
while a significant result could indicate that a certain type of pre-parliamentary career has 
an impact on patterns of legislative behaviour, it could also inform us of a previously 
unnoticed similarity between certain types of legislative activity and the experience from 
certain professions. 
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1.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have briefly reviewed the literature on politicians’ prior careers. I have 
shown that insufficient attention has been paid to how pre-parliamentary careers affect 
political leaders’ performance and behaviour once in office. The approach that existing 
research has used to conceptualize politicians’ pre-office career has tend to ignore the 
duality of pre-office career and, because of that, I have proposed my own theorization of 
how to understand politicians’ prior careers, or what I shall call the holistic conception of 
pre-office careers. Lastly, I have stated the three main hypotheses, which are used to inform 
the methodology and empirical analysis in this thesis.  
 
In the next chapter, utilizing my notion of a duality of MPs’ pre-parliamentary career, I 
discuss the methodology and data collection strategy used in this thesis. Particular attention 
will be paid to how the hypotheses inform the data collection strategy. 
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Chapter Two – Method: Introducing the MPs’ pre-parliamentary 
careers database  
2.1 Introduction 
In the prior chapters, I have discussed the motivations and the main research questions of 
this thesis. I have also reviewed in detail the existing literature and laid out the theoretical 
framework of this thesis and its hypotheses. To tackle the question of if, and how, 
legislator’s prior experience, both professional or political, affects their behaviour in office, I 
have compiled a database of the entire professional and political career of all 226 MPs who 
were newly elected to Westminster in the 2010 general election by coding their pre-
parliamentary occupations and political engagement as recorded on their biographies from 
multiple sources. The variables in the database are the independent variables in the analysis 
of this thesis. In this chapter, I discuss the methodology of the empirical analysis of this 
thesis. In particular, I explain in detail some of the strategies used in compiling and coding 
the database. 
 
Although political scientists have long been interested in the descriptive background of 
political leaders and numerous studies have been conducted on the subject, as discussed in 
the prior chapters, how this translates into the behaviour of political actors and political 
outcomes has yet to receive much attention among scholars. The methodology used to 
conceptualize, operationalize and record political leaders’ biographical information suffers 
from several shortcomings and is not suitable for analysis in this thesis. In recent years, 
there has been an increasing interest in quantitative analysis of political leaders’ 
biographical data, most of which looked at the biographical information of national leaders 
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or officials in the executive branch (For example Besley et al 2011, Besley and Querol 2011). 
This research seeks to follow recent work on similar subjects by Francis (2014) and Allen 
(2014), to expand the analysis of biographical information of political leaders into the realm 
of legislative studies. 
 
2.2 Cohort study 
2.2.1 Justification and limitation 
This research has adopted the method of a cohort study, which focuses on a subset of 
legislators, selected due to their common background and bounded by a period of time. In 
this case, the common factor across all the cases in the database is the fact that the MPs 
were first elected to the House of Commons in a particular general election and the time 
period of study is their first term in office as an MP, from May 2010 to March 2015.  
 
Studies of legislators in a particular term(s) of parliament have been rather common (for 
example Searing 1994). The subject of this study is arguably even narrower, as not only was 
it confined to legislators in a particular term of the parliament, but also to those who are 
elected at a particular time, in other words, a ‘cohort’ of MPs. The method of a cohort study 
has previously been used to study the career trajectory of legislators in both the US and the 
UK (Allen 2014, Francis 2014). There are certainly several drawbacks when research is 
confined to such a subset of cases, the most apparent of which is the limited external 
validity of the inference from empirical analysis. It would be difficult and imprudent to 
casually extrapolate the result of the analysis on cases beyond those out of the confinement 
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of the research setting and reaching generalizable arguments without qualification. Hibbing 
(1991) has argued, for example, that a cohort study is but a ‘shortcut’ in legislative career as 
it is not possible to ‘sort out generational, life cycle or period effect’.  
 
However, I would argue that some of the drawbacks of cohort studies could also be 
considered as advantageous. While Hibbing was correct in arguing that cohort studies are 
unable to distinguish between generational and period effect, the opposite side of this 
argument would be that cohort studies create more consistent set of data that controls for 
factors that are circumstantial and changing through time. Despite the popular notion that 
MPs are confined by the ‘Westminster Bubble’, they nevertheless operate within a political 
environment that is ever changing. The contentious political subject of the day and balance 
of power within the parliament is constantly changing. The roles of MPs have also been 
evolving throughout history (Rush 2001).  MPs in different parliaments would have been 
exposed to very different sets of conditions which, arguably, make direct comparison 
problematic. Cohort studies, by confining the study to a particular period of time, mitigate 
this problem by eliminating circumstantial and time varying variables as all cases present 
would have been expose to the same political environment throughout the entire period of 
study. Moreover, I would argue that the use of cohort study is appropriate for this research 
because the aim and research question requires our attention be confined among the class 
of newly elected MPs. 
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2.2.2 Why only study new MPs? 
The focus on new MPs could enable us to overcome several methodological challenges 
unique to this research. To better illustrate the need to narrow our attention to new MPs, 
let us for a moment consider veteran Conservative MP Kenneth Clarke and Labour MP 
Chuka Umunna, who was first elected to parliament in the 2010 general election, hence 
present in the dataset used in this research. On paper, the pre-parliamentary careers of 
both Mr Clarke and Mr Umunna share a few similarities: Mr Clarke was called to the Bar in 
1963 and was a member of the Bow Group before elected as an MP in 1970; Mr Umunna 
became a solicitor in 2004, was a member of the Fabian society before elected as an MP in 
2010. Both have had several years of experience in the legal profession as well as 
membership in affiliated think-tanks of their respective party before entering the 
parliament. However, given that the pre-parliamentary experience of Mr Clarke was dated 
more than forty years ago while that of Mr Umunna was earned immediately prior to being 
elected, the salience of their pre-parliament experience as reflected in their behaviour 
ought to be very different.  
 
First and foremost, experiences from pre-parliamentary careers could have a diminishing 
effect on MPs’ behaviour as time passes. Skills and knowledge earned through jobs could be 
forgotten, connections and networks gained could be lost through time, and hence, pre-
parliamentary careers of MPs would be most influential toward their legislative behaviour in 
their formative terms as legislators since the memories from their pre-parliamentary days 
would still be fresh in their mind. 
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More importantly, one of the major hypotheses of this thesis is that legislators would 
acquire skills and knowledge during their pre-parliamentary career that will facilitate and 
effect their behaviour once elected. If the accumulation of skills and knowledge do take 
place during legislators’ pre-parliamentary career, it is conceivable that a similar effect 
would also be present during the post-election parliamentary career. In the case of Mr 
Clarke, as of 2010, he had been an MP for forty consecutive years, with more than a decade 
of those years serving as cabinet minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer, while Mr 
Ummuna in contrast had no proper experience in Westminster at this point. We ought to 
expect the parliamentary and government experience to be reflected in Mr Clarke’s 
behaviour as a MP when compared to Mr Umunna because MPs would accumulate the 
relevant skills and knowledge while they are performing their various duties and functions 
as MPs, which would in turn enhance their ability and efficiency in performing those tasks in 
the future. As noted from the prior chapter, the legislative socialization and relationship 
between legislators’ tenure and their performance and effectiveness has been well 
documented in the existing literature (Miquel and Snyder 2006, Rush and Gidding 2011, 
Schiller 1995). Hence, should the skill accumulation hypothesis be correct, MPs tenure in the 
house would be a significant intervening variable in the models that predict their behaviour 
should the entire population of MPs be present in the database.  
 
Moreover, the impact of tenure on MPs’ behaviour could possibly be neither linear nor 
monotonic. Since the hypotheses predict that MPs with different sets of pre-parliamentary 
experience would adopt to their role as MPs differently and exhibit different patterns of 
behaviour, it is not known if the impact of socialization and on-the-job training will diminish 
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or consolidate these diverging patterns of behaviour. Itis possible that as socialization and 
on the job training increase with tenure, the behaviour of experienced MPs would converge 
as they gain more parliamentary experience and the importance of diverging pre-
parliamentary experience diminishes in their behavioural calculus. However, it is equally 
conceivable that diverging patterns of behaviour in the early terms of new MPs that stem 
from different pre-parliamentary careers, could lead to new MPs acquiring different sets of 
parliamentary experience that would further strengthen their diverging behaviours. These 
two possible and conflicting models of parliamentary socialization, while beyond the scope 
of this thesis, certainly show that the impact of tenure on MPs’ behaviour could be much 
more complex than existing literature once thought. By adopting the method of cohort 
study and confining the cases among MPs that are newly elected to the parliament and in 
their first term of office, the complexity of the issue of MPs’ tenure can be avoided, because 
behavioural variation that stems from on-the-job training and socialization would be 
eliminated from the dataset as all cases across the entire database would have  an equal 
and negligible amount of parliamentary experience, which allows attention be paid to pre-
parliamentary experience. 
 
To briefly conclude, the use of a cohort study overcomes some issues unique to this 
research: the intervening effect and possibility of a complex relationship between the 
parliamentary tenure of an MP and their behavioural patterns requires us to focus on a 
particular cohort or class of MPs in one election. The use of a cohort study also provides the 
extra benefit of restricting variance in unobserved variables that are circumstantial and time 
varying. This choice, while limiting the externality of the analysis and inference derived from 
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this research, would greatly enhance the internal validity of the results. Moreover, the data 
collection and coding strategy used in compiling the dataset is designed in the anticipation 
of, and allowing for, future expansion to encompass the entire current parliament, historical 
parliaments as well as other legislature in the world, which could provide both longitudinal 
and cross-country comparison and greatly improve the external validity of the result. 
 
2.2.3 The 2010 cohort and 2010-15 parliament 
Due to the circumstances and uniqueness of the cohort and the period being studied, it is 
perhaps necessary to spare a few words to discuss the political backdrop of the parliament 
and cohort. 
 
The 2010 general election was a watershed moment in British political history that saw a 
major realignment in party strength in parliament. After thirteen years in government since 
their landslide victory in 1997, the Labour party, under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown, which was blamed for the onset of 2008 financial crisis and subsequent 
economic recession, was comprehensively rejected by the British electorate. But the voters 
were not sure who should be given a mandate to govern. Although the opposition 
Conservative Party saw a substantial gain, both in terms of votes and seats, they were not 
able to command a majority in the House of Commons alone. The Liberal Democrats also 
saw a significant increase in votes, but their support was too widely spread across the 
country to translate into seats under first-past-the-post system. As a result, the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, with some reluctance, joined forces and formed the 
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first peace time coalition government in Britain since the Second World War. The fact that 
we had a coalition government during the study period means that we have to take into 
account the unique power dynamic and relation between not only the two governing 
parties but also their respective frontbench and backbenchers. 
 
The substantial swing from Labour towards the opposition parties meant that the 2010 
general election also saw a considerable turnover of MPs. With 232 new MPs1, it was the 
largest turnover of members since Second World War (Fox and Korris 2012), surpassing the 
previous record set in 1997. Table 2.1 indicates the strength of the three major parties in 
the entire parliament and within the 2010 cohort. As we can see, the Conservatives are 
slightly overrepresented in the 2010 cohort when compared with the overall balance of 
power in the House of Commons. This is hardly surprising since the Conservatives made the 
most electoral gains in terms of seats in the 2010 election.  
 
As the country was still struggling to recover from the most severe economic crisis and 
recession since the great depression, the handling of the economic recovery and public 
                                                          
1 Including former MPs who lost their seat in previous elections but subsequently regained their seat in 2010, 
who are not included in this study. 
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finances were the major tasks of the coalition government and this parliament. The bailout 
of financial institutions immediately after the 2008 financial crisis, the ongoing Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis, the subsequent economic downturn and a recovery that was 
stubbornly slow plunged the state of public finances deep into deficit. As a result, the first 
order of the parliament was to address the shortfall in the government budget.  The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne promised to eliminate the structural deficit 
within the lifetime of this parliament. To do so, the government had to introduce ruthless 
austerity measures and spending cuts that sought to bring the government’s books back 
into balance. Welfare cuts, reforms in the NHS and the defence spending review thus 
became prominent issues in the early stages of this parliament (Seldon 2015). 
 
Also lurking on the horizon was the issue of Europe and the struggle between Eurosceptic 
and pro-European elements in the governing Conservatives. The uneasy truce between the 
two wings of the Conservatives during their years in the wilderness disintegrated almost 
immediately after David Cameron arrived in Downing Street. As their coalition partner was 
determinately pro-Europe, it left little room for the Conservative leadership to manoeuvre. 
As a result, the government witnessed numerous threats of open rebellions and even 
suffered a humiliating defeat with regard to European budget in the House. The promise of 
including an in-out referendum in the coming Conservative manifesto only partially 
appeased the Eurosceptic element in the Conservatives and the party saw two high-profile 
defections to UKIP towards the end of the parliament (Seldon 2015). Moreover, the 
deteriorating diplomatic and security situation - which included involvement in Libyan civil 
war, Russian invasion and partial annexation of Ukraine, the rise of Isis in Syria and 
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subsequent heightened terrorist threat - meant issues of international relations and 
national security increasingly become a feature on the parliamentary agenda. Defeat in the 
vote for the authorization of the use of force in Syria was a particularly damaging episode to 
the authority of the government.  
 
Given the unique dynamic caused by the first peacetime coalition government in half a 
century and the distinctive challenges, both foreign and domestic, that were faced by this 
particular government and parliament, the generalizability of the results obtained from 
studying this time period may be limited, as we may not be able discern the effect of having 
a coalition government on the behaviour of MPs. The fact that Conservative MPs are 
overrepresented in the sample may also introduce bias, as the resultant observation may be 
driven by Conservative members and not applicable to MPs representing other parties. 
However, as I have argued, where it lacks external validity, the study of a particular cohort 
within a restricted time period strengthens the internal validity of the result since the entire 
sample is exposed to the same political circumstances. Additionally, the fact that each 
parliament has its own priorities given the changing circumstances also opens the possibility 
of other inquiries. The prevalence of certain issues means that we may have a large enough 
sample to probe into the possibility of issue voting in accordance with MPs’ pre-
parliamentary experiences. We may also observe if MPs, equipped with expertise and 
knowledge in addressing priorities of the time, are more active in parliament or more likely 
to be recruited as ministers.  
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2.3 Data Collection strategy: toward a holistic database of MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers 
As explained in the previous chapter, this research seeks to capture and reflect a holistic 
conceptualization of MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers. In order for this research and the 
database to achieve this, the strategy used in capturing, recording and constructing the 
database needs to achieve several goals. Firstly, the database needs to capture the entirety 
of an MP’s career prior to their election, in particular, it would have to encompass both their 
professional career as well as their political engagement. Secondly, the method used in 
coding needs to be comprehensive in terms of encompassing as wide an array of 
professions and positions as possible, while preserving a certain degree of internal 
consistency within each profession category. Thirdly, in order to appreciate the duality of 
pre-parliamentary careers, MPs’ pre-parliamentary professional and political careers need 
to be coded separately, thus reflecting the notion that they are conceptually distinct, while 
enabling further analysis on their empirical correlation. Lastly, since one of the main 
purposes of this research, and hence the database, is to test the training hypothesis, the 
coding method used in categorizing MPs’ professional and political careers ought to reflect 
the sort of skills and knowledge that MPs earn from their positions. The database also needs 
to record not only the presence of certain types of experience, but also the amount of that 
experience as well. Hence, it is of the utmost importance that the length of time MPs have 
spent in each of their previous jobs is recorded. Given these requirements, the construction 
of a database faced several challenges. 
 
Because of the absence of prior scholarly interest in the subject, as well as the 
unprecedented level of detailed information that is required, no existing database could 
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fulfil the aforementioned requirement. As a result, it was necessary for me to construct the 
database of MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers on my own. One of the most challenging 
obstacles in constructing this database was that information concerning MPs’ pre-
parliamentary careers is difficult to obtain because there is a not a single reliable source of 
UK MPs’ profiles that provides all the information required for the database. 
 
2.3.1 Sources of information and data collection strategy 
Unlike the US Congress, where there exists a comprehensive and independent effort at 
collecting and researching biographical information of members of Congress, such as the 
Almanac of American Politics, published by the National Journal and used by Francis (2014) 
in a similar research on pre-legislative career of American members of Congress, there is no 
similar collection of biographical information on British MPs. Although there are several 
sources of MPs’ biographies and CV, all of these proved inadequate for this research. 
 
When looking for a source of MPs’ biographical information that is both comprehensive and 
reliable, the most natural starting point are MPs’ profiles published by the parliament. 
Unfortunately, the profiles of MPs published on the parliament’s website are rather brief. 
They were mainly concerned with the MPs’ work within the parliament with virtually no 
mention of their experience prior to their election. Alternatively, biographies that are 
provided by the MPs themselves could be another source of information on their pre-
parliamentary career. Nowadays, many of the MPs have setup and maintain their own 
personal website for the purpose of campaigning and communicating with their 
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constituents. One of the common features across the majority of MPs’ personal websites is 
that they include a short profile that briefly describes MPs’ previous career and experiences. 
These self-reported biographies should have a certain degree of reliability in the sense that 
they are provided by the MPs themselves. However, there are flaws with these self-
reporting biographies that made them unsuitable to be used to construct the database. 
Primarily, they are not standardized, both in terms of the level of detail, as well as the 
format they used to report their prior experiences. Some of these profiles provided a 
reasonably detailed account of an MP’s pre-parliamentary career that included their 
profession and number of years worked within it, while some are very brief and vague about 
their profession, such as saying that MP has been “involved in several business prior 
entering parliament”.  
 
Secondly, because the purpose of these websites and biographies is to represent the MPs 
themselves to the electorate, they have the incentive to be strategic in choosing how they 
represent themselves and what information they would like to share with the general 
public. It is likely that they would over-report experiences that are deemed as favourable 
among the electorate, such as experiences in local government and charities, while 
experience that is deemed unfavourable, such as professional involvement in politics, would 
be omitted. Although media oversight ought to prevent MPs from seriously and deliberately 
misrepresenting themselves and misleading the public on their prior experience and 
careers, as journalists could always expose such attempts which would be hugely 
embarrassing and damaging, there is simply no guarantee that these self-reported profiles 
represent the ‘whole truth’ of an MPs’ pre-parliamentary career. Lastly, although the 
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internet has become a major tool of communication between MPs and the general public, 
there remain a few individual MPs who have a limited online presence, which makes 
obtaining their self-reported biography even more difficult. MPs’ profiles and biographies 
given by their respective parties through party websites, most of which are fairly similar if 
not identical to their personal websites, suffer from similar problems. Given these issues, 
the database for this research could not primarily rely on the self-reported biographical 
information found from MPs’ individual or party websites. 
Figure 2.1 Photo Sample of MP profile on Dods Parliamentary Companion (2015) 
Besides the parliament, parties and MPs themselves, there are also a number relatively 
independent organizations and groups that compile and maintain a collection of MPs’ 
profiles and biographies. First is the Who’s Who series, which has, since 1849, been 
collecting and publishing biographies of influential individuals. The vast collection of 
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biographies collected by Who’s Who became available online in 20052. Besides Who’s Who, 
the Dods Parliamentary Companion series also collects and publishes biographies of MPs. 
Continually published annually since 1832, Dods Parliamentary Companion has been a 
reliable source of information on politicians and civil servants. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show 
samples of the MP profiles found from these two sources. One of the major advantages of 
Who’s Who and Dods over other sources is that the level of detail and uniformity found 
across profiles of individuals is second to none. In the majority of cases, MPs’ profiles on 
both Who’s Who and Dods include a detailed account of their careers before and after their 
election to Westminster, which, in most cases, includes information like the title of their 
positions, the name of the companies and organizations that they worked for, as well as the 
years which they occupied those positions. Such rich, detailed information enables the 
database to capture the progression of MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers as well as the sort of 
experience they accumulated through that period. Furthermore, MPs’ profiles found on 
Who’s Who and Dods have included both MPs’ professional careers as well as political 
experience. In this aspect, Dods has gone further than Who’s Who, in the sense that they 
have given a separate account of political and non-political career, while Who’s Who listed 
both aspect of MPs’ pre-parliamentary experiences as careers. The presence of both aspects 
of MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers in their collection made both Who’s Who and Dods ideal 
sources since disentangling the effect of both aspects on MPs behaviour is a central purpose 
of this research. Because of the complete coverage of the entire target population for this 
research, and the level of detail of the biographies compiled, both Who’s Who and Dods will 
serve as the primary source of information used in constructing the database used for this 
research. 
                                                          
2http://global.oup.com/whoswho/about/ retrieved 20/1/2016 
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Figure 2.2 Screen Capture of sample of MP profile on Who’s Who (retrieved 31 AUG 2016) 
Nevertheless, the use of Who’s Who and Dods as sources of information for the purpose of 
constructing the database is not without methodological problems. Since both Who’s Who 
and Dods are compilations of autobiographies of individuals, the profile of individuals 
published in both sources are all prepared by the individuals themselves, instead of 
compiled by independent researchers who are impartial. Hence, the problem of an 
individual attempting to manipulate their public perception by misrepresenting, omitting or 
deliberately emphasizing certain kinds of prior experience over other, which is the major 
problem with the use of MPs’ own profile on their websites and party website, remains a 
concern with respect to Who’s Who and Dods.  
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Despite the potential problems from self-reported information from MPs, the profiles on 
Who’s Who and Dods remain far more reliable than the biographies found in individual and 
party websites. A crude comparison between MPs’ profiles on the two sources and their 
own account on individual websites would show that the former contains a much higher 
level of detail and information that the latter have omitted. This shows that at least MPs are 
more open and willing to share their personal information to Who’s Who and Dods than 
over the internet. This is probably due to their expectation that the general public is very 
unlikely to consult and rely on information from Who’s Who or Dods when forming their 
opinion on their MPs or deciding to whom they would vote for. Although the possibility of 
MPs seeking to omit prior experiences that are particularly embarrassing and damaging 
remains, (such as Nick Clegg’s alleged membership of Young Conservative while studying in 
Cambridge University), the incentives for them to do so on their profile on Who’s Who and 
Dods is significantly smaller when compared to the alternatives. Moreover, we shall not 
expect that the underreporting of missing data would be systematically skewed towards 
certain types of occupation or political experience. Finally, even if there were systematic 
bias in the rate of report for certain occupations or political experiences, it would certainly 
create a downward bias which leads against statistical analysis from reaching a significant 
result. In the end, although the two aforementioned sources are not without their 
limitations and methodological problems, in the absence of better and more reliable 
sources of MPs biographical information, Who’s Who and Dods remain the superior sources 
of information when compared with the alternatives. 
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As these profiles are self-reported instead of centrally compiled there is a degree of 
discrepancy in the level of detail included across individual profiles. While the overwhelming 
majority of profiles listed contain the same set of information on MPs’ prior positions and 
occupations: title, name of employer and time period of employment.  However, in a small 
yet significant minority of profiles, one or more of these pieces of information has been 
missing, with the most extreme cases simply stating the MPs’ prior non-political career as 
‘run own business’. There are also cases, particularly among older MPs, who decided to omit 
the earlier part of their pre-parliamentary career, probably because they deemed them as 
irrelevant, which result in missing data. Fortunately, because we have two profiles of each 
MP from the both Who’s Who and Dods, the information from the two sources have, to a 
limited extent, complemented each other quite well. On several occasions, when certain 
detail, such as their job title, is missing on one of their profiles, the necessary information is 
found on the other profile. The fact that there are duplicate profiles for all the cases also 
serves as a robustness check on the reliability of the information.   
 
As for the cases where certain information is missing on MPs’ profiles from both sources, 
MPs’ self-reported biographies from their websites or other internet based information are 
to be used as a supplement to those found from Who’s Who and Dods. This most often 
applied to cases where the nature of the company or organization that MPs worked for is 
required in the coding process, (the importance of which shall be discussed in the coming 
section), yet cannot be determined by the plain reading of their profile, since the name of 
the company/organization did not make clear of its nature. Under these circumstances, 
company/organization self-description on their website as well as MPs’ own accounts of 
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their business involvement as stated on their personal website would be used. For MPs for 
whom some information on their pre-parliamentary career remained missing, despite 
exhausting all the aforementioned methods of data collection, I have contacted them 
through email and requested the provision of the necessary information from themselves or 
their office as a last resort.3 
 
In short conclusion, the information on MPs’ pre- parliamentary careers is mostly drawn 
from their profiles published by Who’s Who and Dods. The use of both as the main source of 
information is not without methodological problems and limitations. Particular attention 
has to be paid to the fact that the information provided to the two sources are auto-
biographical and self-reported by the subjects themselves, which makes it susceptible to 
intentional, or unintentional, distortion and misrepresentation of their own past. Yet 
despite all these concerns, Who’s who and Dods remain, by far, the best source of MPs’ 
biographical information in terms of their level of detail and complete coverage of all the 
cases within the population of interest in this research. I have also shown that every effort 
has been made to retrieve the necessary information to the fullest extent as well as to 
ensure the reliability and uniformity of the data across all the cases in the database. The end 
product of this data collection process is a set of biographical profiles that includes all 226 
new MPs in the 2010-2015 House of Commons, which highlights their pre-parliamentary 
professional and political career and contains details such as their position or title, the name 
of company or organization they worked for, as well as the time period they occupied those 
                                                          
3 Among the dozens of email sent to MPs with missing data on their profiles, I have only received a handful of 
replies, most of which suggested that I should consult the MPs’ Wikipedia page and only one of them have 
agreed to supply the information that is missing. I shall like to take this opportunity to express my sincere 
gratitude to the said MP, who has graciously agreed to facilitate this research by providing the necessary 
information to complete the database and shall remain unnamed. 
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positions throughout their entire pre-parliamentary career, since the age of 18 or end of 
tertiary education. 
 
2.3.2 Compiling pre-parliamentary career timelines of MPs 
Following the collection of MPs’ biographical information from the aforementioned sources, 
a timeline of each MP’s pre-parliamentary careers is then compiled. As I have argued in the 
previous chapter, MPs’ pre-parliamentary professional career ought to be treated as 
separate and distinct from their pre-parliamentary political engagement. Hence, in order for 
the database to reflect and capture these separate aspects of MPs’ pre-parliamentary 
experience, two separate timelines of MPs shall be compiled from the collected 
information, one describing the MPs’ progression in their professional career, while the 
other denotes their previous experiences within the political realm. 
 
As stated in the previous section, the two main sources of data, Who’s Who and Dods, have 
treated these two aspects differently: the former has not made the distinction between the 
two and put all information under the section of ‘career’ while the latter has given a 
separate account of political and non-political career. While Dods’s approach facilitates the 
compilation of two separate timelines for MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers, it is not without 
issue. For some individuals, in particular those who worked in professions that are 
considered political facilitating or instrumental by previous literature, such as party workers, 
researchers and advisors, their positions are simultaneously professional and political which 
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should then be present on both timelines but coded separately, one on its occupational 
characteristic, the other on its political characteristic. 
 
The effort to separate the two timelines is complicated by the existence of multiple 
occupations or positions for the same period of time. For a significant number of MPs, there 
exist certain points in their pre-parliamentary career where their profile has shown that 
they have occupied multiple occupations simultaneously. There are two main reasons for 
the existence of multiple occupations. Firstly, a lot of MPs have maintained a part-time 
political engagement alongside their full time professional occupation. The inclusion of part-
time occupations into the database would be problematic because we ought to expect the 
accumulation of skills and experience in part-time employment or volunteering positions to 
be different from full time occupation. It would also be useful if we are able to separate 
political involvement that is full time and explore if that provides distinct benefit to politics 
professionals. 
 
Hence the following assumption is made in determining the full-time occupation of an MP if 
multiple positions exist for the same period of time. Non-political occupations shall always 
be considered as the full time and main occupation of individuals in a given period, should 
they have held a political position simultaneously. In this case, the non-political occupation 
will appear on the professional career timeline while the political position will only appear 
on the political career timeline. It is only when an individual has no other simultaneous 
occupation, except their political position, that the latter would be considered as their full 
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time occupation and appear in the professional timeline. For example, Green MP Caroline 
Lucas has been a member of the Oxfordshire county council between 1993 and 1997, 
however, she was also working as the policy advisor for trade and environment for Oxfam 
during the same period, her position in Oxfam is then treated as her main occupation and 
recorded on her professional career timeline while her experience in local government only 
appears on the political career timeline. But since Ms. Lucas' election as MEP in 1999, it 
became her sole occupation, hence, her experience as an MEP appears both on her 
professional and political career timeline. 
 
2.4 Coding strategy 
2.4.1 Challenges in operationalization 
After collecting MPs’ biographical profiles and compiling the information into separate 
timelines that represent their professional and political pre-parliamentary careers, the next 
step is to operationalize the myriad of positions and titles present in MPs’ profiles into 
meaningful groups of professions and political experiences, which will then be used to 
create a coding practice that categorizes all these professional and political positions MPs 
held previously in accordance with the kind of skills, knowledge and experience that they 
earned through these positions. We shall discuss the coding strategy for professional and 
political careers separately. 
 
There are several obstacles that challenged the operationalization and coding process when 
dealing with MPs’ pre-parliamentary professional careers. The most straightforward of 
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these challenges is the sheer amount and diversity of the professions that are present in the 
data. While the process of recruitment and professionalization has certainly narrowed it 
down, the pre-parliamentary professions of MPs remain very diverse. To name a few 
examples, besides the usual suspects such as lawyers, teachers, union representatives and 
business owners, among the new MPs included in the database, there is an actor, a 
bartender, a bricklayer, a GP receptionist and a pastor. While it is tempting to group these 
rare and certainly unorthodox pre-parliamentary professions as miscellaneous, this would 
lead to the fallacy found in many earlier studies of politicians’ prior careers; that is focusing 
only on professions that are traditionally thought as politically relevant while overlooking 
the role played by professions that are deemed non-political. Although these professions 
have only a minor presence in the current database, and are hence unlikely to yield any 
statistically significant and meaningful result given the small number of observations, there 
remains the possibility for them to be grouped with professions that provide people with 
similar experiences and skills into larger categories that can yield significant results. The 
possibility of aggregating these minor professions into meaningful categories would be lost 
if the coding practice failed to appreciate these professions. Lastly, a coding practice that 
takes these minor professions into account would allow the possibility for the number of 
observations for these minor categories to grow and become statistically meaningful as the 
coding practice is applied to other parliaments, both longitudinally and internationally, and 
to expand the database. Devising a coding practice that is able to appreciate the diversity of 
professions found among MPs to the fullest extent would keep alive these possibilities for 
future research. 
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Besides the diversity of MPs’ pre-parliamentary professions, another challenge in 
operationalizing and coding MPs’ biographies is the inherit ambiguity of their job and 
position titles. There are certain professions where the nature of their positions is easily 
identifiable by the plain reading of their job titles; there is little ambiguity in a person’s 
profession if their profile reads ‘Solicitor’ ‘English Teacher’ or ‘Nurse’. However, more often 
than not, a person’s job title does neither immediately and accurately reveal the true nature 
of their position, let alone the skills and experiences it provides, nor how comparable it is to 
positions with other titles. It is possible that jobs with different titles are in fact of similar 
natures and merely named differently by various firms or because of different context. A 
press officer and a public relations manager, while having different titles, are actually doing 
a very similar job that would provide workers with comparable experiences. On the 
contrary, positions with similar titles can have very different nature given the context, such 
as the nature of the firm. For example, an account manager in an advertizing agency and an 
account manager in a financial institution, while sharing the same job title, are indeed 
working in drastically different areas, which would provide workers with very different sets 
of skills and knowledge. This is the reason why determining the nature and business of the 
company or organization that MPs previously worked for are of such importance during the 
data collection process, as stated in a prior section of this chapter.  
 
2.4.2 The coding scheme: SOC2000 
Since 1990, the Office of National Statistics (ONS) has compiled and maintained a single 
occupational classification for the UK. Since its conception, the Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC) has been updated on two occasions, in 2000 and 2010 in order to keep 
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up with changes that have occur in the employment market. Because the cases of interest 
to this research are the MPs elected in the 2010 general election, their pre-parliamentary 
careers would have predated the latest revision of SOC, hence, the SOC2000 classification 
shall be used in coding positions MPs have occupied in their pre-parliamentary careers.  
 
SOC2000 has a hierarchical structure in classifying individual unit groups into minor groups, 
sub-major groups and major groups. There are nine major groups, 25 sub-major groups, 81 
minor groups and 353 unit groups present in SOC2000. Each unit group has a four digit code 
that indicates which major, sub-major and minor it belongs to. The SOC2000 manual also 
has a coding index that contains up to 26000 unique entries that match individual job titles 
or occupational descriptions to SOC2000 unit groups. There is also a detailed instruction on 
coding should there be any ambiguous job title that is not found in the coding index. The 
existence of such a detailed coding manual means that the coding practice used to create 
the database for this research would be subjective, easily replicable as well as 
comprehensive in the sense that it would be able to classify all positions presence on MPs 
profiles into occupational groups. 
 
According the manual for SOC2000, published by the ONS, the purpose of SOC was “for the 
production of occupationally classified information or processing of occupation data” (Office 
of National Statistic 2000), which could be used to inform operations such as job matching 
by employment agencies or provision of career information by educational institutions. 
Given these functions, jobs in SOC2000 are classified in accordance to skills level and 
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content, which is defined as “the nature and duration of the qualification, training and 
experience required to become competent to perform the associated task in a particular 
job” (Office of National Statistics 2000). Although the criteria used in classifying occupations 
in SOC2000 appears to be the training and skills required for the employee before entering 
those positions instead of the kind of skills and experience one acquires on-the-job, which is 
the central issue this research seeks to study, it is a reasonable assumption that pre-
occupational training required ought to be highly correlated with the kind of experience one 
acquires on-the-job. Given the central role that skills played in the classification, this made 
SOC2000 a very appropriate tool in constructing the database for this research as it makes 
occupational categories in the database internally consistent in terms of the skills involved 
in the occupations. The fact that SOC2000 is designed specifically for the British 
employment market, and that it is reviewed every decade, also made it an ideal tool to 
operationalize MPs’ pre-parliamentary occupations, since this could limit error from 
ambiguity or variance in the meaning of job titles that change through time and context. 
Although classification in SOC2000 is mostly guided by the variation in skills involved, this 
has the consequence that the major groups in SOC2000 largely correspond to the 
employment status because variation in skills is also roughly differentiated in occupations 
along the line of managerial, professional, associate, skilled and unskilled labour. While 
social class and employment status is not of central importance to this particular research, 
this allows possibility of the database to be used for future research along a different 
dimension of analysis. 
 
Chapter Two 
111 
 
Despite these advantages, SOC2000 as a coding scheme also has several problems with 
regard to the purpose, as well as the case of interest, in this research. First of all, given all 
the cases present in the database are MPs, this is an extremely skewed sample of the 
general population of the UK, for which the SOC2000 was originally designed. The result is 
that certain kind of experience, such as political operatives, party workers, special advisors 
and lobbyists, which have a heavy presence in the database and are also of central 
importance to this research, nevertheless falls into the residual group of miscellaneous 
occupations, since its presence among the general public is insignificant. Hence, despite the 
advantages of SOC2000, I have made several minor changes in the coding practice in order 
for this to be fit for purpose of this research. 
 
Besides the need for new separated category to capture the professional career of MPs, 
some occupation categories in SOC2000 also need to be aggregated into bigger groups in 
order to produce occupational groups which are statistically significant and meaningful. 
With the 226 individual presences on the dataset and 353 unit groups in SOC2000 coding 
scheme, it is inevitable that many of the groups will have a small and insignificant presence 
in the dataset, which would hamper any statistical analysis to reach significance. Even 
though new MPs are a skewed sample compared to the general population, as many of 
them have somewhat similar career background, which narrows down the number of unit 
groups that is currently presence in the dataset, it still contained more than a hundred unit 
groups, many of which contained less than a handful of cases. Hence, unit groups with 
similar and comparable skill and knowledge requirement are then aggregated into bigger 
groups that contained more cases. The actual occupational groups that shall be used in the 
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empirical analysis in the coming chapters and their corresponded SOC2000 unit group are 
listed in Table 2.2. It should be noted that the aggregation of unit groups in this dataset is 
different from the hierarchical grouping of SOC2000. The reason for this is because the 
major groups in SOC2000 seek to capture variance in level of skills and training needed to 
perform the tasks, while the purpose of this dataset seeks to capture the nature of the skills 
involved. Hence, public relations managers and public relations officers are placed in 
separate major groups in SOC2000 while they are aggregated into one category in this 
dataset because the nature of skills involved is similar. 
Table 2.2 Occupational Groups and their corresponding SOC2000 unit group(s) 
Occupation Groups Corresponding SOC2000 unit group(s) 
(or how they are otherwise defined) 
Lawyer 2411 Solicitors and lawyers, judges and coroners 
(Further divided into Barristers and Solicitors depends on job 
title) 
Teacher 2311 Higher education teaching professionals 
2312 Further education teaching professionals 
2314 Secondary education teaching professionals 
2319 Teaching professionals n.e.c. 
Communication Aggregate of Media and Public Relation category 
Media 3431 Journalists, newspaper and periodical editors 
3432 Broadcasting associate professionals 
Public Relation 1134 Advertising and public relations managers 
3433 Public relations officers 
Social Science Researcher 2322 Social science researchers 
Political Worker Generic positions working for political parties or politicians with 
non-descript/un-categorized responsibilities 
(e.g. Constituency agent, parliamentary liason) 
Full time governmental Experiences 1111 Senior officials in national government 
1113 Senior officials in local government 
4112 Civil Service administrative officers and assistants 
4113 Local government clerical officers and assistants 
Ministerial/MPs advisors Title given as ‘(Special) Advisor’ for Ministers and MPs 
Business Owner Positions with titles such as ‘Founder’ ‘Owner’ ‘Proprietor’ or 
’Director’ for small, for-profit firms and companies 
(Addendum to the timeline) 
 
Military Officer 1171 Officers in armed forces 
Agriculture 1211 Farm managers 
5111 Farmers 
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The featuring of an occupational group on the list is based on several considerations. 
Predominant is the relevance of these occupations to MPs behaviour in parliament. 
Occupations with an undeniable political overtone, such as political workers, 
ministerial/MPs advisors and full-time governmental positions are hence included in the 
analysis. Social science researcher is also featured as, under the context of this study, most 
positions that are coded as such are related to policy research for the government, political 
parties and think-tanks. Occupations that are frequently thought of as politics facilitating, or 
have been subject to previous studies in political leaders’ behaviour, such as lawyers, 
communication, teachers, agriculture and military are also present on the list. Alternatively, 
several groups are included in the analysis because of their heavy presence in the dataset. 
(Table 2.2 continued) 
Science and Technology 1136 Information and communication technology managers 
1137 Research and development managers 
2112 Biological scientists and biochemists 
 
2131 IT strategy and planning professionals 
2132 Software professionals 
2321 Scientific researchers 
3111 Laboratory technicians 
Marketing and Sales 1132 Marketing and sales managers 
3542 Sales representatives 
3543 Marketing associate professionals 
Financial Sector 1131 Financial managers and chartered secretaries 
1151 Financial institution managers 
3532 Brokers 
 
3534 Finance and investment analysts/advisers 
3537 Financial and accounting technicians 
NGOs 1114 Senior officials of special interest organisations 
4114 Officers of non-governmental organisations 
(exclude Trade Unions) 
Trade Unions officials 1114 Senior officials of special interest organisations 
4114 Officers of non-governmental organisations 
(Trade Unions only) 
Social Service 1184 Social services managers 
2442 Social workers 
3231 Youth and community workers 
3232 Housing and welfare officers 
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Occupational groups that are included because of this consideration include finance, 
business owner and marketing and sales. While these occupations are arguably less 
politically related, and we lack prior studies and research to inform us of how to hypothesize 
their effect on legislators’ behaviour, they are nevertheless considered because of the high 
number of MPs who have worked in these professions at some point of their professional 
career. The inclusion of these ‘non-political’ occupational groups in the analysis could also 
test whether MPs behaviours are only affected by politically related experience or if 
experiences in non-political sectors can be extrapolated and facilitate MPs work within the 
context of Westminster. 
 
2.4.3 Coding MPs’ pre-parliamentary political careers 
We now turn our attention from MPs’ pre-parliamentary professional careers to their prior 
political experience. As noted in the first chapter, there have been numerous studies on the 
subject of prior political careers of legislators. What is lacking from the existing literature 
however is a comprehensive schematic that could classify various political positions into 
groups that reflect the nature of political experience that they gained through the process. 
In order to classify MPs pre-parliamentary political experience for further analysis, I have 
designed a coding scheme to operationalize their previous political engagement. A table 
that denotes the various categories on the scheme could be found in Appendix One. The 
overarching concern here is to capture the various kinds of political experience in terms of 
the skills and experience that they could provide to the future MP. The categories of 
political experience in this schematic are divided along several dimensions. 
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The political career coding scheme is designed to capture MPs’ position on the political 
hierarchy with the pinnacle being national party politics. The most important distinction 
along this dimension is experiences that are earned at local level versus experience at the 
national level. Although experience at both national and local level would provide 
individuals with experience in how politics is conducted and plays out, we ought to expect 
some differences between the two kinds of experience in terms of how it affects MPs 
behaviour. According to the skill hypothesis, the relationship between experiences and 
performance is dependent on the similarity and applicability of the skills and knowledge 
involved. Hence, being in closer proximity to the national political scene and Westminster, 
we ought to expect that MPs experience at a national level ought to have a much stronger 
positive impact on their performance as MPs. Also, because of the proximity to the centre of 
political power at the national level, experience in national party politics could provide 
opportunity for individuals to build a rapport with national party figures, to demonstrate 
their loyalty to the party and competences, which improves their parliamentary career 
prospects once they are elected MP. (Allen 2013, Allen 2014). Contrastingly, while 
experiences in local politics could be relatively more different than the setting in 
Westminster, it could nevertheless provide some unique benefits that facilitate work as an 
MP. Partly because of the first-past-the-post electoral system of the UK, while there are 
some variations between parties and through time, local party organization has always 
played an important role in candidate selection (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). Experience in 
local politics could be beneficial in the candidate selection process by providing individuals 
with the contact and network at local party level that enables them to obtain nomination. 
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Involvement in local politics could also provide MPs with experiences in communication 
with electorates, nurturing of grass root networks and support, as well as knowledge of local 
issues which could be of use when they move on to Westminster. Experience as member of 
the European Parliament, as well as in devolved assemblies and executives are put into an 
intermediate category in between local and national level because their mandates are 
regional and the responsibilities required and the opportunity for network cultivation that 
they represent are expected to situate in between local and national politics. 
 
Secondly, the coding scheme distinguishes between political experiences that are electoral 
from those that are not. This distinction is partially, but not entirely, captured by the local-
national distinction. While there are no analogous pre-parliamentary elected positions at 
the national level, this distinction does exist at the local level. MPs’ local political experience 
could either be earned as an elected member of the local council, a prior parliamentary 
candidacy, or instead be acquired as an official in constituency parties. Although all of these 
provide individuals with experience in the conducting of local politics, being an elected 
representative or an electoral candidate provides some unique experiences such as 
campaigning, or in the case of councillor, of being a member of an elected assembly. This 
would provide an individual with first-hand experience of what being a representative of the 
people is like. Such experience could equip MPs with skills such as canvassing, speech 
making, deliberation and negotiation with fellow representatives in policy making which 
serving in local constituency would not. Moreover, a distinction is also being made between 
senior and ordinary members of local councils, in order to account for the difference in 
responsibility and hence skills and experience earned. MPs who have served in capacities 
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such as chairperson or deputy chairperson, committee chairperson, council executive 
portfolio holder of local mayor are considered as senior local elected officials while others 
are considered as ordinary members.  
 
Lastly, the locality from which MPs’ pre-parliamentary political experience is earned is also 
coded. Specifically, local political experience earned within the current constituency of an 
MP is separated from experience earned out of their current constituency. While a 
significant portion of MPs do have some experience in local politics, not all of them have 
earned such experience within the parliamentary constituency that they currently 
represent. A lot of MPs have participated in local politics in one area of the country before 
pursuing a Westminster seat in another region. This distinction between experiences earned 
within MPs’ current constituency versus experience earned elsewhere is important because 
the benefit from local politics could either be generally applicable or locally specific. While 
certain experiences of conducting politics are general, such as communicating with 
electorate or negotiation with fellow councillors, and could be universally applicable across 
different locality and hence should not make much of a difference should MPs moved away 
from the locality that they earn such experience, there are however some components of 
local political experience where the benefits are locally specific. Connection and network 
which made in one locale might not be of much use should an MP is running for or 
representing a constituency away from that locale. There could also be knowledge, such as 
understanding of local issues, or in industry, that is of particular importance to an area, and 
the benefit of which is locally specific. By separating political experience earned from within 
or outside an MPs’ constituency, we could determine if the benefit of local political 
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experience is stemmed from their exposure within the locality or their experience in 
general. It also enables us to analyse if these two components of local political experience 
lead to distinctive parliamentary careers and behavioural patterns of MPs.  
 
However, determining the locale of MPs’ pre-parliamentary political experiences and 
whether it is within their current constituency is rather challenging. In most cases, MPs’ 
profiles on Who’s who and Dods only show which local authority they served in, not the 
exact ward they represented. With the lack of information in the two sources and elsewhere 
it is difficult to determine if the ward they represent locate within their current 
constituency. Also, in most cases, demarcation between local authorities does not perfectly 
align with parliamentary constituency boundary. Hence political experience of an MP is 
coded as ‘local’ if the body they served has some overlapping with their current 
constituency. I believe this is a reasonable definition and determinant on the locale of MPs 
local political experience because even if the ward that an MPs previously represented is 
not within their current constituency, their experience within a local authority that at least 
partially overlaps with their current seat ought to provide the benefit of within constituency 
political experience such as networking and knowledge of local issues. 
 
Similar to the MPs’ pre-parliamentary professional career, MPs’ political experiences are 
organized into a timeline that describes an MP’s movement along the political hierarchy 
throughout their pre-parliamentary career. Each year would be coded separately with the 
more senior position taking precedent should the MP have held multiple positions at the 
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same time. Hence, for an MP who has been both a local councillor and ministerial advisor 
simultaneously, only the latter would appear in the timeline and be considered. The 
timeline is then coded in accordance to the coding scheme as shown in Table 2.3. 
 
 
2.5 Presentational strategy 
Before we turn our attention to empirical analysis using the data collected and coded with 
the aforementioned methods, it is perhaps necessary to spare a few words here to discuss 
the presentational strategy I will be using in the coming chapters. 
 
For the majority of the time, coefficient tables with multiple models using different 
specifications shall be used in presenting the results from statistical analysis. However, 
whenever comparison between results of different specifications is not necessary for the 
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inference, coefficient figures are used instead, with the coefficient table it represents in the 
appendix for the reader’s reference. In many cases during the subsequent analysis, where 
there are intra-party models, the full set of specifications not shown in the main result table, 
yet the remaining models omitted can also be found in the appendix of the respective 
chapter. 
 
Whenever it is applicable, graphical representation of how selected professional or political 
experiences affect the dependent variable as the amount of experience increases will be 
shown. Given the structure of the database, most of the results are stated with respect to 
the baseline of lacking all the pre-parliamentary experience being studied. For example, if 
we are to discover that each year of experience as a lawyer is associated with an increase in 
speech count, this relation is in comparison with the hypothetical of a similar MP with no 
legal nor any other pre-parliamentary experiences included in the analysis. While this result 
is meaningful on its own, we are also interested in comparing between different kinds of 
pre-parliamentary experiences. In other words, how would an individual MP behave 
differently if, instead of spending ten years in legal profession, they had instead been a 
military officer, a media personnel or a think tank researcher? This comparison will be made 
possible on the political dimension of the pre-parliamentary career by the construction of 
political career types, which I shall discuss in length in the next chapter. As for MPs’ 
professional careers, this will be achieved by the aforementioned graphical representation 
of how increasing amounts of experience relate with changes in the dependent variable. 
Furthermore, since the purpose of these graphs is to explore difference between 
occupations that is hidden by the coefficient in the statistical analysis, the selected kinds of 
Chapter Two 
121 
 
experience shown in the graphs may not necessary be statistically significant in the 
coefficient table shown, which nevertheless differ between each other significantly, once 
the amount of experience surpasses a certain number of years. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed the choices behind the selection of cases and the collection 
and coding of the dataset. I have also explained the methodological reasons behind these 
choices. The object of the research is the 226 MPs first elected in the 2010 general election 
and their behaviour in the first term of parliament. Confining this study to this cohort of MP 
strengthens the internal validity of the result by controlling for the parliamentary tenure of 
MPs. Biographical information on the MPs was collected from both Who’s Who and Dods 
Parliamentary Companion, supplemented with web-based and self-reported information 
when necessary. Information on MPs’ pre-parliamentary professional and political careers 
was then used to construct separate timelines on both aspects of their careers. This was 
then coded by using the SOC2000 occupational classification created by the ONS as well as 
the political careers coding scheme that I have devised. The coded timeline was then used 
to calculate the number of years an MP has spent in each group. At the end of this exercise, 
the product was a database that contains the number of years MPs have spent in each of 
the occupational and political experience groups during their entire pre-parliamentary 
careers. 
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Even though I believe I have, to the best of my ability, presented and justified the logic 
behind the data collection and coding practice, I would nevertheless recognize that there is 
inevitably a degree of arbitrariness in the operationalization of the data. Why did I 
aggregate the occupational groups in the way I did? Are there other dimensions that define 
MPs’ pre-parliamentary political careers? Minor changes on these issues may result in 
changes in the analytical result. The observation of political career groups in the next 
chapter could be largely driven by the fact that I included the locale of MPs’ political 
experience into consideration. However, I hope I have offered the clearest and most 
thorough justification to the way I have coded the data and shown that this is, given the 
constrains from the raw data, the most reasonable one to study and understand MPs’ pre-
parliamentary careers.  
 
After describing and justifying the methodology used in compiling the MPs’ pre-
parliamentary careers database, this thesis shall move on to discuss the empirical findings 
derived from analysing the dataset. The next chapter is focused on analysing the dataset 
descriptively. I shall first describe the composition of the 2010 cohort in terms of their pre-
parliamentary professional occupation and political experiences with focus on comparing 
the diverging patterns of pre-parliamentary careers among MPs of the three major parties. I 
shall also compare the descriptive findings with previous empirical evidence of the changing 
career background and professionalization of MPs to test both the comparability, and hence 
the validity, of my methodology with prior studies in this area, as well as to see whether the 
patterns of MPs’ pre-parliamentary experiences noted by prior studies have been sustained 
in the cohort of the 2010 election result. Furthermore, the next chapter will also explore the 
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relationship between MPs’ pre-parliamentary professional careers and their political 
experience. By employing techniques such as latent class analysis (LCA), I shall discover 
patterns of MPs prior political experience and test if these patterns of prior-political 
experiences are correlated with their professional career, thus testing the empirical 
connectedness between the two dimensions of MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers, as stated in 
the hypotheses.  
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Chapter Three – Who were they? Descriptive analysis of MPs’ pre-
parliamentary careers  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter has two aims. Firstly, to analyze MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers descriptively. I 
will describe briefly the patterns of MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers in terms of the proportion 
of MPs who have worked in one of the selected professions, or engaged in certain political 
experiences at some point before their election to Westminster. I shall then turn the attention 
to how these different kinds of experiences are distributed among the three major parties. I 
am also comparing the data of the 2010 cohort with the professional composition of previous 
parliaments found among existing literature. Given the attention is only on the newly elected 
MPs in the 2010 general election and that the methodology and operationalization method 
of this research is unique and differs from prior studies, it would be imprudent to reach a 
definitive conclusion on the changing background of MPs by comparing results from the 
database and prior studies. Nevertheless, such comparison can provide a sense of how the 
methodology used to code and identify MPs’ pre-parliamentary existence in this research 
differs from that found in existing literature and, if it is an improvement from methods that 
have been used to study MPs’ careers.  
 
Secondly, given that one of the main hypotheses of this research is that the professional and 
political aspect of MPs’ pre-parliament careers are conceptually distinct yet empirically 
correlated, I establish their empirical connection by analyzing the relationship between MPs 
professional background and political experiences. Employing several statistical and 
clustering techniques, I determine the typical political routes into parliament and discover 
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how MPs’ professional careers affect their choice among these routes. The results of these 
analyses indicate that there are four main routes toward Westminster: Party Animals, 
Carpetbaggers, Local Heroes and Career Changers. Last but not least, the relationship 
between MPs professional career and choice of political route to Westminster will be 
compared to prior literature on the subject of how professions affect political participation 
and the prospect of individuals.  
 
3.2 Professional background of the 2010 cohort 
Table 3.1 shows the number of MPs by professional background among three major parties 
as well as the proportion that they made up of the party cohort. MPs who have spent one or 
more years of their pre-parliamentary professional career in a certain professional group will 
be considered as such. In terms of the entire cohort of the 2010 intake, the most prominently 
featured professional experience is that of being a business owner, closely followed by 
communication - both of which account for over 20% of the 2010 cohort. They are closely 
followed by experiences in the financial sector, social science research and fulltime 
governmental positions, which account for around 15% of the cohort. Lawyers and teachers, 
which are traditionally seen as professions that are conducive to political participation and 
favoured starting point of a political career (King 1981, Cairney 2007), only account for 14% 
and 7% of the cohort respectively. There are also some interesting variations in the 
distribution of professional careers within the three major parties. It is apparent that MPs 
with experiences in professions that were deemed as instrumental by Cairney (2007) have 
made up a considerably larger proportion of the Labour cohort when compared to the other 
two parties. On the other hand, former business owners and financial workers have 
Chapter Three 
126 
 
constituted a much larger portion of the Conservative cohort in comparison to Labour. It is 
also noteworthy that some professional experiences are found exclusively in one of the main 
parties. All former trade unionists are found in Labour, as are all but one who had worked in 
social services; while MPs with military or agriculture experience are found exclusively among 
the Conservatives. These lopsided results are hardly surprising given the ideological 
persuasion and social class of their support base. 
 
Our attention now turns towards the political involvement of the new MPs prior to their 
election. Table 3.2 shows the distribution of various kinds of political experiences among the 
three major parties. In total, 11% of the cohort have experience as local party officials, 46% 
have been elected to local councils at some point in their pre-parliamentary political career. 
A similar amount of new MPs in the 2010 cohort have run for MP either in a general or by-
election before winning their seat in 2010, and 35% of them have been involved in national 
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party politics at some point prior to their election to Westminster. Among the sub-categories 
of local governmental experiences, around 26% of the cohort have some local council 
experiences within their current constituency while 22% of the new MPs have out-of-
constituency local government experiences. Also, around 20% of the new MPs have occupied 
senior positions in local government, such as council chairperson, committee chairperson or 
council executive positions. There are also interesting observations in the variation of 
distribution of political experience across the parties. The Labour cohort have a significantly 
larger proportion of new MPs that are involved in national party politics, while the 
Conservative cohort has a higher proportion of MPs with out-of-constituency local 
government experiences. New MPs of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats are also much 
more likely to have previously run for MPs, either within or out of their current constituencies. 
These trends could be explained by the fact that Labour had been in government for thirteen 
years prior to the election of this cohort. This provided them with more resources and 
employment opportunities at national level such as ministerial advisors, while the 
considerable swing of votes toward Conservatives and Liberal Democrats propelled more 
previously unsuccessful candidates into Parliament. 
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3.3 Changing professional composition of parliament 
As iterated in earlier chapters, the changing landscape of MPs’ prior experience and career 
has been one of the central themes of contemporary research on the House of Commons. 
Numerous research projects have been conducted on the phenomena that is 
professionalization of politics in the UK (Cairney 2007, Cowley 2012, King 1981, Mellors 1978, 
Rush 2001, Rush 2005). Has this trend continued among the cohort elected in 2010? Table 3.3 
and 3.4 compares the professional composition of the two major parties’ 2010 cohort as 
recorded in the MP pre-parliamentary dataset with those of previous parliaments observed 
by Cairney (2007). 
 
These results confirmed some of Cairney’s (2007) findings, such as the continual demise of 
legal profession as an important pre-parliamentary profession among the Conservatives while 
the other brokerage profession, which is teaching, appears to have experienced a slight 
                                                          
1 Source: data from earlier parliaments are from Cairney (2007) 
2 Full time governmental experience for 2010 
3 Social science research for 2010 
4 Include lecturer for 2010 
5 Include other social service worker for 2010  
6 Media for 2010 
Tabel 3.3. Labour MPs in politics-facilitating occupations 1945-2010(%)1 
 1945 1974 OCT 2005 2010 
cohort 
Barrister 8.5 8.8 3.9 4.76 
Solicitor 3.0 3.1 4.5 7.94 
Civil service/local government2 0.8 1.6 4.5 23.81 
Lecturer/research3 5.0 16.3 11.3 25.4 
Teacher4 6.8 11.6 7.3 9.52 
Social worker5 0 0.9 5.6 11.1 
Political worker 0.8 2.5 14.9 19.05 
Journalist/Author6 9.5 7.8 5.9 6.35 
PR/communication 0.5 0.9 0.8 17.46 
Political instrumental 23.3 21.0 31.5 63.49 
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increase in importance. However, the most dramatic changes to the professional composition 
of the Commons is undoubtedly the continual increase in the number of MPs who have 
previously worked in political instrumental professions and the dramatic change between 
2005 and 2010. There are substantial increases in the proportion of MPs with experiences as 
political workers, Journalists, media and public relations in both major parties. This indicates 
the trends of professionalization, in particular the rise of politicians with experience in 
politically instrumental professions at the expense of those with experience in brokerage 
professions is apparently still valid. 
 
Nevertheless, despite these results appearing to be in agreement with existing literature and 
confirmed the professionalization of politics narrative, the drastic difference between the 
results in 2005 and 2010 require careful interpretation of the data.  There are two reasons to 
explain this dramatic difference in the latest period of study. Firstly, the data of 2010 only 
includes MPs newly elected in a general election, while information on previous parliaments 
encompass the entire chamber. As a cohort of new MPs which is significantly different from 
the chamber as a whole gradually replaces retiring veteran MPs, the result would be a 
continual but gradual change on the composition of the chamber as a whole. Hence, if we are 
Table 3.4 Conservative MPs in politics-facilitating occupations 1945-2010 (%) 
 1945 1974 OCT 2005 2010 
cohort 
Barrister 17.4 17.0 11.9 6.85 
Solicitor 1.9 3.2 7.2 8.9 
Civil service/local government 1.4 0.4 1.0 12.33 
Lecturer/research 2.3 1.1 2.1 13.7 
Teacher 0.5 2.2 1.5 4.79 
Social worker 0.5 0.0 1.0 0 
Political worker 0.5 1.8 4.1 8.22 
Journalist/Author 2.3 6.1 5.7 7.53 
PR/communication 0 1.8 3.1 13.7 
Political instrumental 2.8 9.7 12.9 50 
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to look at the 2010 result from the perspective of the entire chamber, the changes would be 
much less drastic. This could be interpreted as a steady but much more gradual change on 
the professional composition of the entire chamber. Secondly, as stated in the prior chapter, 
this research has operationalized MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers in ways that are different 
from studies of prior parliaments, the most significant distinction being instead of looking at 
an MP’s last profession before they enter parliament, I have taken into account the entirety 
of their pre-parliamentary career. Hence, an alternative explanation to the drastic difference 
in the proportion of MPs with experience in instrumental occupations could be that these 
experiences are usually found at an earlier stage of an MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers, as a 
stepping stone to other positions, which would then lead to success in the realm of politics. 
Because of their formative nature to a successful political and parliamentary career, these 
experiences have been overlooked by previous studies on the matter, which focused on MPs’ 
occupations immediately prior to their election to Westminster. 
 
3.4 Connection between professional and political experiences 
3.4.1 Overall political experience 
After establishing the descriptive composition of the 2010 cohort of new MPs, we shall now 
turn our attention to analyzing the empirical links between pre-parliamentary professional 
and political career. How do MPs’ pre-parliamentary professional careers affect their political 
participation? What should we expect from the following analysis between the two 
dimensions of MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers? As argued in numerous literature on the 
professionalization of politics, people who have previously worked in certain professions 
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appear to be particularly prevalent and overly represented among the political elites. One of 
the reasons for such a phenomena was that these professions are ‘politically facilitating’ and 
conducive to a parallel involvement in politics (King 1981). Cairney (2007) has refined the 
concept of ‘political facilitating’ further into two sets of professions: ‘brokerage professions’ 
such as lawyers and teachers which provide individuals with a stable income and flexible 
timing that facilitates part-time involvement in politics parallel to their full-time job, and; 
‘instrumental professions’ such as journalists and public relations which provide a clear link 
to politics. Hence, we shall expect that MPs’ experiences in these broadly speaking ‘politically 
facilitated’ professions relate to MPs who have more extensive pre-parliamentary political 
experience.  
Figure 3.1. Impact of professional experience (dummy), demographic and party affiliation on MPs’ 
amount of total political experiences 
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Figure 3.1 is a coefficient graph after regressing the total amount of political experiences of 
all new MPs from the three major parties, regardless of nature of those experiences, against 
the dummy variable denoting any prior experience in professional occupational groups. The 
model also includes control for gender, age, ethnicity and party fixed effect. The confidence 
interval indicated in the graph is at 90% (coefficient table can be found in Table 3.9 of the 
appendix). The result as indicated shows that having experience as a trade union official, 
social science researcher, political worker and full-time governmental official has a positive 
effect on the total amount of political experience that one accumulates at the beginning of 
one’s parliamentary career. On the other hand, having experience in the military or the 
financial industry appears to have the opposite effect of depressing new MPs’ prior political 
experiences. In terms of the demographic and party affiliation, new female MPs appear to 
have significantly less pre-parliamentary political experience than their male colleagues, while 
new MPs of Labour and Liberal Democrats have more prior political experience than new 
Conservative MPs. It is also not surprising that age has a positive effect on the amount of MPs’ 
pre-parliamentary political experience, given that they would have had more time to 
accumulate it than their younger colleagues. On the other hand, contrary to the expectation, 
coefficient for public relations, media and both ‘brokerage’ occupations, legal and education, 
are all insignificant. The coefficient for media and legal profession is also negative, again 
inconsistent with the hypothesis. 
 
Alternatively, political benefit that derives from professional occupations could be dependent 
not on the presence, but the amount of the experience. Given the advantage of brokerage 
occupations are that they enable political involvement parallel to a full time day job, the 
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relationship between political experience and brokerage occupation could be dependent on 
the amount of experience in the latter that one has. The more time one spends in a brokerage 
occupation, the more opportunities one would have to participate in politics. Figure 3.2 
indicates the relationship between the amounts of political experience with the amount of 
professional experiences. It is a coefficient graph which shows the result of OLS regression 
with essentially the same model used in Figure 3.2, but substitutes the dummy variables with 
continuous variables that indicate the number of years one spent in a certain professional 
occupation group. The coefficient of demographic variables and party affiliation is included in 
the analysis but their coefficients are not shown because their magnitude is significantly 
larger than those for the continuous variables which would have rendered the graph 
unreadable. The effect of demographic variables is roughly similar to those found in the Figure 
3.2 (For the results from demographic variables in this model, please refer to Table 3.9 in the 
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Appendix). The result for the continuous variables is roughly the same as those in Figure 3.1 
with the notable exception that the coefficient for the amount of experience as a teacher is 
positive and becomes significant. The impact from being an MP or ministerial advisor is also 
positive and borderlining significant (p = .101) This indicates that the benefit on political 
participation from these two occupations are indeed more dependent on the amount of 
professional experience than the mere presence of such experience on one’s resume. 
However, coefficients for lawyers, media and public relations remain insignificant.  
 
3.4.2 Experience in local or national politics 
Besides the total amount of political experience, how do pre-parliamentary professional 
occupations affect the nature of prior political experiences of MPs? To further explore the 
impact of the professional careers on MPs’ prior political participation, we shall also look at 
how the former affect MPs’ experiences in two different political realms - local government 
and national party. 
 
While the professionalization literature has paid much attention on how pre-parliamentary 
professional occupation affects MPs’ overall political participation prior to entering 
parliament, the nature of those participations and how professional occupation affects the 
various kind of political participation separately has received considerably less attention. 
However, given the nature of relation between various political facilitating professions and 
politics as stated in the professionalization literature, we might still be able to generate some 
meaningful hypothesis on how professional experiences affect the nature of MPs’ pre-
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parliamentary careers. More specifically, given the link between politics and instrumental 
occupations such as media, policy research etc., is more likely to occur at the national level, 
previous experience in politically instrumental occupations ought to have a positive effect on 
the amount of prior political experience in national party politics. Moreover, since the political 
benefit of instrumental occupation is its direct relation with national politics, those who have 
worked in these occupations could enter the higher level of the political hierarchy laterally, 
while those who do not have comparable professional experience might need to begin their 
political involvement at the local level and use it as a stepping stone to enter the national 
political scene. Hence, experience in instrumental occupation should also decrease MPs’ prior 
experience in local government. In terms of brokerage occupations, since it merely provides 
individuals with the flexibility to participate in politics but did not specify the level from which 
they would enter the political arena, we should not expect them to have a significant effect 
on any specific kinds of political experience. 
 
Figure 3.3 and 3.4 shows the result of OLS regression of the amount of pre-parliamentary 
political experience a new MP has acquired in either national party politics or elected local 
government posts, both within or out of their current constituency, against the amount of 
experience in professional occupation groups. (Detailed coefficients are denoted in table 3.9 
in the appendix at the end of the chapter) Similar to the former section, the model includes 
only MPs from the three major parties and controlled for MPs’ demographic and party 
affiliation. The confidence interval is at 90%.  
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As expected, it is apparent that many of the politically instrumental occupations, including 
trade union officials, NGOs, social science research, public relations, political workers and 
ministerial/MP advisors all have positive and statistically significant effects on the amount of 
experience in national party politics. Experience in media and the two brokerage occupations 
have negligible effect on experience in national party. In terms of experience in local 
government, similar to my hypothesis, the amount of experience in some instrumental 
occupations, including NGOs, trade union and ministerial/MP advisors have negative and 
significant on the estimated amount of local government experience, while full-time 
governmental officials have a significant and positive effect on the amount of experience as 
elected local councillors. The latter, although contrary to the instrumental occupation 
hypothesis, is nevertheless expected given that a significant portion of full-time governmental 
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experience of MPs are contributed from those who have served in local council with no other 
occupation simultaneously, thus serving in a full-time capacity.  
 
3.5 Problems with OLS model and justification for categorical representation of political 
career 
While the results from the OLS model that uses MPs’ pre-parliamentary professional careers 
to predict their prior political experience do show that some correlation exists between MPs’ 
professional occupations and political engagement prior to their election to Westminster ,in 
particular the relationship between MPs’ prior experience in brokerage and instrumental 
occupations and the amount and nature of pre-parliamentary political experience, there are 
nevertheless several shortcomings to using OLS model to predict political experiences as 
continuous variables. Most important of them all is the difficulty in drawing convincing causal 
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inference from the OLS models. While the models clearly show descriptive correlation 
between the two aspects of MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers, the causal inference that can be 
drawn is awkward and unusual. It is rather odd for one to conclude that a year spent in a 
certain profession increases one’s participation in local government for a certain number of 
years. Alternatively, we could express MPs’ prior political experiences into several routes into 
parliament and types of political career. Not only would it be more convenient for us to arrive 
at a convincing causal inference, but I would also argue that this approach is also in line with 
the existing literature, intuitive and conceptually suitable to the data. 
 
Among the literature of legislative studies, there has been a long tradition of differentiating 
various legislators by conceptualizing and categorizing them into several ideal types (Barber 
1962, Wahlke et al 1962, Searing 1994). Such classifications have provided us with a simplified 
yet powerful framework to understand the otherwise complex patterns of legislative 
behaviours. Although many of these typology distinguish legislators types based on their 
behaviours in parliament (Searing 1994) and motivations (Barber 1965, Searing 1994), some 
have traced the origin of these types back to legislators’ prior political career (Barber 1965). 
Among the studies of political recruitment and political leaders’ prior career, the grouping of 
individuals and similar experiences into types has also been a common practice (Allen 2013, 
Allen 2014, Cairney 2007, King 1981). While I have argued in prior chapters that such a 
practice has overly simplified our understanding of MPs’ prior careers and masked the true 
impact of pre-parliamentary careers on MPs’ behaviour, a typology of MPs’ political 
engagement does have some utilities in terms of providing a clear and concise framework in 
understanding the pattern of MPs’ prior political careers.  
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Moreover, the construction of political career types would enable us to directly compare the 
effect of different political experience on MPs career progression and behaviour in the coming 
analysis. By using individual variables that denote the amount of experience in various types 
of pre-parliamentary professional and political experience in statistical analysis, the resultant 
outcomes are in practice a comparison to the baseline of an individual who lacks any of the 
pre-parliamentary experience as defined by our coding scheme. While this comparison is by 
no mean meaningless and we may still generate significant inference from these results, a 
direct comparison between different kinds of experiences might be more relevant under 
some circumstances. By constructing a typology of MPs’ political trajectory into parliament 
and expressing their pre-parliamentary political experience in a single variable would enable 
the coming analysis to directly compare the effect of different kinds of prior political 
engagement. Instead of only comparing with the baseline of a complete political amateur, we 
may able to discover how MPs who follow a national route into the parliament behave 
differently from those who follow the local government route by direct comparison. 
 
One natural critique to this approach would be to ask why confine the typology to political 
and not encompass the MPs’ pre-parliamentary professional career as well? I would argue 
that there are two distinctions between professional and political careers which justifies 
applying this approach of constructing ideal types to the latter but not the former. Firstly, 
political career, at least in terms of how this thesis has conceptualized and defined it, is much 
less diverse than the professional career of MPs. While there are only eleven individual 
variables that describe various kinds of political experiences in this study, there are, despite 
efforts to aggregate unit groups in SOC2000 into larger occupational categories, up to 
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seventeen different professional career types. The diversity in professional career would only 
increase as the size of the database expands in the future, which would make more 
occupation unit groups in SOC to become significant in their own right. That leads to possible 
disaggregation of the current occupational categories or the featuring of other occupation in 
future researches. On the other hand, many of the individual political experience variables 
can be aggregated along the dimensions that the typology is constructed, for example, the 
four kinds of local council experiences can be aggregated along the seniority or locality 
dimension. Moreover, there is an element of career progression and path dependency within 
the political realm. It is possible to speak of how experience in one kind of political experience 
could lead to another - being an ordinary council member could earn promotion towards a 
leadership position in the council; working in the national party might lead to the opportunity 
to be an MP candidate. However, such progression and interconnectedness among 
professional careers simply do not exist. Although career progression is common within 
certain professions, it is not possible to speak of if and how being a lawyer could lead to an 
alternative career in marketing and sales. This last point is also supported by the fact that 
when I try to apply some of the methodology used to determine MPs political career types on 
their professional career, which I shall mention in the latter section, it did not yield any result 
of significance. 
 
3.6 Introduction to Latent Class Analysis (LCA) 
In order to establish the existence of types of MPs’ pre-parliamentary political careers and 
categorize MPs accordingly, the technique of Latent Class Analysis (LCA) will be used to test 
the existence of these types, the appropriate number of types to describe MPs’ prior political 
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experiences and assign MPs into the types. The idea of LCA was first proposed by Lazarsfeld 
(1950) and Lazarsfeld and Henry (1968) as a method of clustering multi-variate and discrete 
data. LCA as a technique to identify types within dataset has been applied to a variety of 
research in political sciences, in particular determining types of individuals from their 
responses in survey data (For example, Breen 2000, Zheng and Pan 2016, Zamfir et al 2014). 
 
The basic model of LCA assumes that an unobserved, or in other words, latent, nominal 
categorical variable that influences a set of observed, manifest variables which are 
independent of each other and only connected through the latent categorical variable. Hence 
any systematic differences among the set of manifest variables explained by the latent classes 
(Dean and Raftery 2010, Hargenaars and Halman 1989, Linzer and Lewis 2001, Nylund et al 
2007). The manifest variables in an LCA model could be continuous or categorical, ordinal or 
nominal (Nylund et al 2007), although most existing studies and statistical package tends to 
focus on applying LCA on categorical manifest variables. The relationship between latent class 
and manifest variables are not deterministic, but probabilistic. Belonging to a certain class in 
the latent variable would affect the possibility of having certain value in the case of categorical 
manifest variable, or the means and variance in the case of continuous manifest variable 
(Hargenaars and Halman 1989, Nylund et al 2007). The resulting estimate in an LCA model is 
expressed as the set of probabilities that individual cases within the dataset belong to a 
certain class in the latent variable in accordance to the values of the set of observed, manifest 
variables. 
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A major drawback of LCA in the context of establishing a typology of MPs’ pre-parliamentary 
political careers is that the majority of statistical packages require the manifest variables to 
be categorical while the political career variables in my dataset are continuous. In such 
circumstances, the using of factor analysis appears to be more appropriate. However, results 
from factor analysis do not yield any ideal types, but instead estimate individuals’ scores along 
several continuous factors. This makes interpreting any results from factor analysis as a 
typology problematic. Moreover, when data of MPs’ pre-parliamentary political careers is put 
under factor analysis, the overall patterns of the result, in terms of the number of types and 
the main manifest variables that are distinguishing the types, are roughly similar to the results 
in LCA. The similarity between the results from factor analysis and LCA reinforce the 
robustness of each other. Since the resultant categorical outcome from the LCA analysis 
provides more convenient and appropriate inferences, I present the LCA results here. 
 
3.6.1 Construction of LCA model 
To transform the continuous career variables into categorical variables, the most straight 
forward way is simply to turn these into dummy variables and to conduct LCA with the 
dichotomous variables. This approach is not used because of the amount of information that 
will be lost in the process. It is also reasonable to expect that besides the presence of certain 
kinds of political experience on one’s CV, the amount of time spent in the said kinds also ought 
to be an important factor in determining an MP’s political career type. Hence, instead of using 
the dichotomous dummy in the LCA, a set of ordinal categorical variables roughly denoting 
the amount of time MPs spent in different kinds of political positions is generated by 
transforming them into deciles. Because of the high amount of zero entries in many of these 
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variables, the resulting ordinal categories for each of these variables are less than ten with 
the maximum number of categories in any of the variables being five (including the category 
for zero entry) while a number of political career variables have become de facto dummy 
variables after transformation into deciles. 
 
Furthermore, all of the MPs with no political experience at all are excluded from the LCA and 
instead form their own category of ‘Career Changers’. The reason for their exclusion from the 
LCA is because they are a conceptually distinctive and easily identifiable group of MPs within 
the dataset. When the Career Changers are included in the LCA, it is inevitable that either 
they are being classified into certain type of political career type en masse or, when the 
number of latent classes increases in the model, form their own type with a number of MPs 
who have some political experiences. Both of these make interpreting the meaning of the 
career types and generation of inferences from the resultant typology problematic. Career 
Changers are also clearly and easily identifiable within the dataset with concise and 
unambiguous selection criteria, which makes identification of Career Changers with statistical 
processes unnecessary. Moreover, as a robustness test for the decision to omit Career 
Changers from LCA, an alternative dataset including Career Changers are also analyzed by 
LCA, this result in little deviation from the general patterns and structure of the types of 
political career generated from LCA excluding Career Changers. Hence, in order to achieve a 
clean and distinct group of Career Changers in the typology of MPss prior political career, it 
was decided that Career Changers would be omitted in the final LCA. 
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With the dataset to be analyzed by LCA determined, attention shall now be put to determine 
the correct number of latent classes in the model. The usual practice is to begin with LCA with 
only one class, and then gradually increase the number of classes in the model until the 
concern of overfitting outweight the benefit in goodness of fit by further increasing the 
number of classes. Among the literature on LCA, there are several parameters that are used 
in determining the most appropriate number of classes in LCA. These includes L Ration Tests 
(LRT; Linzer and Lewis 2011), Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike 1987) Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC; Schwartz 1978) and adjusted BIC (Sclove, 1987). Among the 
literature, there does not appear to be a general consensus among scholars and statisticians 
as to which of these parameters should be used to determine the goodness of fit of a model. 
Various researchers that have utilized LCA in their work have relied on different parameters 
or combination of parameters to determine the appropriate number of classes in the LCA. 
Nylund et al (2007) have tested the accuracy of these parameters on simulation generated 
data and suggested that Bootstrap LRT has the best performance in determining the correct 
number of latent classes in the simulated data, followed by BIC and adjusted BIC.  Moreover, 
besides these statistical parameters and the model’s goodness of fit, there is also substantive 
concern in selecting to number of classes; whether the number classes are compatible with 
the hypothesis and if the content of resultant classes are empirically and theoretically 
meaningful (Zheng and Pan 2016). 
 
Table 3.5 shows the measure of fit of the LCA models with the number of latent classes of one 
through five using the Stata LCA plugin (Lanza et al 2015). The general rule in determining the 
best model in LCA model selection is to minimize the value of Log Likelihood, AIC and BIC 
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while maximizing the entropy R-square. The parameters given in Table 3.5 have shown that 
the BIC increased while Log Likelihood decreased monotonically when the number of latent 
classes increased from one through five. However, the value of AIC and Adjusted both score 
the minimum value when the number of latent class is set at three. The three class model also 
has the highest Entropy R-square. These parameters indicate that the model with three latent 
classes appears to be the most appropriate one in describing the clusters within the data. 
Table 3.5 LCA Model fit statistics of, Latent class number 1 through 5 
No of 
classes 
AIC BIC Adjusted 
BIC 
Entropy R-sq Log 
likelihood 
1 480.44013 535.90586 482.05421 1 -1007.7775 
2 435.46747 549.66162 438.79057 .84530478 -967.29116 
3 400.2459 573.16848 405.27802 .89040489 -931.68037 
4 407.56689 639.2179 414.30804 .88001556 -917.34087 
5 426.2334 716.61282 434.68357 .8249129 -908.67412 
Note: LCA conducted in Stata using the Stata LCA plugin7 
 
Figure 3.5 shows the conditional probabilities of an MP that situated on a certain decile of a 
political career variable to belong to each of the three latent classes. The first class contains 
about 22% of the MPs subjected to LCA (excluding career changers). The figure shows that 
MPs belong to this group score highly in the variable ctilelocgovn (decile of experience in local 
government in same constituency) and ctilempcann (decile of previous MP candidacies in the 
same constituency). These show that MPs allocated to class 1 are mostly those who have 
extensive local political experience in the constituency that they currently represent in 
Westminster prior to their election. Class 2 contains about 46% of the population. Graph 3.5 
shows MPs who belong to class 2 score highly in ctilelocgovf (decile of experience in local 
                                                          
7 LCA Stata Plugin (Version 1.2) [Software]. (2015). University Park: The Methodology Center, Penn State. 
Retrieved from methodology.psu.edu 
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government, out of constituency) and ctilempcanf  (decile of previous MPs candidacies in 
another constituency) as well as scoring moderately in ctiletpar (decile of experience in 
national party politics) and ctilempcann. This indicates that most MPs in class 2 would also 
have extensive experiences in local politics, but in this case, these experiences are earned in 
another part of the country; in some cases, this is supplemented with a moderate level of 
experience in national party politics and previous attempt in fighting their current seat. Class 
3 contains about 33% of the population. They score very highly in ctiletpar while only having 
modest scores in most other political experience variables except ctilempcanf. This indicates 
that most MPs who belong to this class have had an extensive pre-parliamentary political 
career in the national party political scene, which on certain occasions, is complemented by 
experiences in other levels of government. 
 
3.6.2 Descriptive analysis of the political career types 
Given the nature of these three latent classes indicated by Figure 3.5, I shall call them Local 
Hero, Carpetbagger and Party Animal respectively. As a robustness check for the allocation of 
political career groups, and to further explore the distinction between the groups, Table 3.5 
shows the mean amount of political experience among MPs who belong to a political career 
groups.  
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The results are largely as expected. Party Animals have the most experience in the national 
party political scene. They have on average spent a little under seven years in national party 
politics, while having the least experience in local government and prior parliamentary 
candidacy except for the Career Changers. For the local heroes, experience in local 
government of the same constituency is the most prominent kind of political experience, the 
mean amount of time local heroes spent in local government in the same locale is a little over 
ten years. In comparison, Carpetbaggers prior political experiences are mostly earned from 
local government out of their current constituency. It is also remarkable that besides the 
locale of which these experiences are earned, there are significant differences in the amount 
of local government experience between Local Heroes and Carpetbaggers. On average, 
Carpetbaggers have less than three years of experience in local government out of their 
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current constituency, while Local Heroes have on average ten years of in-constituency 
experiences. Not only does it show that carpet baggers have much less local government 
experiences prior to their election, it also indicates that the Local Heroes’ route toward 
Westminster is much longer and potentially more torturous compared with the other groups. 
It is apparent that these individuals have spent a comparatively much longer time in the lower 
echelons of government and politics before eventually earning promotion to Westminster. 
 
Table 3.7 indicates the party affiliation and demographic among MPs belonging to the four 
political career types. The distribution of the different types of prior political career appears 
to be fairly even among the three major parties with the notable exception of Labour. In terms 
of the proportion within the party cohort, there appears to be many more Party Animals at 
the expense of Carpetbaggers for Labour. The result is consistent with the descriptive analysis 
at the beginning of this chapter. This could potentially suggest that the nomination process 
of Labour is comparatively more favourable to party insiders than that of the other parties. 
Alternatively, this could also be explained by the fact that there was a huge swing against 
Labour towards the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in the 2010 general election, which 
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makes party insiders who are able to obtain nomination to safer seats more likely to secure a 
victory. The relationship between MPs prior career and the safeness of their seats shall be 
subject to further analysis in the coming chapter. In terms of the demographic of the four 
types, the most dramatic difference is between Local Heroes and the three other groups. 
Local Heroes have a statistically significantly higher mean age compared with Career Changers 
and Party Animals, which is not surprising given the fact that they have spent such a long time 
in the local council. Figure 3.6 shows the relationship between the age of the new MP and the 
probability of him/her belonging to one of the political career types. It is apparent that as the 
age of a new MP increases, the probability of them being a Party Animal or Career Changer 
decreases while that of being a Carpet Bagger and Local Hero increases. There also appears 
to be fewer female and minority MPs among local heroes. In other words, Local Hero appears 
to be have the most resemblance to the stereotypical politician - middle aged white man. 
However, it should be noted that the latter two distinctions are not statistically significant. 
 
3.6.3 Professional career and political career types 
After establishing the typography and validity of the political career types, we can again turn 
our attention to the relationship between MPs’ pre-parliamentary professional careers and 
political engagement. Table 3.8 shows the number of new MPs in each of the political career 
groups that have worked in certain professions at some point during their pre-parliamentary 
professional career. The percentage indicated in the table represent how new MPs with 
certain kinds of professional experience are distributed among MPs that have entered 
parliament through one of the four routes. Some of the distributional patterns that are 
emerging here is similar to our finding in the OLS models and hence expected. MPs with inst- 
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Figure 3.6 New MPs’ age at election and probability of political career type8 
 
rumental occupation experiences such as social science research, political worker, 
ministerial/MP advisor, NGOs and trade unionist, who have been found to have more 
experience in national party politics, are also more likely to be categorized as Party Animals. 
Other notable findings include Business Owner appear to be more opportunistic and less 
committed to either their local area nor to the national party as more than half of them are 
categorized a carpetbagger while 75% of military officers do not have any recorded prior 
political engagement and hence fall into the category of Career Changer. The remaining 
military personnel follow the national party route into parliament and none of them have 
passed through the other two routes to Westminster, both of which are driven by some form 
                                                          
8 Results obtained from Multinomial Logistic Regression model that controlled for new MPs’ professional 
career, party affiliation, gender and ethnicity. Coefficient table can be found in Appendix  
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of participation in local politics. It would appear that military credentials might have the 
political benefit of allowing these individuals to bypass local politics and, similar to those who 
have worked in instrumental occupations, allow them to enter politics at the national level, 
or even parliamentary level, laterally. 
 
The distribution of professional experience among MPs of the four types, while useful, is 
nevertheless not sufficient in determining the precise relation between MPs’ professional 
careers and the political route through which they enter parliament. Most importantly, it did 
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not take into account the possibility of MPs having multiple professional experiences and how 
they interact with each other. In order to take the entire professional career into account, 
Figure 3.7 shows the changes in predicted probability of an MP having followed one of the 
political routes into parliament, given they have any experience in one of the professional 
occupation group, regardless of the length or amount of experience. The probability is 
predicted by using multinomial logistic model to regress MPs’ political career type against 
dummy variables of professional occupational groups. The model includes controls for MPs’ 
gender, age, ethnicity and party affiliation, the marginal impact of which is not show in the 
graph but can be found in the Table 3.10 as shown in the appendix at the end of this chapter. 
The coefficient for Trade Union experience is also omitted from two of the graphs because its 
highly correlated nature with political career types prevent statistical packages from 
calculating the confidence interval on these two occasions. The confidence level has been set 
at 90%. 
 
Findings from the multinomial logistic model are mostly similar to the observations from 
previous identification and modelling methods. Some of the instrumental occupations, such 
as ministerial advisors and social science researchers have a significant positive impact on the 
probability of an MP being classified as Party Animal, while decreasing the probability of being 
a Career Changer or Local Hero. This is with the notable exception of experience in media and 
public relations, which have no significant effect on the probability of belonging to any of the 
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political career types. Experience in the military increases the probability of being a Career 
Changer or Party Animal, which is hardly surprising given the observation in Table 3.8. Having 
been an owner of business makes an MP less likely to be a Career Changer. Lastly, it is again 
notable that experience in the two brokerage occupations, lawyer and teacher, have no 
significant impact on the probability of MPs’ political career type. In particular, they do not 
have a negative impact on the probability of being a Career Changer. This is further indication 
that although brokerage occupation theoretically increases the feasibility of having a career 
in politics alongside a proper full-time day job, those who are successful in earning a seat in 
parliament while having these professional backgrounds are not necessary more politically 
seasoned among the cohort. A substantial amount of MPs with experience in brokerage 
occupations do not have any formal and recorded participation in party politics, either in local 
or national level, prior to their election. 
 
3.7 Methodological concerns and inferences 
This last finding also raises some concerns when we try to interpret these results and infer 
generalizable relations between professional career and political participation. Given this 
research is a cohort study that is confined to MPs newly elected in a single general election, 
all the cases included in the analysis are those who are successful in the pursuit of a thriving 
political career and a seat in the parliament. It is therefore a skewed sample of all aspiring 
politicians. Hence all inferences, especially those that involved the relationship between pre-
parliamentary professional career and political engagement, must take the biased nature of 
the data and the methodological implication into account. Results from the above analysis 
only indicate the distributional pattern of professional and political experience among those 
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who are successful in both the nomination and electoral process. What these results have 
shown is therefore the combinations of professional and political careers that are most 
common among those who are successful, instead of the general relationship between the 
two aspects of pre-parliamentary careers. Although this limitation prevents any inference on 
the correlation between professional and political careers among politicos who are not 
successful in obtaining nomination or winning election, it does provide us with a glimpse of 
what a successful pre-parliamentary career looks like. 
 
In light of these methodological limitations and concerns, there are two possible ways of 
interpreting the results. First of all, what the results show is how certain professional 
occupations are structurally linked with the political realm and therefore provide more 
politically experienced individuals. This is similar to the instrumental hypothesis advanced by 
Cariney, but to a certain extent more stringent. Positions in occupational groups such as social 
science research, trade unionist, political worker, ministerial advisors, and to a lesser public 
relations, are correlated with political experience in general and experience in the national 
party in particular, not merely because they provide a link to politics as suggested by Cairney, 
but more so because many of the positions in these professional groups are most commonly, 
if not exclusively, found within the realm of national party politics. In other words, 
experiences among these professions are embedded within the political realm. This relation 
would have been particularly true among those who successfully obtain nomination and 
winning at election. But given the limitation of the dataset, it is not known whether this 
relation holds true to those who lose their election, failed to get nominated or did not pursue 
a parliamentary career all together. 
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Secondly, an alternative way of interpreting the results is that they indicate how, for a 
successful candidate, pre-parliamentary professional and political experience complement 
each other. Since the results has indicate what a typical successful pre-parliamentary looks 
like, we could therefore see these patterns as the kinds of combination of both aspects of 
pre-parliamentary career that are likely to lead to successfully obtaining nominations and 
winning an election. Under this line of inference, a positive relationship between certain 
professional occupation and political experience could be an indication that those who work 
in the said profession might need some prior experience in politics in order to legitimize their 
own bid for parliamentary seats and winning the support of their party gatekeepers during 
the nomination process or their constituent during election. On the other hand, for some 
professions, the professional credential alone could be attractive enough for individuals to 
win support from party gatekeepers and the electorate. Such professions would be shown in 
the result as having a negative correlation with political experience as the latter is less of a 
necessity for these individuals to enter parliament. 
 
The latter interpretation which sees the patterns emerge in the results as how professional 
and political careers complement each other among successful candidates, also enables us to 
reconcile some of the unmet expectations from the results as well as explaining those that 
are unexpected. With the exception of one model, which shows the amount of experience as 
a teacher appears to have a positive correlation with the total amount of political experience, 
among the 2010 cohort of new MPs, there is in general no substantial positive relationship 
between experience in brokerage occupations and prior political participation. In fact, a small 
but substantial portion of successful candidates with brokerage occupations experience had 
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no prior political experience whatsoever. This indicates that successful candidates who have 
worked in brokerage occupations are not necessarily more politically experienced than their 
colleagues as prior literature would have predicted. If we are to take the brokerage hypothesis 
and the second interpretation together. On the one hand, brokerage occupations do provide 
more opportunity for pre-parliamentary political involvement that lead to a positive 
correlation with political experience. On the other hand, however, the fact that brokerage 
occupations are traditionally seen as political stepping stones and have played such an 
important role in parliament both prior and present, means that when compared to those 
who worked in other professions, people with experience in brokerage occupations are more 
likely to be seen as legitimate candidates for nomination and election by party gatekeepers 
and the electorate even if they have little or no prior political experience, which depresses 
the correlation between experience in brokerage occupation with prior political engagement. 
Taking these two opposing forces together might produce a neutral result which is observed 
from the data. Besides the puzzle of the lack of any significant results from brokerage 
occupation, the second interpretation also explains why experience in the military is 
estimated to have a negative effect on MPs’ prior political involvement. Not only is that 
because military personnel are prohibited to participate in party politics during their time in 
the service, it could also be because military credentials are likely to be very well received by 
both party gatekeepers and the electorate that would have allowed them to secure 
nomination and voter support despite their lack of formal political experience. 
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3.8 Discussion 
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers descriptively as 
well as to discover any relationship between the professional and political dimensions of MPs’ 
pre-parliamentary careers. I have shown that the two dimensions of MPs’ pre-parliamentary 
careers do have, as expected by some of the literature and hypothesized in prior chapters, 
correlation between them. As suggested by the professionalization literature, pre-
parliamentary professional experiences in some of the political facilitating occupations, in 
particular among the instrumental occupations according to Cairney (2007) do have a 
significant positive effect on the amount of overall pre-parliamentary political experience 
among MPs. On the other hand, experience in the military, and to a lesser extent the finance 
industry, appears to have a negative relation with pre-parliamentary political participation 
among MPs and depresses the amount of their prior political experiences.  
 
In terms of how professional occupation affects the kinds of political experience that MPs 
have had prior to their election, I have employed two analytical strategies : OLS regression on 
the amount of experiences in the two dimension of pre-parliamentary career; and 
multinomial logistic regression on the types of political career, which is obtained using latent 
class analysis (LCA). Results from the LCA indicate that MPs’ pre-parliamentary political 
careers can generally be classified into four different types: Career Changers, Carpetbaggers, 
Local Heroes, and Party Animals. Results from both the OLS and multinomial logistic 
regression after LCA are largely in agreement with each other. The amount of experience in 
most instrumental occupations is estimated to have a positive relation with the amount of 
experience in national party politics, while having experience in these occupations are also 
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more likely to be classified as a Party Animal in the LCA. Instrumental experiences also have 
the reverse effect on the total amount of experience in local government as well as the 
probability of being a local hero. Having experience in the military and science and technology 
increases the chance of an MP being classified as Career Changer. Contrary to expectations, 
experience in brokerage occupations does not have any significant effect on the amount or 
the nature of MPs’ prior political career, although as suggested in the previous section, this 
could be due to the fact that the dataset is a skewed sample of all aspiring politicians that 
only includes successful individuals. Moreover, results from the LCA and the resultant four 
political career types also reveal how demographic and party affiliation varies among MPs 
with different political careers. Local Heroes are much older, ethnically homogenous, have 
fewer females, and in total spend more time in pre-parliamentary political careers than MPs 
of the other types, while Party Animals are significantly younger than MPs from all the other 
groups except Career Changers. Labour also has many more Party Animals at the expense of 
Carpetbaggers proportionally when compared to the other two major parties. 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
The relationship and correlation between the professional and political dimensions of MPs’ 
pre-parliamentary careers explored in this chapter lays the foundation for the analysis of MPs’ 
legislative behaviour and their choice of roles in the coming chapters. As noted in previous 
chapters, the amount and nature of the political experiences of MPs affects not only their 
skills and knowledge in performing their responsibilities and tasks as an MP, but also the 
networks and connections that they possess, which in turn affects their political futures and 
hence behaviour. The correlation between the two dimensions of pre-parliamentary careers 
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means that in order to discover the independent effect of individual professional and political 
pre-parliamentary careers on legislative behaviour, a comprehensive approach that 
encompasses both dimensions is necessary to discern the effect from the two dimensions of 
pre-parliamentary career from each other. Otherwise, we will not be able to tell which 
dimension is actually responsible for the results. 
 
After analyzing MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers descriptively and exploring the correlation 
between the two dimensions of pre-parliamentary career, the following chapters focus on 
how MPs’ pre-parliamentary professional and political careers together and independently 
affect the career trajectory and behaviour of MPs during their first term in parliament.  
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Chapter Four – Pre-parliamentary career and electoral security  
4.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter I have shown how MPs’ pre-parliamentary professional careers can 
affect the political trajectory through which they enter parliament. The coming chapters are 
devoted to exploring how the professional and political dimensions of pre-parliamentary 
careers affect MPs’ subsequent political careers and their behaviour in parliament. This 
chapter focuses on how MPs’ pre-parliamentary experiences affect the choice of party 
selectors in the process of candidate recruitment and hence the kind of constituency that 
they eventually represent.  
 
There are two reasons why this is noteworthy. Firstly, analyzing the impact of the pre-
parliamentary career on the process of candidate recruitment and the majority, or in other 
words their electoral security, could provide some insight on if, and how, the party 
recruitment process is biased or prejudicial towards applicants with certain types of pre-
parliamentary experiences. Secondly, electoral circumstances and majority has been found 
to be a factor in much of the literature to be an important determinant of MPs behaviour 
once they are elected. Understanding how pre-parliamentary careers can affect the kind of 
constituency that MPs will eventually represent shall provide a solid foundation for further 
analysis between MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers and their behaviour in parliament once 
elected. 
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4.2 Pre-parliamentary career and electoral security 
The electoral security of MPs is a natural starting point in any discussion of individual 
parliamentary behaviour, because it is of such fundamental importance to the consideration 
of any elected politician. In any democratic assembly, parliamentary careers live or die at the 
mercy of the electorate. Scholars of legislative studies have long been using electoral security 
and the parliamentarians’ urge to secure their own political future, by ensuring their survival 
in elections, as a major motivation and determinant in their behaviour in the legislature 
(Mayhew 1974). However, to establish the relationship between pre-parliamentary careers 
and MPs’ behaviour, instead of treating electoral security merely as an intervening factor that 
needs to be controlled for, we should also consider the possibility that the electoral security 
of MPs is endogenous to MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers. The inherit advantage of people 
with experience in professions that are considered ‘political facilitating’ in the process of 
candidate selection has been well established in the literature around the professionalization 
of politics (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). It is possible that their advantage in the process of 
recruitment not only translates into a higher possibility of being selected to represent their 
party in parliamentary elections, but also results in them being selected to run for seats that 
have inherently larger majorities for their respective parties,  which are hence safer and 
ensure a long tenure for the individual, as well as freeing them from electoral pressure and 
insecurity, which could be reflected in their behaviour in parliament. In order to explore the 
relationship between pre-parliamentary careers of MPs and their electoral security, we need 
to first understand the process that decides which constituency a prospective candidate is 
going to run in? Who is involved in this process? And what are their considerations in 
determining who is going to run in which constituencies? 
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Before I further the discussion on how MPs’s pre-parliamentary experience might affect their 
allocation among constituencies and hence their electoral security, it is perhaps necessary to 
reiterate a methodological point made in the prior chapter; that is, the dataset used in this 
research is confined to those who succeed in securing a nomination and winning seats in 
parliament, it would be susceptible to attrition bias if I were to generalize my findings in the 
following section and extend inference on the process of candidate recruitment as a whole. 
Therefore, the purpose of this discussion on electoral security is to descriptively analyse how 
pre-parliamentary careers associate with the pattern of electoral security among MPs, which, 
given the central role of electoral security in determining legislative behaviour in general, is 
an essential step that paves the way for further analysis on the relation between pre-
parliamentary careers and MPs’ behaviour in parliament. I also offer several plausible 
hypotheses on how pre-parliamentary careers may affect the process of candidate 
recruitment and seat allocation in particular, which, while not definitively supported by the 
results given here, may serve as a starting point for future research on the process of political 
recruitment in Britain. 
 
4.2.1 Recruitment and candidate selection in the UK 
The conventional wisdom concerning the process of candidate selection is that it is dominated 
by the local constituency parties, instead of being dictated by party leadership or central 
organization. Under most circumstances, the role of the national party was to compile a list 
of prospective candidates that met minimal criteria of quality, party loyalty or political 
desirability that would serve as a pool of officially sanctioned individuals from which 
constituency parties could consider nominating individuals as their prospective parliamentary 
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candidates (PPC) (Allen 2014, Norris and Lovenduski 1995, Rush 1994). Yet both major parties 
have, in recent years, adopted reforms that could be characterized as a centralization of the 
candidate selection process, exerting more control over who is ultimately adopted, for the 
stated purpose of ensuring the ‘quality’ of candidates, as well as the gender and ethnic 
representativeness of the parliamentary party (Ashe et al 2010, Cutts et al 2008, Hill 2013, 
Mcllveen 2009, Shaw 2001). 
 
For the Conservatives, on top of their existing mechanism, which allows individuals on the 
approved list to apply for any vacant seats, a ‘priority list’, that contained candidates of 
exceptional quality, half of which have to be women, is compiled. Constituencies which have 
retiring Conservative MPs, as well as targeted seats, would have to pick their candidate from 
this ‘priority list’. The rationale behind the implementation of the ‘priority list’ is to ensure 
that these exceptional individuals, women in particular, are selected in seats where they 
would have a reasonable chance of being elected in the election, thus ensuring their entrance 
into parliament, and the quality and representativeness of the resulting parliamentary cohort 
(Allen 2014, Hill 2013, Mcllveen 2009). 
 
For the Labour party, centralization of the recruitment process mainly comes from the 
implementation of a national parliamentary panel of candidates, which is maintained and 
vetted by the National Executive Committee (NEC). Candidates recommended by affiliated 
organizations would also be automatically included in the panel, yet this is subject to any prior 
agreement between the said organization and the NEC (Labour Party, 2013, p24). The national 
panel replaced the previous system of A, B, C and W list of candidates which was separately 
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maintained by trade unions, constituency parties and the Cooperative party (Allen 2014, 
Norris and Lovenduski 1995). To promote female representation and achieve the long term 
goal of having half the parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) consisting of women MPs, the NEC 
has also promoted, and in certain cases imposed, an all women shortlist (AWS) upon 
constituency parties, particularly in seats with retiring incumbent Labour MPs (Ashe et al 
2010, Cutts et al 2008). 
 
Despite these centralization reforms, there are two similarities between the candidate 
selection processes of the two major parties that ought to be highlighted. Firstly, despite 
reforms with centralization tendencies, the ultimate decision of nomination remains in the 
hand of the constituency parties. Although the ‘priority list’ of the Conservative party and the 
national panel and imposition of AWS in Labour has significantly narrowed the pool of 
candidates from which constituency parties, especially among safe and target seats, could 
choose from, the decision of whom from the shortlisted candidates could represent the party 
in these constituencies remains that of the constituency parties. This means that concerns of 
both the national and constituency party would be reflected in the final selection of the 
candidates. Secondly, one element of the candidate selection process that has survived these 
reforms is that approved candidates would have to actively seek nomination from particular 
constituency parties and vice versa.  After individuals have been placed on the ‘priority list’, 
approved list or national panel of candidates, they have to proactively apply for nomination 
from constituency parties, while constituency parties would, at the same time, contact 
approved individuals to apply for nomination (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). During this 
process, seats that are dominated by a party and consistently result in a wide winning margin 
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in elections for the said party, or in other words a safe seat, are considered especially valuable 
among applicants. Receiving the nomination in a safe seat would virtually guarantee their seat 
in parliament for life and provide MPs with a stepping stone to higher office (Allen 2014). 
Hence, safe seats are eagerly pursued by most applicants and the nomination for which is 
considered highly competitive. The constituency party of a safe seat could receive as many as 
200-400 applications from approved individuals, while a difficult seat, where the opposing 
party has a large majority, could have merely ten applicants (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). 
The fact that the slate of applicants approved by the national party organization has a certain 
degree of freedom in deciding which seats they would like to put their name forward for 
consideration in means that the framework of supply and demand for certain types of 
candidates could be applied not only to the overall distribution of candidacy among aspiring 
MPs, but also to the allocation of safe seats and hence the patterns of constituency electoral 
security among MPs (Norris and Lovenduski 1995).  
 
On the demand side of candidates from the party, Norris and Lovenduski (1995) have found 
evidence from surveys of party members present in candidate selection meetings, showing 
that their main concerns with regard to the choosing of candidates includes; likeliness in 
attracting votes, ability in public speaking, enthusiasm, ideological similarity and political 
experience (ibid p139). However, I would argue that in the case of allocation for safe seats 
among candidates, the demand for candidates from the party is arguably more complex. This 
is largely due to the fact that in the case of allocating individual applicants to different seats, 
given the latest reform of centralization of candidate selection in both major parties, the 
distinctive, and sometimes conflicting, interests and concern between the national and 
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constituency parties would be more salient compared to the observation by Norris and 
Lovenduski almost 20 years ago. Indeed, conflict between the national and constituency 
parties in the choice of candidate in recent years has been well documented in the literature 
(Ashe et al 2010, Child and Cowley 2011, Cutts et al 2008, Hill 2013). For the national party, 
they have two slightly conflicting goals concerning the allocation of candidates among 
different seats; the aim of recent reform of both parties in the candidate selection process 
was to enhance the quality and representativeness of the parliamentary party, in order to 
achieve this, national parties would prefer to place ‘quality’ female and minority candidates 
in safer seats to ensure their chance of entering the parliament, and staying in parliament, for 
years to come, however the ultimate aim of a party is, after all, to capture as many seats as 
possible in a general election to enable the formation of a stable government. Therefore, in 
the interest of winning seats, the national party might also prefer to allocate certain ‘quality’ 
candidates, especially those who have the ability to attract votes, in marginal constituencies 
in order to secure as many seats as possible. As for the constituency parties, although there 
is an obvious overlapping of certain concerns with their respective national party, most 
notably being securing electoral victory as well as choosing the ‘best’, there is also a tendency 
of preference for ‘favourite son’ or ‘local men’ with roots in the constituency in opposition to 
outsiders that are being imposed by the national party through the use of ‘priority list’ or AWS 
(Childs and Cowley 2011, Hill 2013). 
 
On the supply side of candidates, one of the major concerns of applicants, when deciding 
which seats they are going to apply for nomination, is that of the cost and benefit involved in 
the pursuit of nomination from that particular constituency. An obvious factor that affects 
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applicants’ calculations of cost and benefit is that of financial impact, in particular the cost of 
career displacement of candidacy and of becoming an MP. The impact of financial 
consideration and job security on politicians’ decisions in pursuing promotion has been well 
documented among the literature of political recruitment (Best and Gaxie 2000, Hibbing 
1993). As noted by Norris and Lovenduski (1995), a switch from a professional into a 
parliamentary career may present a considerable opportunity cost and financial risk to 
individuals: the remuneration and allowance for MPs can be less than generous when 
compared to their previous professions, MPs’ also face much less certain career prospects, in 
particular those who find themselves representing marginal constituencies. Hence, applicants 
who have better extra-parliamentary career prospects might adopt the strategy of only 
applying for, or accepting, nomination from safe seats, which provide them a level of 
electoral, and hence career security, since the prospect of an insecure parliamentary career 
that is probably confined to the backbenches is simply not attractive enough to induce a 
career switch into politics. Furthermore, the motivation of applicants might also affect their 
strategy in seats application. There are a considerable proportion of listed applicants who 
adopt a local or regional strategy in applying for seats, either, because they already have 
contact with people in the constituency party, they already reside in the constituency, or 
because they simply wish to represent their home town or region and have no interest in 
being a carpetbagger. These considerations may limit the choice of constituency that they 
could run in and result in nomination in less favourable seats or even non-selection. 
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4.3 Electoral security hypotheses 
Given these considerations on both the supply and demand sides of the allocation of 
applicants into seats, from both the national and local party as well as the applicants 
themselves, we can come up with the following hypotheses concerning how the pre-
parliamentary careers of MPs might affect the electoral security of the seat that they 
represent: 
 
Hypothesis 4.1: MPs with experience that enhance their performance in parliament as well 
as the representativeness of their respective party will be elected in ‘safer’ seats (with larger 
electoral majorities). 
 
Hypothesis 4.1 reflects the concern of the national party with regard to the quality and 
representativeness of their parliamentary cohort. This consideration was the motivation 
behind some of the recent reforms in their candidate selection process, and this ought to be 
reflected, not only in the composition of the resultant slate of candidates and parliamentary 
party, but also in the kind of constituencies that they are chosen to contest and represent. 
Since it is in the interest of the party to ensure that these candidates will be elected, the 
national party might (not so subtly) encourage constituency parties of safe seats to adopt 
these individuals as their nominee. Indeed, this is exactly the rationale behind Conservative’s 
‘priority list’, to ensure these ‘quality’ individuals, favoured by the national party, are selected 
in targeted and safe seats, thus ensuring the quality and representativeness of the 
parliamentary Conservative party. Given that Labour did not have such an arrangement, at 
least officially, of a preferred or elite slate of candidates, on top of their national panel of 
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candidates with the exception of the imposition of AWS in certain constituency parties, we 
should expect this phenomenon to be more salient among Conservative MPs. 
 
Hypothesis 4.2: MPs with experience associated with campaigning and attracting electoral 
support will be elected in ‘less safe’ seats (with smaller majorities). 
 
Hypothesis 4.2 reflects another consideration in candidate allocation, that is to improve the 
electoral prospect of the party by fielding strong candidates in marginal constituencies who 
could win votes and secure the seat for their party. Given the importance of winning marginal 
seats in the formation of government, it is in the interest of both the national and 
constituency parties to put such electoral considerations on a higher priority in marginal 
seats. Hence, MPs with pre-parliament experience that could contribute to campaigning 
locally and attracting support ought to be associated with smaller majorities and less electoral 
security. This is to a certain extent in conflict with Hypothesis 4.1 given that there are likely 
to be a certain overlap in the skills and experience that contributes to both parliamentary 
work and campaigning. An obvious example is that of public speaking, which is an ability that 
could enable MPs to better represent their constituency and party in Westminster, while also 
a useful skill in campaigning and canvassing. These conflicting concerns might lead to 
insignificant observations as they cancel each other out.  
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Hypothesis 4.3: MPs with professional experience that provides better extra-parliamentary 
career prospects will be elected in ‘safer’ seats (with larger majorities). 
 
This last hypothesis is to reflect the applicant’s concern of career displacement cost from the 
supply side.  Applicants with pre-parliamentary experiences that provide them with 
comparatively better extra-parliamentary career prospects might adopt the strategy of only 
applying for seats with a substantial majority for their respective party, while refrained from 
applying for, or accepting, nomination to contest in constituencies that have a smaller 
majority or are currently occupied by the opposing party. Hence, we should expect MPs’ with 
pre-parliamentary careers that would provide substantial financial advantages to be 
representing constituencies with higher majorities. 
 
4.4 Data and methodology 
We shall be relying on two dependent variables in the following analysis of the association 
between MPs’ pre-parliamentary career and electoral security. Firstly the majority of new 
MPs’ constituency in the last general election (2005). The majority is defined as difference in 
percentage of vote share between the new MP’s party and the first runner up in the 2005 
general election. The reason that we are looking at the majority from the previous election, 
and not the majority won by our cohort in 2010, is that since we are looking at the allocation 
of MPs into seats with different level of electoral security, majority in 2005 is the information 
that is available to the selector in national and constituency party as well as the applicants 
themselves in the process of nomination prior to the 2010 election. Hence, majority from the 
2005 election would better reflect the circumstances during the nomination process. The data 
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used here comes from the 2010 British General Election Constituency Results dataset, 
compiled by Pippa Norris1. Because there are some minor constituency boundary changes 
between the 2005 and 2010 election, the information used here are the notional results in 
2010 boundary calculated from vote count at ward level. 
 
The second dependent variable is a four point scale of electoral security calculated from the 
average majority of MP’s constituencies across three general elections (2005, 2010, 2015). 
This scale corresponds to the quartile of the average majority of each constituency among 
new MPs of the same party. MPs whose constituency’s average majority across three 
elections is situated below the lower quartile among new MPs in the same party would be 
put in the first group, while those above the upper quartile will be placed in the forth. 
Constituency level election results of 2010 general election come from the same source as 
that of 2005 election, while the 2015 majority is retrieved from election results reported by 
the BBC2. The cut-off point between the four categories for the three major parties can be 
found in Table 4.1. This scale of average electoral security across elections is to mitigate 
several problems of looking at the real majority in one particular election. To begin with the 
average majority across several elections is, arguably, a more reliable measure of the level of 
electoral competitiveness among different parties in each constituency as results from 
individual elections are susceptible to bias due to external and circumstantial shocks. 
Additionally, the relation between pre-parliamentary careers and electoral security may not 
be linear. Finally, the real size of majority among MPs representing different political parties 
                                                          
1https://sites.google.com/site/pippanorris3/research/data#TOC-May-6th-2010-British-General-Election-
Constituency-Results-Release-5.0 
2http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2015/results 
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might not be comparable. This is particularly true given the circumstances surrounding the 
nomination and election of the cohort of MP that is being studied. During the run up to 2010 
general election, there was a general anticipation across the aisle that, given the 
overwhelming unpopularity of the incumbent Labour government, there was going to be a 
substantial swing of votes from Labour to other parties, the Conservatives in particular, which 
turns out to have been correct. Under such circumstances, the same majority would have 
drastically different meaning between selectors and applicants of the two parties. For 
Conservatives, a seat with a 5% majority in 2005 could be considered very safe, while a Labour 
seat with the same majority could be seen as marginal, or even a lost cause. Hence, in order 
to normalize electoral security across different parties, separate quartiles are calculated for 
individual parties in the construction of this electoral security scale. 
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 2005 majority models 
Table 4.2 shows the results of the real size of majorities in 2005 election using OLS regression. 
All pre-parliamentary career variables indicated here are continuous and denote the number 
of years the MP has spent in a particular profession or political position with the exception of 
previous MP candidacies, which is measured as the length of time they ran, as well as the 
variables denoting MPs’ political career types, which are dummies. Models 1 through 6 
include all new MPs from the three major parties elected for the first time in 2010 general 
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election. Model 1 is a baseline model which contains only demographic controls and party 
fixed effect. The only variable that is of significance is the dummy for Labour MPs, which 
indicates that in the previous election in 2005, the majority of seats to be occupied by new 
Labour MPs was about 25 percentage points larger than those elected new Conservative MPs 
in 2010, which is not surprising since the huge swing against Labour in 2010 would mean seats 
retained by Labour in 2010 must have had a substantial majority in 2005. On the other hand, 
none of the coefficient of the demographic variables are statistically significant at the 0.1 
level, which indicates that despite effort from both major parties to diversify their 
parliamentary party by reforming the recruitment and nomination process to make it more 
favourable to female and minority candidates, this has not translated into significantly higher 
electoral security for female and ethnic minority MPs since they are not necessarily 
representing safer constituencies.  
 
Models 2, 3 and 4 take into account the professional and political aspects of pre-
parliamentary careers separately. Model 2 adds all the professional career variables into the 
specification, the R-square of model 2 is .07 larger than that of baseline Model 1, which 
indicates that the addition of professional career variables to the model is capturing a modest 
yet significant amount of variation in the dependent variable. Professional occupations 
variables that are significant at the 0.1 level are those that denote amount of experience in 
the military, science and technology, financial services and full-time governmental officials. It 
is estimated that each year an MP spent in their pre-parliamentary professional career in each 
of these occupational groups is associated with a 1.4, 0.8, 0.8 and 0.9 percentage point 
increase in the majority of their seat in the previous election respectively. Model 3 adds the 
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amount of political experience to the equation. Coefficient for both variables denoting the 
number of previous runs for Westminster seats by the MP, both within and out of their 
current constituency, are statistically significant at 0.1 level, however, the sign of the two 
significant coefficient are different. The model estimates that each time an MP ran for a 
parliamentary seat out of their current constituency is associated with 2.7 percentage point 
increase of the majority of their current seat in 2005 election. On the other hand, each time 
they ran for parliament in their current seat indicates a 3.3 percentage drop of majority in 
2005. The latter finding is not surprising since if the MP has previously run for the same seat, 
it almost certainly means that the seat is taken from an opposing party in 2010 election, which 
in turn indicates a negative majority in 2005. Model 4 also looks at how pre-parliamentary 
political experience affects the majority of an MPs’ seat, but, instead of measuring the 
amount of experience that they have acquired, we are using the political career types 
constructed using LCA in the previous chapter. The baseline category used in comparison is 
Local Heroes. It is found that, when compared with Local Heroes, the coefficient for all three 
remaining political career types are significant and positive, which indicates that these groups 
of MPs are representing seats that are significantly safer than those represented by Local 
Heroes. It is estimated that, on average, constituencies represented by Career Changers, 
Carpetbagger and Party Animals have, in 2005, a majority that is 6.7, 9 and 8.3 percentage 
points larger than those represented by Local Heroes. The value of R square for both Model 
3 and 4 are only 0.03 larger than the baseline, which indicates that on its own, MPs’ pre-
parliamentary political experience is not capturing a lot of the variation in their electoral 
security. 
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Models 5 and 6 consider both aspects of pre-parliamentary careers together in the same 
equation, but with different identification strategies for political experience. Model 5 uses the 
continuous variables for amount of political experiences while Model 6 uses the LCA political  
career type. Both models have a 0.1 increase in their value of R square when compared to the 
baseline model, which indicates that together, both aspects of MPs’ pre-parliamentary career 
are together explaining about 10% of the variation of electoral security across the entire 
cohort. The size, sign and significance of most of the coefficient for pre-parliamentary career 
variables are roughly similar to those found in Models 2, 3, 4, with the exception that the 
amount of experience in science and technology loses significance in Model 5, while the 
dummy variable for career changers loses its’ significance in Model 6. These similar results 
show, on the subject of electoral security, there is not much interaction going on between 
the professional and political aspects of MP’s pre-parliamentary career, and that findings 
from these models are robust as they are not changed by taking both aspects of MPs’ pre-
parliamentary careers into consideration. 
 
To explore the party specific pattern in electoral security among MPs, Models 7 and 8 includes 
only new MPs of the Conservative and Labour parties respectively. The result of Model 7 is 
largely similar with those found in earlier models, with the notable difference that the 
coefficient of the dummy variable for ethnic minority MPs is positive and statistically 
significant at 0.01 level, which indicates that among the cohort of new Conservative MPs, 
minority MPs are indeed representing seats that have larger conservative majority in 2005. It 
is estimated that on average, in the 2005 election, those constituencies that are now 
represented by new minority Conservative MPs have had a Conservative majority that is 11.5 
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percentage point higher than other seats that have elected new Conservative MPs in 2010. 
On the other hand, prior experience as government officials loses its significance among the 
Conservative cohort. As for the Labour model (Model 8), given the substantially smaller 
Labour cohort, it is perhaps not surprising that statistic significance is not achieved by most 
of the variables. The only coefficients that are significant in Model 8 are those that denote 
the amount of experience as political worker and the dummy variable for Carpetbagger.  
 
4.5.2 Average electoral security scale models 
Table 4.3 shows the odd ratios after ordinal logistic regression using the normalized four point 
electoral security scale as the dependent variable. The models are largely similar to those 
found in Table 4.2, except for the omission of party fixed effect. Given the scale denotes the 
intra-party quartile of the size of majority, each parties would have exactly one fourth of their 
MPs in each categories, party fixed effect is expected to be redundant and hence omitted. 
Because the electoral security scale is calculated from the average size of majority across 
three general elections, including the 2015 election in which Labour and Liberal Democrat 
have suffered historic losses in Scotland, due the extremely large, post independence 
referendum swing from them to the SNP. In order to take this into account, a regional dummy 
for all MPs representing Scottish seats is added to capture this shock.3 
 
                                                          
3 Since the model only include MPs from the three major parties, new SNP MPs elected in 2010 are not 
included in these models, the Scottish dummy is therefore only capturing the losses of Labour and the Liberal 
Democrat in Scotland. 
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Model 9 is the baseline model with only demographic control variables and the dummy for 
Scotland. The latter is the only variable that is statistically significant. It is estimated that being 
a Scottish MP reduces the odd of moving up the scale by about 72%. Model 10 adds the 
professional career variable into consideration. Each year of experience in the military,  
marketing and sales, finance and full-time governmental office is estimated to increase the 
odds of moving up the electoral security scale by 16.8%, 7%, 8% and 12.2% respectively. 
Dummy variables for female and ethnic minority MPs also became significant at 0.1 level, 
after the inclusion of professional career variable into the model. It is estimated that the odds 
of being in a safer group of constituencies on the electoral security scale is 67% and 171% for 
women and ethnic minority MPs respectively. Models 11 and 12 consider the impact of pre-
parliamentary political experience on MPs standing on the electoral security scale. None of 
the variables denoting the amount of various kinds of political experience are statistically 
significant in Model 11, while Model 12 found that both Career Changer and Carpetbagger as 
a group are significantly safer than the base line group Local Heroes on the electoral security 
scale. It is estimated that, compared to Local Heroes, the odds for Carpetbagger to be in a 
safer group on the electoral security scale is 117% higher. Models 13 and 14 include variables 
for both professional and political careers into the model. Results from these two models are 
very similar when compared between themselves and with the earlier models on the table. 
Notable differences between these and earlier models is that the amount of experience as 
ministerial or MP advisor, member of devolved assemblies or European Parliament as well as 
the number of times they ran for MP outside of their current constituency becomes 
statistically significant in Model 13. Each year of experience as a ministerial or MP advisor 
would increase the odd of being safer on the electoral security scale by 27%, each year as a 
member of the devolved assemblies or European Parliament increases the odds of being in a 
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safer category of seat by 77.8%, while each time an MP ran for parliamentary election out of 
their current constituency increases the odds of being safer on the scale by 50.7%.  
 
Models 15 and 16 analyze new MPs from the Conservative and Labour parties separately. For 
the Conservative model, none of the pre-parliamentary professional careers have a significant 
effect on MPs place on the electoral security scale. However, political career type appears to 
be have quite substantial impact toward electoral security among Conservative MPs. It is 
estimated that when compared to Local Heroes, Carpetbaggers among the Conservatives are 
169% more likely to be safer while Conservative Party Animals are 279% more likely to be 
placed in a safer group along the electoral security scale. As for Labour, the situation appears 
to be somewhat the opposite of that found in the Conservative party. Political career types 
of Labour MP do not appear to have any significant impact on their electoral security. On the 
contrary, it is found that professional experience as full-time governmental officers, political 
workers and ministerial or MP advisors significantly increases the possibility for Labour MPs 
to be representing a constituency that is safer. It is estimated that each year of experience in 
these professions increases the odds of being found in a safer group by 49%, 23% and 59% 
respectively. In contrast, prior experience in the legal profession is found to be associated 
with representing less safe seats, reducing the odds of occupying a safer category of seats by 
15% 
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4.6 Discussion 
There are several observable trends across all specifications that predict both measures of 
electoral security. Firstly, in the professional aspects of pre-parliamentary careers, the 
amount of experience in military, finance and full-time governmental service appears to be 
enhancing the electoral security of MPs. Secondly, the number of previous runs for MP in 
another seat is found to be associated with higher electoral security once they are elected. 
Thirdly, with the exception of Model 16, being a Local Hero in the political career type appears 
to be associated with representing more marginal and less secure seats when compared with 
the other three types of MPs. On the other hand, although it appears that electoral security 
is higher for Carpetbaggers, the difference in majority between the other three types is not 
statistically significant. All of these results are consistent across multiple models, with both 
dependent variables, where coefficients for these variables are of the same sign, similar 
magnitude and statistically significant in a majority of models.  
 
Could these findings be reconciled with the hypotheses concerning pre-parliamentary careers 
and electoral security? For Hypothesis 4.1, there is limited evidence to support it. Almost none 
of the variables for political facilitating professions, which allegedly relate to skills and 
experience related to be an effective MP, most notably those for the amount of experience 
in the legal profession, media, public relations, political work or ministerial/MP advisors, are 
statistically insignificant. Political experience as an MEP or member of the devolved 
assemblies is also found to have little impact on MPs’ electoral security except in one model. 
The only finding that appears to show experience contributing to performance as MP 
affecting electoral security is that of full-time experience in governmental services, including 
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full-time experience as a local councillor, MEP, devolved assembly member or civil servant, 
which appears to contribute to a higher electoral security when these individuals apply for 
nomination in constituencies. 
 
As for the impact of demographic on electoral security, we do observe some signs that gender 
and ethnicity are affecting the allocation of safe seats, as female and minority MPs appear 
more likely to be elected from safer constituencies. While the coefficient for gender and 
ethnicity is not significant in most models that use the real majority in 2005, and both 
variables are also insignificant in the baseline model for both measures of electoral security, 
they are nevertheless a significant determinant of an MPs’ place on the electoral security 
scale, especially when an MPs pre-parliamentary professional experiences are taken into 
account. These suggest that the efforts and recent reforms from both parties that seek to 
diversify their parliamentary cohort, in particular the ‘priority list’ established by the 
Conservatives, not only increase in the proportion of female and minority MPs in the House 
of Commons in recent elections, but also results in comparatively higher electoral security for 
female and minority MPs who did get through the recruitment process and won seats in 
elections. Furthermore, our models might have captured an unintended consequence of 
Conservative ‘priority list’, which is that it is enhancing the electoral security of MPs who were 
party insiders, since, when we compare between the Conservative and Labour models, we 
can observe that Party Animals among the Conservatives are having much higher electoral 
security, while the same effect is not observed among new Labour MPs. 
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Previous experience of contesting (and losing) an election in another constituency is also 
found have a positive impact on MPs’ electoral security. However, this has perhaps little to 
do with the expectation that prior campaign for parliament is going to improve one’s 
performance as an MP, but is more likely a result of the long tradition in British politics that 
parliamentary aspirants are expected to carry the banner for their party in a hopeless seat as 
a form of service or proof of loyalty to the party before being ‘rewarded’ with a safe seat in 
the future. Similarly, the positive relation between prior military service and representing 
safer constituencies as MPs could also be contributed to traditional prejudice among selectors 
in parties, where military service is seen as sign for patriotism or commitment to public 
services, and little to do with how this could potentially contribute to their performance in 
parliament. 
 
In comparison, the above findings appear to have lent much more credence to Hypothesis 
4.2. One notable variable that is associated with lower electoral security for MPs is that of 
being classified as a Local Hero. Nominating a Local Hero or ‘favourite son’ candidate could 
have multiple electoral benefits. Local Heroes have served in the local government of their 
community for a substantial amount of time, they would have developed name recognition 
in the community, as well as network and personal relationships with the electorate. Their 
experience also provides them with knowledge of their community, which allows them to 
better identify issues and problems that resonate with their constituents. Lastly, Local Heroes 
could also cite the achievements they have delivered for their community through years of 
service during the campaign. All these mean that nominating Local Heroes to contest in 
marginal seats makes perfect electoral sense to both constituency and national parties and 
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this effect is exactly what is being observed in the statistical models that predict electoral 
security of MPs. 
 
Finally, the positive relation between the amount of experience in the financial industry and 
higher electoral security could be explained by Hypothesis 4.3. Among the various pre-
parliamentary professional careers that are being studied, the financial services are arguably 
the one that is most financially lucrative. Hence, as expected, MPs’ amount of pre-
parliamentary experience in financial services is related to their electoral security. This is most 
likely due to the reasoning of these individuals that unless they are being nominated for a 
safe seat, which would virtually guarantee a long spell in parliament and good prospects for 
promotion, it is not worth the risk and cost associated with a career change into politics, when 
the opportunity cost of staying in the financial service is considered. Alternatively, this could 
also indicate a possible preference for applicants with experience in financial service given 
the tradition among selectors in Conservatives that they prefer to nominate individuals with 
‘business credentials’ and who ‘have proven themselves outside of politics.’ This latter 
hypothesis is made even more plausible once we take the findings from next chapter, which 
shows experience in financial services is associate with higher chance for frontbench 
promotion, into account. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
To briefly conclude the results on majority and electoral security, it has been found that both 
professional and political pre-parliamentary careers of MPs do affect the kind of seats that 
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they represent in terms of electoral security of the constituency. However, it is difficult to 
contribute this pattern of MPs with military, financial and governmental experience 
occupying safer seats to meritocratic consideration that should favour applicants with 
experiences which facilitate parliamentary work. Rather, these observations could be better 
explained as manifestations of traditional prejudice, which favour applicants with these 
backgrounds, or as a result of cost and benefit calculus of applicants that limits the supply of 
candidates with certain professional backgrounds to safer seats. The results also show a 
modest effect on electoral security from being a female or ethnic minority MP, which 
indicates that measures adopted by the two main parties to enhance representativeness, 
especially along the lines of gender and ethnicity, appear to have had some effect in putting 
female and minority candidates into safer seats. The results also indicate that, given the clear 
electoral benefit, parties appear to have intentionally nominated candidates with local roots 
in constituencies that are more marginal, so as to improve their electoral prospects in these 
areas and maximize their number of seats in parliament. 
 
Given how electoral security varies among MPs with different pre-parliamentary careers, it is 
intriguing how this may impact their behaviour in parliament. Occupying a safe constituency 
may ease MPs from electoral pressure to a certain extent, allowing them to pay more 
attention to activities that are not necessary for the purpose of securing votes among their 
constituents. The higher majorities among ex-military officers and financial workers might 
allow these individuals to focus on either using their expertise to contribute to the legislative 
process, or pursuing their sectorial interest. Conversely, might the reduced majority and the 
resultant electoral pressure confine Local Heroes to spend more of their time nursing their 
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own constituency, and thus unable to do as much in Westminster as they otherwise may be? 
Also, besides the impact on their role and focus among their various areas of responsibility, 
patterns of majority may also affect their career trajectories and voting record, especially 
their tendency to rebel against their own party, once they enter the parliament. MPs who 
found themselves having to defend a slim majority might find it necessary to defy their party 
on more occasions, so as to cultivate a personal following within their constituency that is 
independent of their party. The party may also refrain from appointing MPs with less electoral 
security to executive positions in order to avoid the embarrassment of a senior party member 
losing their seat in an election. In the following chapters we are going to see how MPs’ pre-
parliamentary careers affect these issues, and if electoral security does indeed play a role in 
determining the trajectory of an MPs’ parliamentary career, as well as their behaviour in 
parliament. 
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Chapter Five – Pre-parliamentary career and frontbench promotion 
5.1 Introduction 
While the importance of recruitment of parliamentary candidates and allocation of 
constituencies among applicants towards representativeness, and to functioning of our 
democracy as well as the behaviour of MPs once elected is self-evident, this is by no means 
the only juncture where the party, or its leadership, could determine MPs’ political fortunes. 
Another tool at the disposal of party leaders in determining the trajectory of individual MPs’ 
parliamentary careers, and hence moulding their behaviour, is through the distribution of 
ministerial and frontbench appointments. 
 
Although the British Parliament is nominally sovereign, it is the government that holds much 
of executive and legislative power. Under most circumstances, it is government ministers 
and the frontbench team who oversee the running of various departments and provision of 
public services, control public finances, develop and implement new policies, communicate 
and explain government actions towards the public, and initiate most of the legislative 
proposals that are presented for parliament’s consideration. The importance of ministers’ 
and frontbench members’ capacity to discharge these functions is self-evident. In this 
chapter, we look at the promotion of MPs as ministers and frontbench members in the 
House of Commons. More specifically, we focus on how MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers, 
both professional as well as political, affect their chances of receiving promotion to the 
frontbench, or even the (shadow) cabinet. These provide vital information to the sort of 
knowledge and skills we could expect to find within the government as well as the 
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opposition frontbench and (shadow) cabinet, and allow us to contemplate what kind of 
impact it would have on the governance of the UK. What made this exercise even more 
intriguing is the fact that we are observing MPs who are newly elected to the House of 
Commons and serving their first term in Westminster. Numerous research have found that 
these nascent moments in a parliamentary career is a significant determinant of their 
political future. It is found that those who receive promotion during their first term are also 
more likely to be promoted in latter terms and eventually attaining higher offices then their 
contemporaries (Allen 2013, 2014, Kam 2009, Kam et al 2010). MPs being studied in this 
research and received promotion to the frontbench are likely to stay on the frontbench and 
ministerial positions for years or even decades to come. Hence, the patterns we observe 
here are not only of importance to the present, but are likely to leave a legacy to the 
governance of the UK for years to come.  
 
5.1.1 Principles of cabinet government 
In the British context, the idea of the ‘frontbench’ is used to distinguish them from ordinary 
MPs who have no position in the government or opposition leadership. In its broadest 
sense, ‘frontbencher’ encompasses a variety of positions that differ in responsibilities and 
ranking in the hierarchy of cabinet government or party leadership. At the top among 
frontbenchers are cabinet ministers, who usually carry the title of Secretary of State and are 
given the responsibility of overseeing certain policy portfolios and the functioning of 
corresponding government department. Those who serve in sinecure posts, such as 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, are also usually considered to be of the same rank as 
cabinet ministers without a portfolio. Serving under cabinet ministers are junior ministers 
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who are answerable to the head of their department, which includes both ministers of state 
as well as parliamentary undersecretaries. Junior ministers are usually given responsibility 
for a specific policy area under the umbrella of the broad portfolio of a government 
department. Under most circumstances, junior ministers only attend cabinet meetings 
when the issue being discussed relate to their brief, although in recent years, some junior 
ministers have been invited to attend cabinet meetings regularly. Cabinet and junior 
ministers are together vested with executive power and comprise the government proper. 
Besides the aforementioned executive positions, the frontbench also consists of two 
categories of posts that are non-executive and out of government proper - Parliamentary 
Private Secretary (PPS) and party whips. The responsibility of PPS is to serve as the liaison 
between individual minister and the parliament, while whips are responsible to ensure that 
the parliamentary party toe the party line during divisions and vote in accordance to the will 
of the leadership. The frontbench of the opposition is for most part organized according to 
principles similar the government frontbench, with shadow cabinet ministers, supported by 
junior shadow ministers, in charge of the opposition’s response to corresponding 
government cabinet minister and departmental affairs, while opposition whips are in charge 
of maintaining party cohesion during division. One notable difference between government 
and opposition frontbench is the lack of PPS for opposition ministers except for the leader 
of the opposition. 
 
The extent of and constraints upon the Prime Ministers’ power in appointing and dismissing 
members of cabinet as well as other lesser member of their  government has been subject 
to scholarly scrutiny in recent years (Berlinski et al 2007, Berlinski et al 2012, King and Allen 
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2010). While the appointment of ministers is ultimately the responsibility and prerogative of 
the prime minister, they could consult fellow cabinet members when appointing junior 
ministers answerable to them. For the non-executive positions, the appointment of PPS and 
junior whips are the responsibility of, or at the very least strongly influenced by, the 
corresponding minister and the chief whip (Berlinski et al 2012). Therefore, the frontbench 
appointment, in particular among more junior and non-executive position, is more of a 
collegial decision, while the Prime Minister can exert more influence in the appointment of 
more senior frontbench members. Moreover, although there are no de jure constraints on 
whom the Prime Minister can appoint as minister, given the principle of accountability to 
parliament and the fact that one of their major responsibilities is to represent the 
government in response to parliamentary scrutiny, British ministers have to be, by 
convention, member of the parliament. Because of the declining importance and status of 
the House of Lords, ministers and frontbenchers have been, for the last several decades, 
drawn overwhelmingly among the ranks of MPs sitting in the House of Commons.  
 
5.1.2 Responsibilities of ministers and the skills involved 
There are several different and occasionally conflicting considerations when Prime Ministers 
or party leaders choose from among their parliamentary party who is to be promoted to the 
frontbench. Most important of which is the ability of individual MPs in shouldering the 
responsibilities of becoming a minister or frontbench member. After all, implementation of 
party leaders’ agenda and electoral prospect of the party are at least partially dependent on 
the ability of frontbenchers to deliver the desired policy change and effective provision of 
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public goods when the party is in government, or the vigorous scrutiny of government 
conduct and formation of alternative policy proposals when they are in opposition. 
 
Similar to our discussion on the various roles of parliamentarian there are multiple roles 
that frontbenchers are expected to play. Headey (1974) suggested seven roles that 
ministers are expected to perform - to initiate policy of their own or impose policy 
formulated by their party, to choose between policies as proposed by civil servant or other 
advisors, to manage their performance of their government department, to be an active 
member of cabinet member and simultaneously contribute to the broader discussion and 
coordination among various government department while strive for resources for their 
own departmental programs; to strengthen cohesion of their party and facilitate future 
electoral success, to promote the policies of their department or the government as a whole 
to interest groups as well as the general public through good management in public relation, 
and lastly to be a representative of their respective regional, religious, ethnic or social class 
in government by being a member of these groups and provide a voice of their concern in 
government. Bakema and Secker (1988) conceptualized these roles along two dimensions of 
responsibilities - technical and political. These dimensions correspond to the dual identities 
of a government minister, who on one hand is the manager of governmental department 
overseeing the delivery of policy changes and public goods provision, while simultaneously 
representing their party in the collective cabinet government. 
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5.2 Pre-parliamentary and frontbench prospects 
5.2.1 Professional experience 
These multiple roles of minsters demand a variety of skills and quality for them to be 
effective. King and Allen (2010) suggested four criterion Prime Ministers use in choosing 
their ministers. Firstly, potential ministers ought to have governmental competence. This 
relates to the technical aspect of being a minister as suggested by Bakema and Secker 
(1988). Effective ministers ought to be able to swiftly master the policy brief that they are 
assigned, as well as being able to deal with civil servants and other governmental officials in 
order to effectively manage the running of their department. The issue of ministers’ 
governmental competence has also given rise to the discussion on the required level of 
specialized knowledge of certain policy area for individuals to be qualified as ministers. On 
the one hand, the traditional views of British ministers was that their roles were that of a 
generalist, intelligent layman who brings with them extensive experience on a variety of 
issues but no intensive knowledge in a particular area (Berlinsky et al 2012, Headey 1974). 
On the other hand, it has been suggested that ministers ought to have some technical 
knowledge on the specific policy brief that they have been given. The appointment of 
technical ‘specialists’ has been found to be the common practice in the Netherlands 
(Bakema and Secker  1988) and to a lesser extent in Sweden (Beckman 2006). ‘Specialist’ is 
usually defined as ministers who has an extensive education or pre-ministerial careers in 
occupations or positions that has some relevance to their policy brief (For example, Justice 
Minister with a law degree or who has been working as a lawyer prior to appointment). 
However, Beckman argued that certain political experience, such as membership of relevant 
legislative committee or previous ministerial experience could also bestow individuals with 
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technical knowledge of the brief and the definition of ‘specialist’ ought to be extended to 
include these political experience as well. Such ‘specialist’ ministers are arguably more able 
to deliver innovative and radical policy change as oppose to the generalist (Headey 1974).  
In contrast, the notion of ministers as generalists associates the role of ministers not as 
policy initiators but instead sees them as selector policies as well as manager of their 
government department. The dilemma between appointing generalist or policy expert to 
certain ministerial brief is perhaps dependent on the agenda of a particular government or 
Prime Minister. In some policy areas, the Prime Minister might want a policy expert who has 
the knowledge and expertise to develop and deliver bold and new policy ideas to deliver the 
desired changes, while some other policy area might call for a more prudent approach 
which requires a generalist who is best at running the department with a safe and steady 
pair of hands (Berlinski et al 2012, Page 2001). 
 
Given that the latter analysis is looking at the distribution of all frontbench appointment 
among the cohort of new MPs disregarding the specific brief that they have been assigned 
to, it is perhaps necessary to spare a few moments to discuss how policy expertise is defined 
in the following analysis. Given the limitation of the research design (a cohort study of new 
MPs with a relatively small-N), it is not possible to match frontbench appointment of a 
specific policy brief with the relevant pre-parliamentary experience since the number of 
frontbench position for each brief would have been too small to reach any statistically 
significant findings. Instead, what I am looking at are three kinds of pre-parliamentary 
occupations that might give individual MPs advantage in policy expertise and management 
of government department across a wide range of policy brief.  
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First and foremost, I expect occupations that provide individuals with experience in policy 
formulation in general or management of large organization to have an edge in the 
competition for frontbench appointment, in particular for positions with executive 
responsibilities. Specifically, this refers to pre-parliamentary experience in policy/social 
science research as well as ministerial/MPs advisors. These experiences ought to bestow an 
individual with knowledge of the processes of formulating as well as implementing policy 
change and facilitate their role as manager of government department, overseeing policy 
changes should they be promoted to the frontbench. Secondly, a major responsibility of 
minister in the process of policymaking is to overseeing the smooth passage of legislative 
bills through the parliament. Expertise in the matter of law could therefore be useful across 
a wide range of policy briefs as it may facilitate the drafting of legislations as well as 
responding to scrutiny in committee. Hence, MPs with extensive experience in the legal 
profession could potentially be an effective minister and be an attractive choice for the 
Prime Minister or Party Leader in the processes of appointing frontbench members. Thirdly, 
besides the importance of governance in the role of ministers, individuals’ presentational 
capacity is also an important concern when Prime Ministers put together their frontbench 
team (King and Allen 2010). After all, minsters are the most visible members of the 
government who are expected to serve as the chief spokesperson of their department and, 
particularly on their assigned policy brief, of their party. It is essential that ministers are 
competent in communication and public relations in order to effectively explain, promote 
and defend policy decisions and actions of the government, both toward the parliament as 
well as the general public. Headey (1974) noted the unusual emphasis in British politics on 
ministerial performance at the despatch box. Increased scrutiny from mass media in recent 
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decades has further strengthened demand for ministerial presentation capacity as they are 
required to present the government’s position via media and stand up to questioning by 
presenters and audiences during radio and television interviews. Hence, we could arrive 
with the following hypotheses:                 
 
Hypothesis 5.1: MPs with more pre-parliamentary experience in policy research or as 
ministerial/MPs’ advisors are more likely to be appointed to the frontbench, especially to the 
senior, executive positions. 
 
Hypothesis 5.2: MPs with more pre-parliamentary experience in the legal profession are 
more likely to be appointed to the frontbench 
 
Hypothesis 5.3: MPs with more pre-parliamentary experience that strengthen their skills in 
communication, in particular in public relations and in mass media, are more likely to be 
appointed to the frontbench 
 
5.2.2 Political experience 
Besides MPs’ professional pre-parliamentary careers, their prior political experiences could 
also provide them with the skills and expertise to be effective member of the government 
frontbench. We should expect MPs who have occupied political offices that provide them 
with executive experience or experience in dealing with the bureaucracy to be more likely to 
receive promotion to the frontbench. This refers to MPs who have held senior executive 
experience in the local level. Traditionally, local councils in the UK have a committee system 
where council committees are responsible for the management of certain policy briefs. The 
Local Government Act of 2000 forced local councils to move to an executive based system 
where, similar to the system in Westminster, councils are to either appoint an executive 
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cabinet or manager to exercise executive power on behalf of the council, or opt for having 
an elected mayor as the local chief executive (Moran 2005). The roles of portfolio holder, 
elected mayor and committee chair prior to the reform are therefore comparable to that of 
a minister despite at a much smaller scale. Such experience at senior level of local 
government could therefore be theoretically useful when these individuals are promoted to 
the national level of government in areas such as managing government departments, as 
well as dealing with civil servants and relevant stake holders. With the advance of 
devolution and establishment of the Scottish and Welsh Government in the 2000s, there has 
been further increase in the opportunity for prospective MPs to gain pre-parliamentary 
executive experience. However, there were but a handful of cases among the cohort being 
studied that have experience as member of these devolved assemblies and only two of 
them, Cathy Jamieson and Margaret Curran, have held executive position in the Scottish 
Government. Given the relatively short history of these institutions, especially with respect 
to our cohort (the two devolved executive has only a little over ten years of history when 
our cohort enter the parliament) it remains to be seen if the devolved assemblies and 
executives are to become an important recruitment channel and breeding ground for 
Westminster parliamentarians and ministers, or instead, to become an alternative foci of 
political ambition that would provide an independent route for political career progression 
in the constituent countries of the UK, hence retaining these talents at a regional level 
(Borchert 2011). Given the small number of MPs who have gained executive experiences 
through devolved assemblies and executive, prior experience in devolved assemblies ought 
not to have a significant impact on MPs’ frontbench prospects. 
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However, the acquisition of skills and expertise is not the only channel through which pre-
parliamentary political experience affects MPs’ frontbench and ministerial prospects. 
Although experience in local government could equip future MPs with executive experience 
that would facilitate their duty should they become ministers, it has also been found that 
MPs with local government background appear to be at a disadvantage when it comes to 
frontbench promotion. Mellors (1978) noted that local activists, whilst a major channel for 
recruitment of parliamentary candidates, ‘rarely achieve leading positions in their 
parliamentary party (p 98). Similarly, an empirical study by Allen (2014) of the cohort of MPs 
first elected in 1997 found that for MPs with only local government experience but lacking 
any prior involvement in national politics tend to begin their ministerial career at a more 
junior level, which in turn limits their prospects of further promotion and the highest office 
they could attain for the duration of their tenure in parliament. On the contrary, prior 
political experience at the national level appears to have the opposite effect: MPs who have 
pre-parliamentary experience in national politics began their frontbench career in higher 
offices, which in turn leads them to attain even higher office at the pinnacle of their 
parliamentary career (Allen 2013, 2014). Cowley (2012) suggested that this is a symptom of 
further professionalization of politics in the UK, which: 
 
Creates the potential for a two-track career path, with accelerated promotion for 
those with significant pre-Westminster experience and perhaps a slower route for 
those without. (Cowley 2012, p 36) 
 
These observations further complicate the effect of pre-parliamentary political experience 
on MPs’ frontbench prospects. On one hand, executive position in local government would 
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have made future MP better equip to be an effective minister. However, given the 
importance of political capital, contact and networking in determining promotion within 
parliament (Allen 2014, p 84), previous political engagement at the national level could also 
improve MPs prospect for frontbench appointment at the expense of those who only have 
local government experience. Therefore, we could arrive at the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 5.4: MPs with more pre-parliamentary experience in national party politics are 
more likely to be appointed to the frontbench. 
 
Hypothesis 5.5: MPs with more experience in local government are less likely to be appointed 
to the frontbench. 
 
Hypothesis 5.5.1: When compared to MPs’ experience as ordinary members of local 
government, the negative effect of experience as senior officials in local government on MPs’ 
frontbench prospects is smaller. 
 
5.2.3 Opposition versus government  
Until now, we have only considered the concern of the governing party in appointing their 
frontbench, but could the same hypothesis be applied to the opposition frontbench? There 
are two possible reasons for us to expect that composition of the opposition frontbench 
would be different from that of the government, notwithstanding the fact that they are 
from the opposing party. Firstly, the method of selecting frontbench members could be 
slightly different when a party is in opposition. For the Conservatives, the rule in selecting 
frontbench member in opposition is similar to those used when they are in government. The 
party leader, when in opposition, is able to dictate who among the parliamentary party shall 
be named ministers, with minimal consultation and input from other figures within the 
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party. However, for the Labour Party, although their leader is afforded the freedom to 
appoint cabinet ministers as they saw fit when they are in government. However, prior to 
changes in party rules in 2011, when they are in opposition, membership of the Labour 
shadow cabinet is, as stipulated by the party rulebook, selected by an annual ballot among 
the PLP. Since Labour was in the opposition throughout the timeframe of this research, it 
would be intriguing to see if such an arrangement of allowing the parliamentary party select 
members of the shadow cabinet would produce a set of frontbenchers with different pre-
parliamentary backgrounds. 
 
Secondly, the skill set that is required of the shadow cabinet could be different from that of 
the government. There have been relatively few systematic enquiries into the roles and 
corresponding skill set for the opposition frontbench. Yet, given the similarity in the 
organization of the frontbench as well as their common responsibility as the spokesman for 
their party we ought to expect a high degree of overlap in the skills required to be an 
effective government minister and member of opposition frontbench team. Frontbenchers 
on both sides of the aisle are required to be at least reasonably competent in their assigned 
policy portfolio, whether it is as an intelligent layperson or policy expert. Presentational 
capacity is also an important criteria on frontbench selection for both government and 
opposition parties. The most notable difference in role and required skills between 
frontbenchers of the two sides of the aisle is perhaps the lack of demand for managerial 
competence for opposition frontbenchers, since they are not responsible for the day-to-day 
functioning of a government department. However, given the fact that the opposition 
frontbench is seen by most as the ‘government in waiting’, its members are expected to be 
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potential government ministers should their party win the coming election. The competence 
of opposition frontbencher as government ministers is therefore a crucial consideration for 
the electorate when deciding to which party they will lend their support. Hence, despite the 
difference in responsibility, individual competence as government minister ought to be an 
important consideration when opposition leaders choose their frontbench team.  
 
5.2.4 Rebellion, party unity and frontbench appointment 
Notwithstanding their expertise and competence, the ideological compatibility and political 
utility in appointing certain individuals to the frontbench are also a significant concern when 
Prime Ministers are choosing their ministers (King and Allen 2010). These two 
considerations are perhaps in conflict with each other. Given ministers are the agents who 
facilitate their principle – the Prime Minister, to govern (Berlinski et al 2012). For the sake of 
ensuring that their political agenda is to be pursued faithfully by their ministers, the Prime 
Minister should, other things being equal, prefer a set of ministers who are ideologically 
close to their position. Also, since the British government and cabinet operate under the 
principle of collective responsibility, an ideologically diverse team of ministers might 
complicate discussion in cabinet, which could lead to indecision and gridlock in the 
executive. These concerns might lead one to expect that MPs who are ideologically closer to 
the party leaders and less rebellious are more likely to receive promotions. However, Prime 
Ministers are often constrained by the internal dynamic of their party to appoint individuals 
whom they personally dislike, distrust or disagree with in order to maintain party unity and 
to bring various factions and interests within the party into the fold. Individuals who 
represent certain interests or ideological persuasions, who have substantial following in the 
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party, the parliament or among the public, who were described as the big beasts in the 
jungle, have rarely been left on the backbench or sacked from the frontbench (King and 
Allen 2010). Since this research includes only new MPs, the inclusion of big beast is perhaps 
less of a concern. Yet, the carrot of frontbench appointment remains an important tool for 
Prime Ministers and party leaders to maintain party unity by attracting the support of MPs 
who might otherwise rebel against the party during division (Benedetto and Hix 2007). 
These two contradictory concerns complicate our expectations on MPs’ voting record, in 
particular their instance of rebellion, affect their frontbench prospect.  
 
5.3 Data and methodology 
The dependent variables analyzed here are dummy variables that denote if an MP was 
occupying a frontbench position in a given year. The information used to compile this 
variable comes from Dods Parliamentary companion from 2010 to 2014. At the end of each 
year, Dods publish a list of all government and opposition office holders, including assistant 
whips and government PPS. In order to further distinguish between different ranks on the 
frontbench, all offices are divided between senior and junior frontbench positions. The 
definition of seniority is slightly different between government and opposition MPs. For 
those in government, which correspond to all Conservative and Liberal Democratic MPs, 
senior positions are those that are formally on the government payroll, binding them to the 
ministerial code and involving the exercise of executive power. In other words, this includes 
Parliamentary Undersecretaries, Minister of States and Secretary of States. For the 
opposition Labour MPs, because there is no formal designation of PPS to shadow ministers, 
the line between junior and senior on opposition frontbench is drawn by involvement in 
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shadow cabinet. Any opposition MPs who are appointed as a member of the shadow 
cabinet or is shown as ‘regularly attending shadow cabinet’ on Dods annual account of the 
composition of shadow cabinet will be considered as senior frontbencher while all other 
shadow ministers are recorded as junior frontbenchers. Moreover, assistant whips of both 
major parties also count as junior frontbenchers. Although this only provides a cross-
sectional observation of MPs’ parliamentary careers at the end of each year, this roughly 
captures the moment which they receive these appointments, their tenure in those 
positions and their career trajectory. 
 
The analysis is divided into two parts. The first part encompasses all frontbench positions, 
both senior and junior. A panel structure is used through which the probability of each MP 
to be on the frontbench at a given year is estimated using a random-effects model, applying 
the data of their pre-parliamentary career as well as a set of control as the independent 
variables. The primary reason I have opted for a panel structure for this analysis is  because 
what we are interested here is not only whether an MPs has occupied any frontbench 
positions throughout their first term, but also for how long they stayed on the frontbench. 
An alternative approach of achieving that without using a panel structure is to simply use 
the aggregated number of years an individual MP have stayed on the frontbench as the 
dependent variable. However, this approach presents another problem because one of the 
important control variable – MPs’ rate of rebellion.  
 
It has been found, not surprisingly, that MPs who are less willing to dissent from their party 
are also more likely to receive ministerial and frontbench appointments (Kam 2009). 
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However, MPs’ rate of rebellion is also highly endogenous of their status on the frontbench. 
Given the principle of collective responsibility, MPs who are also members of the 
government are bound by their status and prevented from voting against the government 
on a wide range of matters. This means that MPs’ status as a frontbencher is going to 
supress their rate of rebellion for the duration of them staying in office. Hence, a panel 
structure is used and the rebel rate from the year prior (t-1) is instead used to predict the 
frontbench status of individual MPs at time t. It should also be acknowledged that there is 
the possibility of an ‘anticipation effect’ among backbenchers - MPs who are confident of 
receiving appointment to the frontbench in the immediate future might not want to 
jeopardize their ministerial ambition and toe the party line during divisions which they 
might otherwise have rebel against their party (Kam 2009). The approach used here is 
unable to take the ‘anticipation effect’ on rebellion rate into account.  
 
Another critical issue that needed to be address in using a panel structure to analyze MPs 
frontbench status in a given year is that observations of an individual MP across different 
year is not independent of each other. In a ministerial career, there is a certain degree of 
inertia involved - MPs who are on the frontbench in a given year are also more likely to be 
still on the frontbench the year afterward when compared to a backbench colleague. This 
required the models to also include MPs frontbench status from the previous year as a 
control for this inertia. Moreover, because frontbench status in the previous year is going to 
affect MPs’ rebel rate for that particular year as well, we are therefore required to add an 
interaction term between the two so as to discern the effect of rebel rate on future 
frontbench prospect among backbenchers and frontbenchers. Lastly, given that all MPs in 
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the dataset are newly elected, there were no frontbench status and rebellion rate for the 
year prior to their first year in Westminster. For the former variable, this issue is easily 
addressed since we could simply give all MPs a backbench status in the year prior to their 
entrance of parliament. For the latter, I have used the average rebel rate of the entire 
cohort during their first year in parliament as the substitute for their hypothetical rebel rate 
in the previous year. Whilst this may not be the most accurate approximation of their 
genuine tendency to rebel, and did not take into account the difference among members, 
nonetheless I would argue that this better reflects the circumstances that are faced by the 
Prime Minister and party leaders at this juncture. Given that these individuals are elected 
for the first time and have no voting record to rely on, there is a degree of uncertainty on 
how they would actually vote in parliament. Hence, the application of the mean rebel rate 
on the entire cohort as their hypothetical rebel rate for the year prior is a reflection of this 
uncertainty faced by those responsible for making the appointment at the beginning of the 
parliament.   
 
Besides rebellion and prior frontbench status, important variables that needed to be 
controlled include the age and majority of the MP. Various studies have found MPs who are 
younger at the time of election and have a larger majority are more likely to be appointed to 
the frontbench as well as attaining higher offices (Allen 2014, Berlinski et al 2012). One 
obvious explanation is that both youth and majority prolong a parliamentary career, which 
naturally translates into higher possibility of receiving an appointment at some point. There 
are also incentives for parties to appoint younger and electorally safer individuals to the 
frontbench, as younger ministers are more likely to have a longer spell in that position, 
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providing stability and accumulation of experience to the position as well as providing the 
novelty effect to the government while electorally safer MPs prevent the party from the 
humiliation of unexpected electoral defeat of a prominent frontbench member (Allen 2014). 
Other demographic information, including the gender and ethnicity of MP, as well as party 
and year fixed effect shall also be used as control. Lastly, the standard error will be clustered 
at individual MP level. 
 
For the analysis on senior level appointment, instead of a panel structure, a simple logistic 
regression is used to estimate the possibility of MPs reaching senior frontbench posts during 
their first term in Westminster. The main reason for not using a panel structure for senior 
post appointment is that none of the MPs in our database who have reached senior 
positions has ever been demoted within the time frame of this research. This means that 
when I try to replicate the models for the entire frontbench to analyze senior frontbench 
appointment, the dummy variable denoting senior status in the previous year causes all the 
MP-year after one they first achieve senior frontbencher level to be dropped from the 
sample due to collinearity. The fact that none of those who have entered the executive 
position or shadow cabinet has been demoted and they are all promoted in the last few 
years of the previous parliament meant it is less meaningful in analyzing the length of their 
stay at their present office. Hence a normal, non-panel, approach is used to study senior 
level appointment. One obvious drawback, of such an approach is that it prevents the 
inclusion of MPs’ rebel rate as a control variable since the issue of endogeneity cannot be 
addressed without using a panel structure. However, this is a trade-off that has to be made. 
Other than rebel rate and frontbench status of the previous year prior, the other 
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aforementioned control variables are included in the analysis. Finally, all models include 
only new MPs from the three major parties and exclude those representing minor parties. 
 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 All frontbench positions 
Table 5.1 shows the estimated odds ratios of being a frontbench member in a given year 
derived from unit change in each of the independent variables. Model 1 is the baseline 
model that includes only control variables with none of the pre-parliamentary career 
variables. The sign of the coefficient and direction of effect it indicate is mostly as expected. 
Young age is found to have a positive impact on MPs’ frontbench prospects, as it is 
estimated that every year older at the point of first election reduces the odds of being on 
the frontbench in a given year by 3%. New Labour MPs are also more likely to be found on 
the frontbench than their counterpart on the opposite side of the aisle, with an 80% 
increase in the odds of being on the frontbench in any year compared to the Conservatives. 
But most importantly, frontbench status in the previous year is found to have a significant 
impact on MPs frontbench prospect in the following year. The odds of an MP who has been 
a backbencher in the previous year, to be promoted to the frontbench is merely 4% of the 
odds of a comparable colleague who has already been on the frontbench to stay in office. As 
for the rebel rate, the tendency of backbenchers to vote against their own party during 
division is found to not have a significant impact on their prospect for promotion. While the 
sign of coefficient is consistent with the expectation that rebellion from the backbench is 
damaging MPs’ frontbench prospect, the effect is not statistically significant. Moreover, in 
contrary to previous studies, the majority of MPs do not appear to have an impact on the 
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frontbench prospect as its effect on the odds of being a frontbencher is not significant, and 
the sign of the coefficient indicates that increased majority actually has the effect of 
reducing the chance for frontbench appointment, opposite to what is expected. 
 
Model 2 introduces the set of variables denoting the number of years in employment of one 
of the professional career occupational groups. The only variable that has any significant 
effect on MPs frontbench appointment is the amount of experience working in mass media. 
The model estimates that every year of pre-parliamentary mass media experience is going 
to increase the odd of being a frontbencher in a particularly year by around 10%. This lends 
credence to hypothesis 5.3 which predicts that MPs’ previous experience in communication 
is a valuable trait in frontbench position and those with such experience are hence more 
likely to be selected to the frontbench. However, it would appear this effect is only confined 
to mass media experience as a pre-parliamentary career in public relations does not appear 
to have a significant impact on MPs’ probability of being appointed to the frontbench. Also 
notable is the effect of pre-parliamentary experience as ministerial or MP advisors. The 
coefficient for experience in this occupational group is quite substantial and borderline 
statistic significant (p=.107). It is estimated that a year of working as a ministers’ or MPs’ 
special advisor would translate into a 15% increase in the likelihood of being a frontbench 
member in any given year. This is consistent with our expectation from Hypothesis 5.1 
which suggests that pre-parliamentary experience in policy formulation and governing 
would increase one’s chance of being selected as a frontbencher. Lastly, contrary to our 
expectation from Hypothesis 5.2, experience in the legal profession does not appear to 
affect MPs’ frontbench prospect as the coefficient is very small and statistically insignificant. 
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Model 3 and 4 explore how the amount of pre-parliamentary political experience affects 
MPs’ frontbench prospects. Just as Hypothesis 5.5 predicted, experience in local 
government is found to have a negative effect on the MPs’ possibility of becoming a 
frontbencher. It is estimated that, regardless of the difference in localities and 
responsibilities that they might have, for every year of experience in local government in 
general, the odds of an MP being appointed to the frontbench in a given year is reduced by 
around 3%. In order to test the difference between ordinary and senior membership of local 
government as suggested by Hypothesis 5.5.1, Model 4 further distinguish the amount of 
local government experience between the two tiers of local political positions. The 
estimation from Model 4 is largely as Hypothesis 5.5.1 have expected; the coefficient for the 
amount of experience as an ordinary member of local government remains negative and 
significant while the coefficient denoting the effect of senior membership of local 
government shows its effect is slightly less negative in comparison to being an ordinary 
member, and this effect is not statistically significant. These shows that while in general, 
prior experience in local government appears to hamper MP’s frontbench ambitions, with 
the accompanying experience in governance and executive position, being a senior official in 
local government appears to at least partially mitigate the negative effect of following a 
local route into parliament. On the contrary, the effect of national party experience on MPs’ 
frontbench prospects appears to be inconclusive. In both Models 3 and 4, as Hypothesis 5.4  
expected, the coefficient for national party experience is positive, yet the magnitude is 
rather small and it is not statistically significant. Model 5 expresses MPs’ pre-parliamentary 
political experience in terms of their political career type. The baseline category used as 
comparison is ‘Local Hero’. None of the coefficient for the other three career types are 
significant, and this is partially surprising. Since local government experience in general, and 
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experience as an ordinary council member in particular, is distributed among both ‘Local 
Heroes’ and ‘Carpetbaggers’, they ought not be have significant impact on MPs’ frontbench 
prospect. However, as found in Models 3 and 4, experience in the national party, as denoted 
in Model 5 by the category ‘Party Animal’ is also not significantly related to possibility of an 
MP being on the frontbench, although the direction of their effect are as expected in 
Hypothesis 5.4. 
 
Models 6, 7 and 8 estimate MPs’ frontbench prospects by taking their pre-parliamentary 
professional and political experience into account. Results from Models 6 and 7 largely 
confirm the findings from previous models. The coefficient for the amount of pre-
parliamentary experience in media is of the same sign, with similar magnitude and remains 
significant across all models, including Model 8. The coefficient on total amount of 
experience in local government in Model 6 is also of the same sign and significance; its 
magnitude also increases in comparison to Model 3 and is hence statistically more 
significant as a result. This shows that the negative effect of being a local council member 
over MPs’ possibility to serve in the frontbench is even more apparent after taking MPs’ 
pre-parliamentary professional career into account. Furthermore, the discrepancy between 
the coefficient for junior and senior position in local council in Model 7 is also much more 
apparent and the coefficient for experience as ordinary local council member is more 
negative and therefore statistically more significant compared to Model 4. This shows that 
the difference between junior and senior position in local government is also made more 
salient when we consider both professional and political pre-parliamentary career. These 
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findings further increase the robustness of my findings from the earlier models and hence of 
Hypotheses 6.3, 6.5 and 6.5.1. 
 
On the contrary, Model 8 presents a surprising result - after taking professional experiences 
into account, the effect of being a Party Animal on receiving possibility of frontbench 
appointment becomes negative in comparison to the baseline, although this result remain 
insignificant. Similar result is also observed in Models 6 and 7, where the coefficient 
denoting how the amount of experience in national party affects MPs’ frontbench prospects 
becomes negative with the addition of professional experience into the model. 
Concurrently, we can observe substantial changes in the magnitude and sign of coefficients 
which represent the effect of several professional occupations that are found to be related 
to national partisan experience. The coefficient for experience in social science research and 
trade union changes from being negative in Model 2 to positive across Models 6, 7 and 8. 
There are also less substantial change in the coefficient for political worker and full-time 
governmental official, which becomes much less negative and even slightly positive when a 
political career is considered in the model. But most strikingly, the coefficient for prior 
experience as ministerial/MPs advisor increase substantially in Model 8 and become 
statistically significant. The model estimates that every year of pre-parliamentary 
experience as ministerial/MPs advisors would increase a MPs’ odds of being on the 
frontbench in a given year by over 23%. This lends us more confidence on the validity of 
Hypothesis 5.1 with regard to the positive effect of being a Ministerial advisor. These results 
appear to indicate that the slightly positive yet insignificant result for national party 
experiences we have observed in Models 3, 4 and 5 is in fact largely driven by the positive 
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impact of experience as Ministerial/MPs advisors and, to a lesser extent, by other 
‘instrumental’ occupations. Once these are taken into account, the impact of previous 
participation in national partisan politics on MPs’ frontbench prospect is actually negative. 
 
Table 5.2 shows the results of applying Model 7 to new members representing the coalition 
as well as the two main parties. Model 9 includes both Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
new MPs with a party fixed effect for Liberal MPs. The main difference between Model 9 
and previously discussed models is that prior employment in education is found to have a 
significant and positive impact on the possibility of becoming a frontbench member. It is 
estimated that among coalition MPs, every year of experience as a teacher increases the 
odds of being a frontbencher in any year by around 6%. Also found to have a significant and 
positive impact on coalition MPs frontbench prospects is pre-parliamentary experience in 
marketing and sales, which is estimated to increase the odds of being on the frontbench in 
any year by 5%. Similar to the complete cohort models, experience as ordinary member of 
local government is found to have a significant and negative effect on MPs frontbench 
prospect while experience in senior local government position among coalition MPs is found 
to have a slightly positive yet insignificant effect. However, coefficient for experience in 
media and ministerial/MP advisors lost its significance and the sign of ministerial/MPs 
advisor is actually negative, suggesting that among coalition MP, prior experience as 
ministerial advisor actually decreases the chance for one to become a frontbencher, which 
is opposite to the expected observation from Hypothesis 5.1. It should however be noted 
that the size of the coefficient for mass media experience is still quite substantial and 
borderline significant (p=.104). Lastly, it should be noted that although experience in social 
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service is also found to have significant and positive effect on frontbench possibility, it 
should be noted that there is only one sample among new coalition MPs who have any pre-
parliamentary experience in social services, which diminish the validity of this result. 
 
Another interesting finding from both Models 9 and 10 is that the coefficient for the rebel 
rate among backbenchers became statistically significant and the sign is Negative. This 
suggests that while backbenchers’ rebel rate does not have any significant effect on the 
frontbench prospect among the entire cohort of new MPs, it does have an impact on the 
probability of becoming a frontbencher among government MPs. The models estimate that 
every percentage point increase in rebel rate in a given year among government 
frontbenchers would translate into a 19% to 17% decrease in the odds of becoming a 
frontbencher in the coming year. On the other hand, the coefficient of backbench rebel rate 
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among new Labour MPs is insignificant and of the opposite sign. This indicates that while 
backbench rate of rebellion does not appear to have an overall effect on frontbench 
promotion across new MPs from three major parties, it seems to be much more of a 
concern among governing party(ies). There are two explanations for this discrepancy in the 
effect of rebel rate on frontbench appointment between governing and opposition parties. 
Firstly, being in governing and dependent on a disciplined backbench to vote to secure 
passage of legislation and motions through parliament, utilizing promotion as the carrot to 
maintain party cohesion is likely to be more of a concern for party(ies) in government. 
Secondly, since Labour has the policy of electing shadow cabinet member through a ballot 
among PLP members, the party leadership is unable to dictate the appointment of a 
substantial portion of the frontbench dependent on individuals’ loyalty, which makes rebel 
rate an insignificant determinant of frontbench promotion among new Labour MPs. 
 
Moreover, the coefficient for frontbench rebel rate is positive and significant in Model 10. 
This suggest that among new Conservative MPs who are already on the frontbench, the 
more you vote against the majority of your own party, the more likely you are to retain your 
position. The model estimate that every percentage point increase in a frontbench member 
rebel rate is going to increase the odd of him/her retaining that position in the coming year 
by 129%. This may appear to be particularly counter intuitive, but there are actually both 
theoretical and circumstantial reasons to make sense of this. Firstly, there are theoretical 
incentives for the Prime Minister or party leader to tolerate a certain degree of 
rebelliousness among frontbenchers. One of the purposes of frontbench appointment is to 
act as both an incentives for individual to vote with the party as well as bounding these 
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individual to vote with the party in important division through collective responsibility. A 
certain degree of rebelliousness would indicate that these individual might require the 
nudge that is frontbench appointment to vote for the party. Frontbench rebellious also 
signal that should these individuals be sacked from their current post, they may cause much 
more trouble for the party from the backbench. In terms of circumstantial reason, we 
should bear in mind that for the duration of this study, the Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats are engaged in a coalition government, which involved both party compromising 
on some of their position in order to form a government together. This is likely to create 
displeasure and unrest within the two parliamentary parties, especially among those who 
feel more passionate on the cause of their respective party or those who situate in the more 
extreme wing of the party. These are also the two groups of MPs who are most likely to be 
appointed to the frontbench given their loyalty to the party and the need to placate the 
extreme wing in order to secure their support for the coalition. Hence, we have observed 
this counterintuitive result where rebellious frontbenchers are more likely to retain their 
post. 
 
Model 11 shows the result of the Labour model. It should be stated in advance of further 
discussion that given the relatively small size of the Labour cohort (N=63), it is much more 
difficult to achieve statistical significance here. Although none of the variables are 
statistically significant, it is worth noting that the coefficient denoting experience as 
Ministerial/MPs advisors is positive and the magnitude is very substantial. It is estimate that 
each year of experience as ministerial advisor increases the odd of being a frontbencher in 
any year by 69%. It should also be pointed out that all of the new Labour MPs who worked 
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as ministerial or MPs’ advisors have all served on the Labour frontbench at some point 
during the last parliament. This further indicates that experience as ministerial advisor could 
be an important determinant of Labour MPs’ frontbench ambitions. However, unlike 
previous models, we do not observe any negative effect on possibility of frontbench 
appointment from neither local government experience in general nor being an ordinary 
member of local government in particular. This indicates that the negative effect of local 
government experience on MPs’ prospects for promotion is largely confined among the 
Conservative in the last parliament. 
 
To briefly conclude, the models have confirmed some of the existing understanding on 
frontbench appointment found in the literature - those who are younger are more likely to 
be selected to serve as frontbencher. Although not having an effect on the cohort as a 
whole, backbench rebellion is found to be a hindrance of government MPs’ ministerial 
ambitions. A rather unexpected finding is that frontbencher on the government bench are 
more likely to retain their position if they vote against the majority of their party. However, 
this is likely due to the compromise involved in forming the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition government compel those who are ideologically consistent with their own party to 
vote against some of the coalition policies and the government hesitant to return these 
individuals to the backbench to prevent even more serious cases of descent. In terms of the 
impact of pre-parliamentary career on an MPs’ frontbench prospects, the model has 
consistently shown that amount of experience in mass media are more likely to become 
frontbenchers while membership of local government in general have a negative impact on 
the probability of an MP serving as a frontbencher. Further investigation have shown 
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discrepancy between the effect of being a senior member of local government and ordinary 
member as the negative  impact of the former on frontbench prospect is found to be 
substantially smaller and less significant than the latter. These finding is consistent across 
almost all specification, suggesting they are robust. These have confirmed our expectation 
from hypothesis 5.3, 5.5 and 5.5.1. Experience as  special advisors to ministers and MPs 
have also been found to have a substantial positive influence on MPs chance of becoming a 
frontbencher although this result is less robust as the coefficient is only significant or 
borderline significant in some of the models. This lend some credence to Hypothesis 5.1 
with regard to ministerial or MP advisors.  
 
5.4.2 Senior frontbench appointment 
Our attention shall now be turned toward the appointment of senior positions of the 
frontbench. Given that all of these positions involve the drafting and implementation of 
policies as well as management of government department, at present or when the party is 
voted in government, we ought to expect MPs ability in policy formulation and executive 
experience to be a much more relevant and hence important consideration during the 
selection of senior members of the frontbench when compared to the recruitment of 
frontbench positions in general. Hence, the effect of Hypotheses 6.1 and 6.5.1 shall be much 
more prominent when we only consider the appointment of cabinet level positions. 
 
Table 5.3 shows the results of simple logistic regression predicting the probability of a new 
MP being promoted to senior frontbench positions at some point during their first term in 
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Westminster. The dependent variable used here is a dummy denoting if they have ever 
served in executive positions or shadow cabinet during the study period. As previously 
explained, given that none of those who have reached senior positions have been demoted, 
we are unable to use a panel structure to study cabinet appointment. And given the 
endogeneity issue with regard to rebel rate, a non-panel structure model could not 
accurately estimate that effect of rebellion on cabinet appointment, hence the factor of MP 
dissent is omitted from the model. Also notable is the fact that none of the new Liberal 
Democrat MPs have joint the executive by the end of the study period, hence all model 
contain only new MPs from the two main parties, except for the Conservative only Model 9.  
 
Model 1 serves as the baseline for subsequent specifications. None of the control variables 
have a significant impact on MPs’ probability of being appointed to senior frontbench 
positions with the exception of the gender of individual. The model estimates a moderately 
significant effect of being a female MP on the probability of becoming a member of the 
executive or shadow cabinet. It is found that female MPs among the 2010 cohort is twice as 
likely to be appointed to senior frontbench posts as their male colleagues. On the other 
hand, it is slightly intriguing that the model found no relation between electoral security and 
being a senior frontbencher, which is counterintuitive as well as going against some of the 
existing literature on frontbench and executive appointment.  
 
Model 2 introduces professional pre-parliamentary variables into the specification. As 
predicted by Hypothesis 5.1, prior experience as advisors to ministers and MPs is found to 
have a positive and statistically significant impact on MPs’ prospects of becoming a senior 
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frontbencher. It is estimated that every year of experience as a ministerial advisor increase 
the odds of receiving a senior level appointment in the first term by about 52%. Similar to 
our finding with regards to the entire frontbench team, it is found that pre-parliamentary 
experience in mass media is also a contributing factor to MPs being appointed to executive 
posts or shadow cabinet. The model estimates that every year of experience in the media 
would translate into a 32% increase in the odds of being appointed to senior frontbench 
positions. Unlike our previous finding, and somewhat unexpectedly, previous employment 
in the financial service sector is also found to have a significant and positive effect on senior 
frontbench appointment. It is predicted that every year of experience in the financial 
industry would increase a MPs’ odds of reaching senior frontbench offices by about 14%.  
 
Models 3, 4 and 5 explore the impact of pre-parliamentary political careers on executive or 
shadow cabinet appointment. Model 3 combines all local government experience into a 
single variable. The model indicates that local government experience appears to hamper 
MPs’ ministerial ambition. The result shows that every year of experience as local councillor, 
regardless of locality and seniority, reduce the odds of becoming a member of government 
or shadow cabinet by about 12%. Model 4 further distinct the effect of being an ordinary or 
senior member of local government. This estimation shows the negative effect of local 
government as observed in Model 3 can largely be contributed to being an ordinary 
member while the negative effect that stem from being a senior member of local 
government is much smaller and also statistically insignificant. The model predict that every 
year an MP serve as an ordinary member of local council is going to reduce their odd of 
receiving executive or shadow cabinet appointment by over 17%. Instead of distinguishing 
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local government experience through seniority, Model 5 distinguishes local experience by 
locality. The reason for including this model is that during the fitting of models it is found 
that none of the new MPs who have been classified as local hero has become a senior 
frontbencher during the last parliament. This prevent us from using the types of political 
career as a variable in our analysis here, but it does indicate that local heroes might be 
discriminated against in the selection for government executive offices or shadow cabinet 
member, which is confirmed by the result of Model 5. This specification estimate that every 
year of local government experience within an MPs own constituency reduce the odd of 
them becoming a senior frontbench member by about 19%.  
 
Models 6, 7 and 8 took both professional and political pre-parliamentary careers into 
consideration. When compared to earlier models, the coefficient representing the effect of 
prior experience in financial services and mass media is of the same sign, with similar 
magnitude and level of statistically significance. This suggests the positive impact of these 
experience on MPs executive or shadow cabinet prospect is not altered with the inclusion of 
political career into the equation. However, we can observe a substantial reduction and loss 
of significance with regard to the coefficient for Ministerial/MPs advisor and combined 
experience in local government. Concurrently, the coefficient with regards to pre-
parliamentary involvement in national partisan politics substantially increases in magnitude 
and becomes statistically significant. This model estimates that every year of involvement in 
national politics prior to becoming an MP increases one’s odd of being promoted to 
executive position or shadow cabinet by around 23%. Also notable is that some of the sign 
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of coefficient that represents prior experience in instrumental occupations, such as political 
workers, public relations and social science research, has changed their sign, which indicate 
a change in the direction of the effect on MPs senior frontbench prospect from positive to 
negative. Similar changes can also be observed in Models 7 and 8, as the coefficient for 
junior membership as well as in-constituency experience in local government lose their 
significance while the coefficient for national partisan activities become significant.  
 
Taking these findings together, a possible interpretation to these changes in the result 
would be that findings from prior models is actually better explained by MPs pre-
parliamentary involvement in national partisan activities. As suggested in Hypothesis 5.4, 
prior involvement in the national party familiarizes these individuals with the leadership and 
other important figures within the party as well as showing loyalty and commitment to the 
party. These two factors should increase the possibility of them being chosen as 
frontbencher and cabinet members should they find themselves in parliament. The reason 
that many of the variables denoting instrumental occupations are positive, although most, 
except for ministerial advisors, by themselves do not achieve statistical significance, is that 
they are highly related to prior involvement in national party as shown in Chapter 3. 
Similarly, the negative result for three local government related variable in Models 3, 4 and 
5 could also be explained by the lack of partisan experience among individuals who have 
followed the local route into parliament. Hence, when taking both political and professional 
experience into consideration, the pattern of involvement in national politics becomes a 
better explanatory variable on who among the new members are appointed to government 
executive positions or shadow cabinet. 
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Model 9 shows results that only include new Conservative MPs, the result is fairly similar to 
those observed in Model 8. The coefficient for pre-parliamentary experience in finance, 
media and national party have all remain statistically significant with similar magnitude, 
suggest these findings are robust among the Conservative sample. Several other variables 
do become significant when only Conservative MPs is concerned, they are those that denote 
pre-parliamentary experience in NGOs and legal profession. The Model estimates that for 
every year of pre-parliamentary experience in NGO or legal profession, the odds of an MP 
joining the government is increased by around 54% and 11% respectively, the latter is 
consistent with Hypothesis 5.2, which expects MPs with legal experience ought to be more 
likely to receive promotion due to their potential contribution to drafting of legislation. On 
the other hand, prior experience and ministerial or MP advisors is not a significant 
determinant of ministerial appointment among Conservatives; the sign is also opposite to 
what we have observed in previous models, this suggest the positive effect we have 
previously found with regard to experience as special advisors must have originated from 
Labour MPs. As a matter of fact, all 9 ex-advisors among the new Labour cohort have served 
in a frontbench capacity at some point during the parliament, and five out of nine have 
become member of the shadow cabinet. These indicate being a ministerial advisor do play a 
major role in the promotion of Labour MPs on to the frontbench. Lastly, this model also 
found Conservative MPs who are electorally more secure are also more likely to be 
appointed to executive positions. It predicts every percentage point increase in one’s 
majority increase the odds of joining the government by around 8%. This is consistent with 
expectation from existing literature on ministerial appointment. The fact that MPs electoral 
security is only significant in the Conservative only model and not among the general 
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models suggest that the Conservative leadership is likely to be more concerned with the 
electoral survivability of its minister than Labour on its shadow cabinet member. 
 
5.4.3 Predicted frontbench prospect 
Figure 5.1 Probability of becoming government minister or shadow cabinet member over the 
number of years of political experiences 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the predicted probability for an individual MP to become either a 
government minister or shadow cabinet member at some point during the entirety of the 
parliament. The predicted probability is estimated by Model 8 shown in Table 5.3. The 
baseline, which is shown on the graph at year 0, is set to be a white male Conservative MP 
who has the average age of the cohort, elected to the parliament with the average majority 
among the cohort, having never served in devolved assemblies nor the European 
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Parliament, nor having previously ran for parliament and having none of the professional 
experience being studied during his pre-parliamentary career.  
 
At year 0, or in other word if the MP have none of the two kinds of political experience, it is 
estimated that the probability for the individual to receive a ministerial appointment during 
his first term is only 5.9%. However, as predicted by the model, should the hypothetical MP 
joint the national party, as the amount of national political experience of our hypothetical 
MP increases, so does his chance for becoming a government minister while if he chooses to 
follow the local route into parliament and becomes a junior member of local council, the 
probability of him becoming a minister decreases.  
 
The probability of ministerial appointment begins to diverge significantly the at 90% 
confidence level when the amount of experience reach around twelve years. In the end, if 
the hypothetical MP have 20 years of experience in national politics on his CV, the 
estimated probability of him becoming a minister is at a more than respectable 79%. On the 
other hand, if he stayed as an ordinary member of a local council, his chance of becoming a 
government minister is at a very low level of 0.4% - in other words, virtually impossible. 
 
5.5 Discussion 
Looking at the results on both tiers of frontbench positions across the two tables, we see 
that there is evidence to validate most of the hypotheses concerning how MPs’ pre-
parliamentary career affects their prospect of receiving promotion to become a frontbench 
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member. On MPs’ professional pre-parliamentary careers, pre-parliamentary experience in 
mass media is a positive and significant factor that contributes to the frontbench prospect 
of MPs. This is a strong vindication of Hypothesis 5.3, although it would appear that only 
those who worked within mass media are favoured during the allocation of frontbench 
positions as MPs with public relations backgrounds do not appear to have a higher tendency 
of serving on the frontbenches. This indicates the skills in communicating with the general 
public and the ability to confront and engage with the mass media play a vital role in the 
selection of frontbenchers and ministers across all parties. The results from the party 
specific models also show a slight bias towards MPs with legal backgrounds when it comes 
to cabinet level appointments among the governing Conservatives. This suggests that 
concern with regard to legal expertise or competence in drafting of legislation is likely to be 
more apparent among the governing party with regards to executive positions, since it is the 
role of government ministers to draft and propose new legislation and overseeing their safe 
passage through parliament. On the other hand, for the opposition party, the point of 
contention with government over proposed legislation likely lies in select or public bill 
committees. Hence, the opposition Labour might have less need for having legal expertise 
on their frontbench. 
 
The results also strongly support all the hypotheses with regard to the effect of pre-
parliamentary political experiences. Repeatedly, the analysis has shown that MPs with more 
experience in local politics, especially those who served as ordinary members in local 
councils, are being overlooked during the frontbench recruitment process, as expected by 
Hypothesis 5.5. The evidence also supports Hypothesis 5.5.1, which suggests that there are 
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discrepancies in the frontbench prospects between ordinary local councillors and senior 
members of local governments, as the negative impact of the latter is much less severe. This 
indicates that occupying positions with more responsibility at the local level could to certain 
extent mitigate the stigma of being a local councillor during frontbench selection process. 
Results with regard to senior frontbench positions have also shown pre-parliamentary 
involvement in national party politics is an important indicator of a successful ministerial 
career, as it shows that the amount of experience in national party politics significantly 
boost the possibility of one serving as a minister or in the shadow cabinet in their first term 
as an MP. This confirms the expectation of Hypothesis 5.4. However, it would appear that 
experience in the national party is only a determining factor when choosing members of 
government and shadow cabinet while it does not significantly distinguish frontbenchers in 
general from backbenchers. What this indicates is that while prior involvement in national 
party politics does not appear to be a necessary condition for one to become a frontbench 
member, it is of crucial importance in the selection for senior positions on the frontbench. 
There could be a whole range of reasons why the Prime Minister or party leaders are willing 
to put someone on the frontbench, such as prevention of rebellion, cultivation of potential 
ministers, regional or ideological balances etc. However, previous involvement in national 
party politics appears to be a key determinant when it comes to ministerial posts, as party 
insiders are much more likely to be getting them in their first term.  
 
However, unlike the others, the evidence is not consistence with expectation from 
Hypothesis 5.1. In none of the specifications across both dependent variables was social 
science research a significant determinant. Although it is found in several models that 
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amount of experience as ministerial or MP advisors do have some positive influence on 
MPs’ frontbench prospects. Nevertheless, one of the twist with regard to the impact of pre-
parliamentary experience as ministerial advisor is that contrary to what is expected from the 
hypothesis, this is actually a more prominent, positive factor on frontbench prospect among 
Labour MPs than the governing Conservative and Liberal Democrat. This is somewhat 
counter intuitive given that executive and governing experience is arguable more valuable 
to the governing party frontbench than opposition shadow cabinet. A possible explanation 
to reconcile this finding is that the utility of being a ministerial advisors during pre-
parliamentary career does not actually stem from executive experience, but rather the 
connection within party leadership and bigwigs that it provides. As shown in the senior 
frontbench models, the positive effect of being a ministerial advisor is largely washed away 
by the inclusion of national party experience in the model. Moreover, the observation that it 
is only a contributing factor to frontbench promotion among Labour MPs while almost 
hindering the ambition of Conservative MP could be explained by the fact that the 
Conservative has been, at the beginning of the last parliament, out of government for the 
last thirteen years. Some of those who have served as ministerial advisors might have done 
so during the Major or even Thatcher administration, which means they would have to be in 
their late middle age in 2010. Not only could their age hamper their frontbench ambition, 
but the ministers they have served, or the connection and network that they have made 
during their tenure as ministerial advisors might either have lost their seats in the 1997 
Labour landslide or retired due to old age, hence losing their influence in the party, thus 
negating the benefit of experience as ministerial advisor among these individuals. On the 
other hand, ex-ministerial-advisor among Labour have most likely served during the Blair-
Brown years, ministers and MPs they have served under are most probably still fairly active 
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in the present PLP, which means they could exert their influence in propelling their protégé 
into the opposition frontbench. All in all, the results suggest that even if being a ministerial 
advisor improves one’s frontbench prospects, the likely utility of it lies not in the expertise 
and skills in governance that it provides, but the opportunity to cultivate the networks and 
relationships with party leadership that it offer.  
 
The significant effect of experience in financial services on ministerial prospects, in 
particular among Conservative MPs, is also worth some further discussion. Such a bias 
towards MPs with experience in the financial sector is largely unexpected. It is even more 
intriguing if we take this finding together with some of the observations we have made in 
the previous chapter, that pre-parliamentary experience in financial services also relate to 
MPs representing safer constituency among Conservatives. Together, what these findings 
might suggest is a latent preference or bias toward ex-financial workers during the entire 
process of political recruitment within the Conservative party, from the allocation of seats 
among applicants of parliamentary candidacy to selection of ministers among the 
parliamentary party after election. Alternatively, this tendency of appointing ex-financial 
workers as minsters could be related to Hypothesis 5.1, that previous employment in the 
financial sector equips these individuals with skills and expertise that is valuable in 
governance or management of government department. One of the major executive 
responsibility of ministers is monitoring public finance, overseeing departmental spending 
and compiling of departmental budget. Skills and knowledge ex-financial workers earned in 
the industry might be useful in these aspects of the ministerial brief. Moreover, this benefit 
expertise is not specific to a particular policy brief, but useful across multiple government 
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department. This could also explain why we only observe significant impact from prior 
experience in financial services on appointment of government ministers and not on 
frontbencher in general since financial expertise is only useful in an executive context, which 
is less of an issue when appointing PPS or assistant whips. Lastly, this preference for 
ministers with financial expertise could be merely circumstantial. As I have noted, the 
parliament that is being studied is elected and inaugurated in the wake of a severe financial 
crisis, this made public finance as well as reform and regulation of the financial industry a 
major priority for the newly elected Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government. 
Hence it is natural for the government to appoint expertise in these areas into the team of 
ministers so they could utilise their skills and knowledge with regard to these area as well as 
connection within the industry to develop new policies that tackle these issues and secure 
the support for potential policy chance within the financial sector.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
All in all, the findings in this chapter are largely consistent with the trend of 
professionalization of politics in Britain that has been observed by numerous scholars (Allen 
2013, 2014, Cairney 2007, Cowley 2012, King 1981). Those who could roughly be described 
as party insiders enjoy better ministerial prospects than their colleagues. MPs who had 
more involvement in national party politics prior to their arrival in Westminster are also 
more likely to be appointed to senior positions on the frontbench of both main parties, 
while those who followed the local route into parliament tend to be overlooked in the 
promotion process. However, the observation we have made here do help further refining 
our understanding of professionalization of politics as we have discovered some nuance 
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with regard to the impact of pre-parliamentary career on frontbench and ministerial 
appointment. 
 
First and foremost, not all party insiders are created equal, and some insiders are more 
favoured than others. My findings have shown that among occupations that can broadly be 
described as ‘political facilitating’, some of them are substantially more influential in 
frontbench and ministerial appointment than others. The models have shown that the 
amount of experience in mass media, as ministerial or MP advisor among Labour, and legal 
expertise among Conservative are all related to increase odd of becoming a minister during 
their first term in Westminster. The likely explanation for the prevalence of mass media and 
legal expertise in ministerial ranks is the functional utility that these experiences provide to 
ministers. Experience in mass media and the legal profession facilitate ministers’ roles as 
communicator and champion of party policies as well as drafters of legislation.  
 
Secondly, being a party insider is good, but local politicians are not necessarily all bad. 
Specifically, we ought to distinguish between being an ordinary member of a local council 
and being a senior official in local government. While we have indeed found experiences in 
local government hindering the frontbench prospects of MPs, there is a stark difference 
between these two tiers of local political experience in terms of their effect on individuals’ 
future frontbench prospects. Having been an ordinary member of local councils is clearly 
preventing some MPs from serving on the frontbench, yet the negative effect of serving as a 
senior officials in local government or council, either as council chair, elected mayor or 
cabinet portfolio holder, is much less severe and less significant when compared to being 
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merely an ordinary councillor. What this suggest is, although reaching parliament through a 
local political route remain a disadvantage for individual MPs in the frontbench selection 
process, the executive and governance experience associate with senior offices in local 
government means MPs who have occupied these positions have something more to offer 
the party on the frontbench when compared to ordinary local councillors and hence these 
experiences partially mitigate the disadvantage of being a local politician.  
 
However, in terms of pre-parliamentary careers and ministerial appointments, what remain 
intriguing is if these experiences actually affect the performance of ministers? Our 
hypotheses rely on the assumption that increases in knowledge and experience in a certain 
area would result in better performance in corresponding aspects of their role as ministers. 
This is a reasonable expectation from the vantage point of the Prime Minister and party 
leadership when they make appointments. However, is that really the case? Are 
frontbenchers with mass media experience better presenters and spokespersons for their 
parties? Do they perform better on Newsnight or Question Time? Are ministers with legal 
expertise producing more legislation or ensuring a smoother passage of legislation through 
the House? Moreover, this thesis has not touched upon the matching between pre-
parliamentary career and corresponding policy briefs: Are MPs with agriculture experience 
more likely to be the agriculture minister? Are the Chancellorship and treasury ministers 
usually occupied by financial experts? Answering these questions would require a 
substantial expansion of the existing database, but the potential findings could further 
advance our understanding of the ministerial selection process. In the end, these are some 
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interesting questions with regard to MPs and ministerial expertise and governance that are 
worth answering but beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
In conclusion, the findings we have observed in this chapter confirm one of the central 
hypotheses of this thesis, that the accumulation of skills and knowledge of MPs throughout 
their pre-parliamentary career could affect the trajectory of their career in parliament and 
their behaviour. In the following chapters, we shall discover if diverging pre-parliamentary 
careers of MPs do give rise to different patterns of actual behaviour in parliament.  
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Chapter Six – Pre-parliamentary career and MPs’ voting patterns  
6.1 Introduction 
In the two previous chapters we have explored how MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers affected 
their trajectory towards and within parliament. It has been shown that in both candidate 
recruitment and seat allocation processes, as well as in the appointment of frontbench 
members, the selectors do rely on MPs’ pre-parliamentary background to inform them of 
their potential quality and effectiveness as an MP or frontbencher and make decisions in 
accordance to their prior experience. However, so far we have only focused on how parties 
determine the tasks and positions of MPs based on their pre-parliamentary experience and 
the skills and expertise they bring to the table. Thus far, MPs have been treated as passive 
entities whereby their roles have been assigned to them in accordance to their respective 
experiences. What about the MPs themselves? Do diverging patterns of professional and 
political pre-parliamentary careers affect their choice of actions as a parliamentarian? In the 
remaining chapters, I focus on how MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers affect their behaviour in 
parliament. 
 
In this chapter, I look at how MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers affect their patterns of voting 
when they walk into division lobbies. Voting in divisions is a central, if not the most important, 
responsibility of an MP. Although power of the cabinet is seen as paramount in the 
Westminster system. Yet ultimately, it is through the votes of MPs that motions are carried, 
laws are made, policies are determined and the course of a nation is decided.  
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The overarching argument of this chapter is that diverging patterns of MPs’ pre-parliamentary 
career are going to affect both MPs’ policy preference as well as the effectiveness of party’s 
cohesion maintaining tools upon individual MPs, which would then translate into distinct 
patterns in voting and rebellion depended on MPs’ prior experiences. The following analysis 
of MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers and their voting patterns will look at two separate yet 
related issues. Firstly, I explore if MPs’ prior experiences affect the tendency to which they 
rebel and vote against their own party in divisions. Secondly, I also examine if pre-
parliamentary careers affect MPs’ positions on specific policy and lead to distinct voting 
pattern in division related to the particular issue. For this purpose, I use euroscepticism 
among Conservative MPs as a case and investigate if Conservative MPs’ career backgrounds 
predict their votes in divisions with regard to the issue of Europe. 
 
6.2 Why do MPs rebel? 
The general consensus with regard to politics in the Westminster system is that political 
parties are a monolithic entity whereby individual MPs under the whip of their respective 
party are loyal foot soldiers in divisions and always vote in accordance to the party line. 
Indeed, the increasing party cohesion in the House of Commons in the late nineteenth century 
to the early twentieth century has been well documented (Eggers and Spirling 2014a, Rush 
2001). However, there has been a remarkable increase in the rebelliousness of British MPs 
since the 70s (Franklin et al 1986, Norton 1987). No longer bounded by the principle of 
‘parliamentary rule’, whereby the government is expected to resign and take their case to the 
country should they lose in any division (Schwart 1980), MPs are becoming increasingly willing 
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to exhibit their discontent and disagreement to the party line by defying the party whip, 
walking across the aisle into the division lobby of the party opposite. 
 
What makes individual MPs vote against their own party? The first and most straightforward 
answer would be because they disagree with the party line. Kam (2009) called this the 
‘preference-driven approach to parliamentary behaviour’ whereby individual legislators are 
considered as policy maximizers, each with their unique policy preferences (Krehbiel 1993, 
1999). In divisions, each MP would simply vote for the option that is closer to their ideal policy 
position. Hence, the further an MP’s policy preference is away from the median of their party 
of that of the party leadership, the more likely that they may disagree with the party line on 
a particular legislative proposal and rebel against the party. Cowley (2002) found that Labour 
MPs who are self-identified as more ideologically left wing were also more likely to be 
rebellious against the Blair administration during the 1997-2001 parliament. Similarly, Kam’s 
(2009) analysis has shown that the self-reported ideological position on the left-right 
ideological spectrum and devolution has significant influence on dissent of British MPs. 
However, Kam (2009) also noted that the explanatory power of his model is rather limited, 
which suggests that MPs’ individual policy preferences are, while significant, an imperfect 
predictor of their voting pattern in the House of Commons and other factor are clearly 
affecting their decisions in the division lobbies. 
 
Another factor that compels MPs to vote against their party is the pressure of securing re-
election through winning support from their constituents. An obvious objective of all 
politicians is to win votes in order to stay in office. The electoral pressure has been an 
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important explanatory factor to a wide range of political and legislative behaviour (Mayhew 
1974). Hence, more often than not, MPs’ voting decisions are not only dependent on their 
personal policy preference, but also that of their constituents. Should the policy preference 
of the party is at odd with one’s constituents, the MP would have an incentive to deviate from 
the party line and rebel. Moreover, MPs representing marginal constituencies, thus 
vulnerable to electoral defeat, would also have a higher incentive to develop a personal 
following among constituents by rebelling in divisions. Nevertheless, most literature has 
argued that British MPs’ effort in cultivating personal votes are mainly focused on providing 
constituency services. Indeed, Norton and Wood (1993) have argued that since any particular 
national policy decided in Westminster would only be of interest to a miniscule portion of 
one’s constituent, rebellion is an awfully ineffective way of nurturing personal vote in the 
constituency. This leads to the compartmentalization of MPs between the Westminster and 
constituency aspect of their job whereby MPs rely on constituency service instead of 
parliamentary vote to create personal brand among their constituent. Cowley (2002) has 
found no relation between Labour MPs’ marginality and their rebelliousness. On the other 
hand, Pattie et al (1994) did find a modest yet significant positive effect of seat marginality 
and MPs tendency to rebel. Lynch and Whitaker (2013, p329) suggested that constituent 
pressure was the reason for some of the Conservative MP rebelling over the issue of Europe 
while Gaines and Garrett (1993) have similarly found that Labour MPs whose constituency 
party is more radical are also more likely to dissent in parliamentary votes, which indicate 
that rebellion could be a response not to the preference of the general constituent, but to 
that of the constituency party which control the process of reselection.  
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Although empirical evidence does suggest that difference in policy preference and ideological 
position between the party as a whole or its leader on the one hand and individual MPs 
themselves or their constituents on the other do contribute to MPs decision to rebel, it is 
nevertheless an imperfect and relatively weak explanatory variable to the overall pattern of 
rebellion in the House of Commons. It is an undeniable fact that despite the diversity in MPs 
and constituent policy preference, British parties remain remarkably cohesive in 
parliamentary votes. It is hence apparent that there are other considerations, in particular 
certain tools at the disposal of the party and its’ leaders in managing intra party differences 
and dissent, that is affecting MPs voting behaviour and maintaining party cohesion. 
 
6.2.1 Tools to maintain party cohesion 
There are plenty of tools in the arsenal of party leadership to maintain the loyalty of their 
troops and party cohesion during division, including carrots that reward those who displayed 
loyalty, and sticks to punish those who have gone astray from the herd. The biggest carrot of 
them all would be the appointment (or the promise of future appointment) of various 
patronage offices at the leadership’s disposal. It is of no secret that, even though most would 
deny it when asked, a substantial portion of MPs do harbour ambitions for frontbench and 
ministerial jobs at some point during their parliamentary career. Moreover, the principle of 
collective responsibility means that those who are in government are obliged to vote in favour 
of the government’s position or otherwise resign from their post. Party leaders can therefore 
maintain the party line by appointing rebellious members who might otherwise dissent into 
the government and bind them with the principle of collective responsibility.  
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The use of ministerial appointment as a tool to maintain party cohesion in Westminster has 
been well established in the existing literature. Cowley (2002) has found that of all the newly 
elected Labour MPs in 1997-2001 parliament who are promoted in their first term in 
Westminster, only one of them have voted against the government. He also found that among 
those who confess their ministerial ambitions, only 13% of them ever rebel while the 
percentage of those who do not is 66%. However, self-reported ministerial ambitions became 
an insignificant factor in multivariate analysis. Similar results were also been found by Kam 
(2009) where dissent hinders MPs’ ministerial prospects in the future. However, the 
expectation of prospective promotion does not always enhance MPs’ loyalty and for 
ministerial aspirant,a  certain limited degree of rebelliousness might actually be beneficial 
since it gives party leaders more incentives to bring one into the fold by ministerial promotion 
(Searing 1994, p106). Furthermore, when MPs’ ambitions is not realized it can become the 
reason for restlessness in the backbench. Benedetto and Hix (2007) have demonstrated that 
MPs who have either been sacked from the government or have yet to receive promotion 
despite an extended period of time on the backbench, or in other words, those that are least 
likely to be tempted to toe the party line in exchange for future promotion, are also most 
likely to rebel during parliamentary vote. This suggests that while the promise of future 
promotion might be a useful tool for party leaders to manage intra party dissent, ambitions 
harboured by individual MPs might increase their tendency to rebel, especially when they are 
still on the backbench. 
 
Besides the dangling of the carrot that is future promotion in front of MPs, party leaders could 
also deploy the stick that is party whips to discipline rebellious MPs. In its most aggressive 
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form, a party whip could impose party discipline by “making life less pleasant for the 
troublesome” through practices such as “deny places on (…) select committee, deny time away 
from the House, deny time for overseas trip, deny promotion, deny better office space” or even 
physical bullying (Cowley 2002). However, more usual than not, the strategy of party whip is, 
instead of punishing dissenting MPs, to communicate between the frontbench and backbench 
and to persuade the latter to toe the party line by appealing to their better senses. Cowley 
(2002) has documented the importance of party whips and other channels of communication 
between frontbench and backbench, such as parliamentary party committee, backbench 
groupings and access to minsters in maintaining party discipline, and crediting them for the 
remarkable degree of cohesion exhibit by the Labour government between 1997-2001. It is 
through these channels that before mass rebellion materialize on the Commons floor, the 
government could either adopt or compromise on their position or simply withhold 
contentious issue from being tabled. The feeling of being involved and consulted also 
contributes to MPs’ decision to toe the party line despite their disagreement on the issues. 
Lastly, even if all else failed and individual MPs remain concerned with a particular issue, party 
whips could always arrange or persuade the dissident to strategically absent from a particular 
vote in order to stifle any potential contagious rebellions (Cowley 2002, p178). 
 
Last but not least, party cohesion is also maintained by socialization to install a sense of loyalty 
and obligation to support the party despite ideological differences. Crowe (1986) argued that 
party cohesion is mostly maintained, not by the carrots and sticks at the disposal of party 
leaders, but the loyalty among MPs, which is defined as a sense of duty and obligation to 
support the party and its leader in division lobby. Moreover, loyalty is internalized through 
Chapter Six 
253 
 
constant socialisation within the parliament which internalize conformity among MPs. Cowley 
(2002) credited the desire for unity among the PLP in the 1997-2001 parliament as the key 
reason for the relatively lack of intra party dissent despite their large majority and a large 
contingent of unexpected and un-vetted victors in the landslide election. There is a 
determination to learn the lesson of disunity from the 1980s which condemned the party to 
the wilderness for nineteen years, and compelled otherwise dissenting MPs to nevertheless 
vote for the government for the sake of party unity. Similarly, Kam’s (2009) analysis of 
rebellion among Westminster MPs has also shown individual sense of loyalty to the party to 
be a significant factor that discourages MPs from dissenting in parliamentary votes.  
 
6.3 Hypotheses 
6.3.1 Professionalization, ministerial ambition and rebellion 
MPs’ pre-parliamentary career is going to affect the effectiveness of a party’s cohesion 
maintaining tools in several ways. First and foremost, it is how MPs’ prior careers affect their 
ministerial ambitions and hence the effectiveness of the promise of promotion as a tool to 
make individual MPs toe the party line. Professionalization of politics has brought an ever 
increasing number of ‘professional’ politicians who harbour much more ministerial ambitions 
than any previous cohort of parliamentarians. Former Prime Minister John Major once 
expressed his amazement as well as criticism to this trend of increasing career-mindedness 
among newly elected MPs: 
Most of the newcomers wanted, and in some cases expected, to become ministers 
within months of arriving at Westminster. Four of the 1992 intake met with the 
Chief Whip in 1993 to ask when they would be made ministers - unthinkable 
behaviour in previous generations (Major 1999, p347). 
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However, the effect of increased ministerial ambition on rebellion remains ambiguous. On 
one hand, increase ministerial ambition could arguably lead to less rebellion among MPs since 
those who seek higher office ought to be more hesitatant to bite the hand that feeds them, 
hence decreasing their tendency to rebel and have their disagreement with the powers that 
be publicized. Kam (2009) showed that MPs voting behaviour is endogenous to their 
likelihood of promotion; those who are expecting a ministerial appointment in the immediate 
future are less likely to rebel in parliamentary vote. My analysis from the prior chapter also 
shows that toeing the party line appears to be an important factor that contributes to 
frontbench promotion among the governing Conservative MPs.  On the other hand, higher 
expectations for office could also mean increased restlessness in the backbench as well as 
more intense backlash should the expectations not be met. King (1981) attributed the 
decrease of party cohesion in the 70s to the rise of career politicians who were ‘ambitious for 
office’. Benedetto and Hix (2007) have shown Labour MPs who have been overlooked in 
ministerial promotion are more likely to rebel, while Franklin et al (1986) demonstrated that 
Conservative MPs who have been salaried professionals, hence having more ‘professionalist’ 
outlook to their parliamentary career, are similarly more rebellious. All in all, it remains to be 
seen which of the following factors are more prominent in determining the voting behaviour 
of career politicians - the increased desire for promotion that pacifies backbench rebellion, or 
the bitter resentment when ambition for office is not met. Moreover, we should also note if 
there are any differences in the relevance of these two opposing forces over specific politically 
relevant occupation and experiences.  Hence we could arrive at the following competing 
hypothesis which shall be tested in the coming analysis: 
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Hypothesis 6.1 (‘Pacifying hypothesis’): Pre-parliamentary experience in political facilitating 
occupations decreases MPs dissent on the backbench due to increase ambition for higher 
office 
Hypothesis 6.2 (‘Backlash hypothesis’): Pre-parliamentary experience in political facilitating 
occupations increases MPs dissent on the backbench due to unmet ambition for higher office 
 
6.3.2 Party political experience and rebellion 
Secondly, besides the impact on MPs’ ministerial ambitions, pre-parliamentary careers, in 
particular prior political engagement occurring within the party, ought to affect both party 
loyalty and communication between front and backbenchers, which leads to a lower 
tendency of dissent. While most literature on parliamentary socialization has focused on post-
election socialization that occurs in Westminster and how it has led to increased loyalty to 
the party (Kam 2009, Crowe 1986), it is nevertheless possible that loyalty could have extra-
parliamentary origins (Asher 1973). Indeed, Kam (2009) hypothesized that an extended 
period of membership in extra-parliamentary party ought to teach and instil party and 
parliamentary norms among individuals before they enter parliament. Some MPs have also 
expressed the view that prior experience as member of party group in the local council 
facilitates the learning ‘habit of group discipline’ (Cowley 2002, p118). 
 
Although there ought to be an overall positive effect on party loyalty, we should also expect 
political experience earned at different levels of the party to have diverging results on MPs’ 
dissent. For party political experience that occurs at the national level, since it allows the 
possibility for individuals to develop personal relationships with the party leadership and 
other party bigwigs, this would provide them with better access to ministers when they are 
elected as MPs, which would hence decrease their propensity to rebel in a parliamentary 
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vote. However, as noted by Cowley (2002) despite the hypothetical effect on learning about 
party loyalty, prior experience as local councillor appears to be a significant contributing 
factor to increased rebelliousness among Labour MPs. Bale (1997) suggested that this might 
be because former councillors are more used to ‘having a say in the running of things’ instead 
of doing other peoples bidding once they become a backbencher in Westminster.  
 
Hypothesis 6.3: Party political experience at the national level decreases dissent among MPs 
Hypothesis 6.4: Experience as a local councillor increases dissent among MPs 
 
6.4 Data and methodology 
There are two unique challenges with regard to the study of rebellion in the House of 
Commons - to determine the existence of the party line and where the party line stands in a 
particular vote. By definition, for an MP to rebel, there would have to firstly be a party line 
issued by the whips’ office and the said MP would have to vote against the party line in the 
particular division. Yet on a wide range of issues, mostly concerning issue of conscience, 
parties occasionally allow its MPs a free vote, unbounded from any official party whip, to 
allow MPs to vote according to their personal judgement. Further complicating the definition 
of rebellion is the fact that even if MPs are given a free vote, the party leadership may 
nevertheless signal their preference for the vote, such as the vote on same sex marriage and 
the air strike on Syria. Ultimately, the lack of transparency from party whips to disclose the 
party line means it is difficult to determine if a particular vote is indeed a rebellion or not. 
Hence, in the following analysis, a rebellion shall be defined as a vote where an MP adopts a 
position different from the majority of his/her party. 
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The data used to calculate the number and rate of MP dissent in parliamentary division comes 
from theyworkforyou.org.uk1, which covers how each MP voted in all divisions during the 
2010-2015 parliament. This information is first used to determine how the majority of MPs in 
each of the main party voted in every division, which is then used to determine if an MP voted 
with the majority of their parliamentary party in a particular division. Should an MP be on the 
minority of their party in a particular division, they will be deemed as rebelling, regardless of 
any voting instruction from the leadership or party whips. The number of rebellions for each 
MP is then aggregated. In order to account for strategic absence of MPs and determine if the 
number of rebellions relates to MPs’ division attendance, I have also recorded if an MP has 
attended a particular division by voting in one of the lobby and calculated their attendance 
rate. (It should be noted that those who abstain by staying in the chamber without walking 
into either division lobby will also be deemed as ‘absent’ since there is no record of their 
votes).  MPs’ attendance rate is used as an intervening control variable in the coming analysis 
on MPs’ voting behaviour as well as to calculate the rate of rebellion, defined as number of 
dissentions divided by the number of attended divisions, elsewhere in this thesis. 
 
The dependent variable used in the following analysis will be the total number of rebellion 
each MP has participated in the 2010-2015 parliament. Since the total number of rebellions 
for individual MPs is a count data, negative binomial regression model will be used to analyze 
how MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers impact on their propensity to rebel against their party 
during division. The analysis could be divided into two parts. Firstly, all newly-elected MPs 
                                                          
1http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/data/votematrix-2010.dat (Retrieved 27th October 2015)  
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from the three major parties will be considered together and explore how MPs’ prior 
experience affects their rebelliousness in general. Secondly, separate analysis for new MPs 
representing the two main parties will be conducted to discover trends specific to each of 
them.  
 
A few words should perhaps be spared to explain why I have opted to analyze the aggregated 
number of rebellion throughout the entire parliament but not that of each particular year, 
especially since the data is available and called for, given the importance of controlling for the 
period which individual MPs have spent on the frontbench. The reason that a panel structure 
is not used in analyzing MPs’ rebellion is the fact that for individual MPs, in a lot of years, 31% 
among newly elected MPs to be precise, there were no rebellions, which would render the 
dependent variable heavily zero-inflated. Moreover, the explanation for an MP to not rebel 
at all in a particular year, most notably being appointed to frontbench or government 
position, which made them bound by the principle of collective responsibility, is likely to be 
different from those that separately occasional and frequent rebel. On the other hand, the 
aggregate number of rebellions do not suffer from the problem of zero inflation as over 90% 
of all new MPs have voted against the majority of their party at some point during the course 
of their first term. The issue of frontbench MP not able to rebel can be taken into account by 
adding the number of years they spent on frontbench as a control variable. 
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6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Full models 
Table 6.1 shows the result that encompass all newly elected MPs from the three major 
parties. All models include demographic control variables and party fixed effect while MPs’ 
division attendance rates throughout the entire parliament and the number of years they 
spent in the two tier of frontbench positions areadded as an intervening variable in some of 
the models.  
 
Model 1 consists of demographic controls; the party fixed effect as well as the set continuous 
variables that denote the number of years an MP spent in each of the pre-parliamentary 
professional career occupational groups. It shows that old age among MPs increases the 
number of occasions when they rebel, by 1.3% per year, while being an ethnic minority and 
representing the opposition Labour party decreases the number of rebellions they are 
involved in. For the professional career variables, the only professional experience that has a 
significant effect on MPs’ rebellion is that of being a lawyer or worked in social services. The 
sign of the coefficient for both variables are positive, which suggests that experience in the 
legal profession and in social services increases the number of dissenting votes an MP would 
cast during divisions. The model estimates that each year of pre-parliamentary experience in 
the legal profession would increase their number of rebellions throughout the entire 
parliament by 2.9%, while each year spent in the social services sector increases the number 
of rebellions by 4.4%. 
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Models 2 and 3 consider the impact of MPs’ pre-parliamentary political experiences by using 
two sets of variables. Model 2 considered MPs’ pre-parliamentary political involvement as 
continuous variables that measures the amount of experience they have in various type of 
party political positions. It is found that prior experience as elected member of devolved 
assemblies or European Parliament have a significant effect on discouraging MPs’ dissent. The 
model estimates that each year an MP has spent in a devolved assembly or European 
Parliament reduces the number of rebellion by 5.9%. Model 3 used the pre-parliamentary 
political career type constructed in Chapter Four to measure new MPs’ political experiences. 
It found none of the career types are a significant explanatory factor on parliamentary 
rebellions. Sign, magnitude and significance of coefficient for all demographic control 
variables and party fixed effects in both Models 2 and 3 are roughly similar to those found in 
Model 1. 
 
Models 4 and 5 take into account both professional and political aspect of MPs’ pre-
parliamentary career by including variables from both dimensions within the same 
specification. Model 4 used the continuous measure of the amount of pre-parliamentary 
political experience. It was found that, besides the positive effect of legal and social service 
experience on rebellion, prior experience in the military also contributes to MPs’ decisions to 
vote against the majority of their own party. It is estimated that each year of experience as a 
military officer increases the number of rebellion from an MP by 5%. On the other hand, prior 
experience as a ministerial or MP advisor significantly reduces the number of occasions an 
MP rebel against their party by an estimate of 9.3%. In terms of their political experiences, 
Model 4 found that the coefficient for previous experience in devolved assemblies and 
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European Parliament loses its significance, while experience as elected local councillor within 
their current constituency became significant. The model estimate each year of local council 
experience within an MP’s current constituency increases their number of rebellions by 2.6%. 
A similar effect on rebellion is not observed with regard to local council experience out of an 
MP’s current constituency. It should also be noted that the coefficient for an MP’s age has 
significantly reduced magnitude, which rendered it statistically insignificant. Model 5 used 
MPs’ political career type to denote their prior political experience; it was found that after 
taking professional experience into account, political career type becomes a significant factor 
that predicts MPs’ rebellious tendency. It is found that both Local Heroes and Party Animals 
are significantly more likely to rebel when compared to Career Changers, it is estimated that 
belonging to the two former categories increases MPs’ dissent by 53.2% and 43% respectively 
when compared to those who have no prior political experience. This is similar to what we 
have found in Model 4, that in-constituency local government experience contribute to 
increase rebelliousness. The coefficient for professional experience in Model 5 remains 
roughly similar to those found in earlier models, except for Social Services which loses its 
significance. 
 
Models 6 through 8 are based on Model 5 but added MPs’ division attendance rates and the 
length of their stint on the frontbench as intervening control variables. Model 6 included MPs’ 
division attendance rate into the specification. Not surprisingly, it is found that higher rate of 
attendance in divisions also leads to increased number of rebellions as it is estimated that 
every percentage point increase in an MP’s rate of attendance increases their number of 
rebellious votes by 2.9%. There are also some remarkable changes to the coefficients of pre-
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parliamentary experience when division attendance rate is taken into consideration. Most 
notably the magnitude of the coefficient responsible for prior experience in mass media has 
increased substantially and has become statistically significant. The sign of this coefficient is 
positive, which suggests that previous experience in mass media increases rebelliousness 
among MPs. It is estimated that each year of experience in mass media increases the number 
of rebellions of an MP by 5%. On the other hand, the inclusion of division attendance has the 
opposite effect on the coefficient for prior experience in the legal profession as the magnitude 
and hence statistical significance are substantially reduced. The effect of MPs’ political career 
type remain largely similar to those found in Model 5, although the there is a slight reduction 
to the magnitude and significance of the coefficient for Local Heroes.  
 
Model 7 includes the length of time an individual has spent on the frontbench to account for 
the fact that they are bound by the principle of collective responsibility and are unable to cast 
their vote against the government, despite any disagreement or other consideration. As 
expected the coefficient for the length of time one spent in both tiers of the frontbench is 
negative and highly significant. The model estimates that every year in junior frontbench 
positions reduces the overall number of rebellious votes by an individual MP by 14.4% while 
a year as a senior frontbench member would reduce the occasion of rebellions by 21.3%. A 
notable difference after the inclusion of MPs’ stint on the frontbench into the model is that 
the coefficient for prior experience as military office and ministerial advisors has lost its 
significance. This suggests that the significant effect of these two professions on MP 
rebelliousness as observed in some of the other models are likely driven by the inclusion of, 
or exclusion from, the frontbench. As shown in Chapter Six, pre-parliamentary experience as 
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a ministerial advisor was a moderately significant contributing factor to frontbench 
appointment. Hence, the slight negative effect of previous experience as ministerial advisor 
on MP rebelliousness could be partially explained by the higher probability for them being a 
frontbench member, as found in the last chapter. Similarly, the fact that none of the new MPs 
with military experience have been promoted for the duration of the entire parliament is a 
better explanation for the apparently higher level of rebelliousness among them.  
 
Model 8 is a complete model that includes variables from both dimensions of pre-
parliamentary career as well as all the control variables. It is estimated that only two pre-
parliamentary professional experiences are significant predictor of the number of rebellious 
votes cast by an MP - mass media and financial services. The model estimates that each year 
of experience in finance and mass media is going to increase the number rebellious vote cast 
by the MP by 2.7% and 5.4% respectively. As for prior political experience, it is found that 
being a Local Hero has lost its significance while Party Animals remain significantly more 
rebellious when compared to Career Changers. The magnitude and significance of all control 
variables are similar to what have been observed in the previous models, with the exception 
of age, which again loses its significance as a contributing factor to rebellion among MPs.  
 
To briefly conclude the results we have uncovered so far, there are several pre-parliamentary 
experiences that have been shown to have a significant impact on individual MPs’ level of 
rebelliousness - military, legal profession and in-constituency local government experiences 
have been found to encourage MPs to vote against the majority of their own party, while 
prior experience as ministerial advisors appears to enhance loyalty during division. While this 
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appears to have lend credence to Hypothesis 7.4, which predicted that local government 
experience increases dissent from individual MPs. However, all of these effects are washed 
away once MPs’ division attendance rates and the length of time they spent on the 
frontbench is included in the specification. This suggests that party leadership preference for 
certain pre-parliamentary experience in frontbench appointments might be a better 
explanation for these trends. As for the apparent positive effect on rebellion from legal 
experience, since we have observed a substantial decrease in its significance after the 
inclusion of division attendance rate in Model 6, a more plausible explanation to the observed 
effect is that ex-lawyers are simply more diligent MPs in terms of showing up during divisions.  
 
On the other hand, MPs’ amount of prior experience in finance and mass media is shown to 
encourage rebellious votes among MPs after attendance rate and frontbench status has been 
taken into account. This shows that MPs who worked in these two sectors prior to entering 
parliament tend to be more rebellious when they are on the backbench. These results are 
similar to what the ‘backlash’ hypothesis anticipated, that MPs with higher expectations for 
frontbench promotion are likely to be more restless and rebellious on the backbench. We 
have, in the previous chapter, established that MPs’ experience in both finance and mass 
media are important predictors for earning promotion, in particular to ministerial rank. 
Chapter 4 have also established that MPs with experience in finance are more likely to be 
representing safe constituencies, a plausible explanation of which is that they are more 
ambitious and career- minded that they intentionally choose to apply for candidacy in safe 
seats in anticipation of a long and successful spell in Westminster. It is perhaps not surprising 
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that when their expectations of a ministerial career were not immediately met, they make 
their disappointment and frustration be known by voting against the party line.  
 
All in all, there are several major findings from these models. Firstly, frontbench appointment 
is a powerful tool in managing intra party dissent. The models have shown significant and 
substantial decrease in the number of dissentions that could be attributed to the amount of 
time individual spent on the frontbench. However, it also shows that using frontbench 
appointment as the carrot to encourage loyalty and cohesion among backbenchers does have 
its limits. MPs who are equipped with experience that made them, rightly or wrongly, more 
ambitious are also more likely to be frustrated by the unmet expectation of rapid promotion 
and are not hesitant to express their disappointment by rebelling in divisions. Lastly, it is also 
found that taking everything into account, being a Party Animal is a significant factor that 
encourages rebelliousness among MPs. This is a somewhat surprising finding given that 
Hypothesis 7.3 has predicted that prior involvement in the national party does not inspire 
loyalty and conformity among new MPs alone, which is a puzzle that we will explore further 
in the coming sections. 
 
Figure 6.1 is a graphical representation of the amount of experience in one of the selected 
occupational groups and the estimated number of total number of rebellion for the entirety 
of the parliament given the stated number of experience to a baseline case. The estimation 
was made using Model 8 shown in Table 6.1. The baseline of calculation is a male, white 
Conservative MP at the mean age, elected on the mean majority and having the mean 
attendance rate among the cohort who has never become a frontbench member throughout 
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the parliament, and has none of the professional experience being studied. Because we have 
included experience as ministerial or MP advisor in this analysis, which is highly related to 
being classified as a Party Animal, we therefore assume the baseline case to be a Party Animal 
as well.  
Figure 6.1 Amount of Experience in Selected Occupational Groups and Estimated # of Rebellion 
 
The point to the left of the graph represents the estimated number of rebellion vote the 
baseline MP is expected to cast throughout the five years of the parliament. It is estimated 
that at the baseline, without any professional experience being studied, that the said MP is 
going to vote against his party 21.4 times through his first term. As shown in the coefficient 
table, amount of experience in media is associated with increased rebelliousness, while that 
as a ministerial or MP advisor is associated with increased party loyalty. Hence, we could 
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observe that the line that represents prior experience in media has a positive slope and trend 
upward. On the other hand, the line representing experience as ministerial or MP advisor has 
a negative slope and trend downward. The estimate number of rebellions between the three 
professional experiences began to diverge significantly at 90% confidence level when the 
amount of experience in respective occupations increased beyond ten years.  At the end of 
the estimation, after our hypothetical baseline MP has spent twenty years in ether mass 
media or as ministerial advisor, the expected number of rebellions is 61.7 and 5.6 
respectively. 
 
6.5.2 Party models 
After exploring the general models that encompassed new MPs from all three major parties, 
we shall now turn our attention to party specific models. Table 6.2 shows the result of party 
specific models, applying the same specifications found in Models 5 through 8. Models 9 to 
12 include only new Conservative MPs, and it is shown that the coefficient is not much 
different from those observed in Table 6.1, with a few notable exceptions. Firstly, the amount 
of experience as teachers and in public relations is shown to have a slightly significant and 
negative effect on MPs’ tendency to rebel, although this effect disappears after taking 
attendance rate and frontbench status into account. Secondly, it further confirms my earlier 
finding that the positive effect of legal experience on rebelliousness is largely driven by their 
higher attendance rate since it is only a significant factor in specifications that exclude 
attendance rate as a control variable. Thirdly, in contrast to the results from the general 
model, age is consistently a significant and positive predictor for MP rebellion across all 
specification. Fourthly, being a Party Animal loses its significance in the final model. Lastly, 
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coefficients for military experience and ministerial advisors become significant in the final 
model that includes all control variables. It appears that, even if their frontbench status, or 
the lack thereof, are taken into account, experience as military officers and ministerial 
advisors does affect individual Conservative MPs’ decision on rebellion. Conservative MPs 
with military experience do indeed more frequently vote against the majority of their 
colleagues, while those who have been ministerial advisors are more likely to toe the party 
line.  
 
Our attention now turns to how pre-parliamentary careers affect Labour MPs’ tendency to 
dissent. Models 13 to 16 indicate the result of the models on new Labour MPs. There are 
several stark contrasts between the results of the two main parties. None of the factors that 
significantly affect the number of rebellions among new Conservative MPs, including 
experience as military offices, ministerial advisors, financial services and being a Party Animal, 
are significant when the same model are applied to new Labour MPs. Nor do MPs’ age and 
minority status affect their decision to rebel. While past experience in mass media remains a 
significant factor, the sign of the coefficient is negative, which suggests that in contrast to 
what we have observed among the Conservatives, media experience among new Labour MPs 
actually discourages parliamentary dissents. On the other hand, experience in social services 
encourages rebelliousness among new Labour MPs. Lastly, while Party Animal appears to be 
the most rebellious group of MPs among the Conservatives, it is the Local Heroes who proved 
to be more restless among new Labour MPs. This suggests that, while among Conservative 
MPs it is prior involvement in the national party and being a party insider that is inspiring 
dissent, it is in-constituency local political experience and a personal roots among ones’ 
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constituents that encourages new Labour MPs to defect from the party line. A possible 
explanation for this would be the fact that for the duration of this study, the Conservatives 
were involved in a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. It is inevitable that there 
had to be compromises on policy for such an arrangement to work. It is no secret that with 
regard to a wide range of policies, from the issue of Europe, Civil Liberty to political reform, 
there was significant unrest on the backbench of both parties. King (1981) argued that it is 
the career politicians, those that have long involvement in politics, who are more ideological 
and have stronger commitment to a political cause. Hence, an alternative explanation on 
what we have witnessed with regards to the rebelling Party Animal among the Conservative 
might be a sign of rebellion against what is perceived as a betrayal of the true values of the 
party and an indication of loyalty to the principle of Conservativism, untainted by compromise 
with any external actors. 
 
6.6 Pre-parliamentary careers and the formation of special preferences 
After exploring how pre-parliamentary careers affect MPs’ general tendency to rebel in 
divisions, we now turn our attention to how it contributes to the formation of special 
preference or interest in a particular policy, which could turn into distinct voting patterns in 
selected groups of parliamentary votes. 
 
Burden (2007) argued that while institutional and structural factors such as constituency 
preference, ideology and partisanship are indeed important factors that are driving the 
aggregate pattern of voting in the US congress, they are nevertheless less useful in explaining 
Chapter Six 
272 
 
the voting pattern in a specific vote or issue which, he believed, is more dependent on 
personal characteristics and has found, for example, that  congress members who smoke are 
also more likely to vote against regulating the tobacco industry. In the context of Britain, 
individual MPs have also been credited with bringing in their expertise from their pre-
parliamentary career which has substantially shaped the debate and policies. For example, Dr 
Sarah Wollaston, a former GP, has been a vocal critic of her parties’ policy with regard to 
health and social care (The Guardian, 14th June 2014) 2 . In the tribute following her 
assassination, Jo Cox’s colleagues frequently cited how she brought her expertise and 
perspective from her former career in international aid and development into  parliament and 
contribute to the ongoing debate about the Syrian refugee crisis (The Guardian, 16th  June 
2016)3. However, research on how MPs’ personal experiences affect issue voting in the House 
of Commons has been rather limited. Goodwin (2015) studied the impact of MPs’ scientific 
training and education, or the lack thereof, on their votes during the passing of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 and found that MPs’ prior experience in scientific 
research did not have any significant impact on how they voted with regard to the particular 
bill being considered. But nevertheless, it remains possible that MPs’ pre-parliamentary 
career might play a role in shaping their preference on a specific issue.  
 
6.6.1 Euroscepticism among the Conservatives 
To further investigate if pre-parliamentary experiences do affect MPs’ position and voting 
record in a particular issue, we shall use Euroscepticism among new Conservative MPs to 
                                                          
2https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jun/14/tory-critics-cameron-battle-health-select-committee 
3http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/jo-cox-global-aid-worker-to-labour-adviser 
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demonstrate if their pre-parliamentary careers do contribute to the formation of special 
position with regard to Britain’s relationship with the European Union. 
 
The issue of Europe has long plagued party cohesion among the Conservatives ever since Ted 
Heath first brought Britain into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, which split 
the party into those who wanted Britain to fully participate in the European project and those 
who opposed British involvement in Europe. It was the issue of British ascension to the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) that accelerated the downfall of Margaret 
Thatcher. It was also the signing of the Maastricht treaty and the resultant series of high 
profile rebellions that tarnished the reputation of John Major’s administration as well as that 
of the Conservative party, which led to their landslide defeat by Labour in 1997. The move to 
opposition did not cease the animosity between two factions of the party and managing intra-
party dissent on Europe has been a priority on the agenda of several Conservative leaders. 
Despite their efforts, Europe remains a contentious issue among the Conservatives after their 
return to power. Following the 2010 election, the Conservatives joined the considerably more 
pro-Europe Liberal Democrats in a coalition government; the Conservative leadership is 
therefore bound by the coalition agreement and principle of collective responsibility, which 
brings their position further away from the Eurosceptic wing of the party, who by now not 
only oppose further transfer of power to Brussels, but advocate the repatriation of power and 
even Britain’s complete withdrawal from the EU. Hence, throughout the parliament, there 
have been several high-profile mass rebellions whereby Eurosceptic Conservative 
backbenchers are pitted against a relatively pro-Europe frontbench. The salience of this 
particular issue and the fact that it is being reflected in the voting behaviour of MPs in 
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parliament makes Euroscepticism among Conservative MPs an ideal case to be utilized for the 
purpose of examining if pre-parliamentary careers lead to the formation of special 
preferences and voting behaviour.  
 
In the following analysis, I shall use three different dependent variables to measure 
Eurosceptic rebelliousness among Conservative MPs. Firstly, I have selected two divisions in 
the 2010-2015 parliament where there were high profile mass defection from the 
Conservative backbenches. The two divisions are: 
 
1. The division on 24 Oct 2011, on a motion tabled by David Nutall MP, urging the 
government to hold an in/out referendum with regards to Britain’s membership of the 
European Union.   
 
2. The division on 31 Oct 2012, on an amendment to a motion, Proposed by Mark 
Reckless MP, which urged the government to seek reduction of British contribution to 
the EU budget in real term.  
 
On both of these occasions, the official position of the government was against the motion 
and amendment tabled by Eurosceptic Conservative backbenchers and the Conservative 
party whip issued instructions to backbenchers to vote against them in the division. (The 
Guardian, 25th October 20114, 31st October 20125) Yet, despite that, a considerable number 
of Conservative backbenchers defied the party line and voted for the motion and amendment. 
In fact, the division on EU budget cut was one of the rare occasions where the government 
was defeated when the Eurosceptic rebels were joined by a united PLP which voted for the 
                                                          
4http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/oct/24/david-cameron-tory-rebellion-europe 
5http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/oct/31/cameron-commons-defeat-eu-budget 
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amendment and overcame the government’s majority. Table 6.3 indicates how Conservative 
MPs voted in both divisions. In the EU referendum motion, over 26% of the parliamentary 
Conservative party voted in favour of the motion, while the new cohort of Conservative MPs 
voted for the motion in a slightly higher percentage, around 34%. As for the EU budget cut 
amendment, around 17% of both the new cohort and the parliamentary Conservative party 
as a whole supported the amendment. These numbers demonstrated that generally speaking, 
the voting pattern of new Conservative MPs on both occasions was roughly similar to the 
Parliamentary Conservative party as a whole.  
 
Besides individual Conservative MPs’ votes on these two divisions, I will also use the number 
of times they rebelled on European integration issue from May 2010 to May 2012. This 
information was compiled by Lynch and Whitaker (2013), based on data found in 
publicwhip.org.uk, who identified 29 votes on European integration in the first session of the 
last parliament where there was rebellion on the Conservative backbenchs. The addition of 
the total number of Eurosceptic rebellions of each MP has involved as a dependent variable 
can provides us with a clearer picture on their general tendency to rebel on the issue of 
Europe in addition to their voting decision on the two high-profile divisions.  
 
Table 6.4 presents how MPs pre-parliamentary careers influence their voting behaviour in the 
two aforementioned divisions, and on the issue of European integration in general. Models 1 
through 4 are results from logistic regression whereby the dependent variable is a dummy 
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which indicates whether individual Conservative MPs have rebelled against the party line in 
the two divisions. MPs are coded as 1 if they voted for the motion or amendment on these 
occasions. The coefficients are presented as odds ratios. A variety of control variable is also 
included in the specifications, including their frontbench status. Since MPs’ frontbench status 
are recoded at the end of each year, the entry closest to the date of the vote is taken as the 
proxy, which may be different from their status on the exact day of the vote. 
 
Models 1 and 2 look at new Conservative MPs’ vote on the EU referendum motion. The 
coefficients shown are odds ratios. There are two types of pre-parliamentary experiences that 
appear to be significantly encouraging MPs voting in favour of holding an in/out referendum 
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on Britain’s membership to the EU - experience in the military and local government. Both 
models estimate that prior experience as military officer dramatically increase MPs’ odds to 
vote for the motion, and each year of experience would increase the probability of rebellion 
by 50% to 80%. Local government experience, especially those earned within their current 
constituency, is also contributing to MPs’ decisions to support the motion. Model 1 estimates 
that each year of in-constituency local government experience is going to increase the odds 
of them voting in favour of holding an EU referendum by 23%. Model 2 further indicates that 
both being a Local Hero or Carpetbagger significantly increases the probability of one 
supporting the motion by seventeen times and seven times respectively. Models 3 and 4 
estimate MPs’ rebellion on the EU budget cut amendment. Since the size of the rebellion is 
smaller compared to the one on the EU referendum, a few variables were dropped from the 
estimation due to collinearity, which in turn reduced the size of N of these models. The results 
of Models 3 and 4 are fairly similar to what we have observed in the EU referendum vote. 
MPs’ amount of prior experience in the military and local government within their current 
constituency is significant predictors for rebelling against the government on the EU budget 
cut amendment. Moreover, it should be noted that across these four models, the variables 
for frontbench status are dropped from the specification, again due to collinearity, which 
indicates that none of the Conservative MPs sitting on the frontbench at the time of the vote 
has rebel in these two votes, further illustrating frontbench appointment as a powerful tool 
in maintaining party cohesion. 
 
Models 5 and 6 estimate the number of times each new Conservative MP have rebelled 
against the party leadership on the issue of Europe in the first session of the parliament. As 
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the dependent variable is a count data, negative binomial regression is used in these two 
models and the coefficient shown are incident rates rations. On top of the specification used 
in the previous models, a variable denoting each MPs aggregated rebel rate for the duration 
of the entire parliament is added to the model as a control for their overall rate of 
rebelliousness in order to distinguish MPs who are particularly concerned over the issue of 
Europe but nevertheless loyal to the party on other issues from those who are simply more 
rebellious across a wide range of issues. Again, pre-parliamentary experience in the military 
was a significant factor for overall rebelliousness on Europe among new Conservative MPs. 
Model 5 predicts that each year of experience in the military would increase their number of 
rebellious vote on Europe by 11.6%. However, the magnitude of the coefficient for military 
experience is considerably reduced and loses its significance in Model 6. It is also found that 
amount of party political experience at almost all level are significant factor in encouraging 
Eurosceptic rebellions among new Conservative MPs. It is estimated that the amount of 
experience in local government, in or out of their current constituency, and in the national 
party, are going to significantly increase individual MPs’ the number of rebellions on Europe 
by 12.8%, 10.2% and 14.1% respectively. MPs’ pre-parliamentary political career type does 
not however appear to be a significant factor in determining their overall Euroscepticism in 
parliamentary votes. Moreover, these models also found that, despite its insignificance in 
predicting Eurosceptic rebellion in individual votes, prior experience in financial services is a 
significant factor in encouraging loyalty to the party in parliamentary votes on Europe. The 
models estimate each year of experience in the financial sector is going to decrease the 
number of Eurosceptic rebellions among new Conservative MPs by approximately 8.3% to 
6.6%. 
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There are several things to take away from these findings. First and foremost, prior political 
experience among new Conservative MPs is a significant factor influencing their decision in 
rebelling against their party on Europe. Local government experience, in particular those 
earned within their constituency, is a significant factor encouraging Eurosceptic rebellion in 
general as well as in the two high profile rebellions we have studied. This could be interpreted 
as an indication that Euroscepticism are deeply rooted in the grassroots and local party of the 
Conservative and those who followed a local roots into the parliament is not hesitate to 
express that in parliamentary vote. On the other hand, although prior political experience in 
the national party did not encourage new MPs to rebel in the two high profile mass 
Eurosceptic rebellions, Model 5 nevertheless shows that the amount of time new 
Conservative MPs spent in the national party do increase their tendency to rebel on the issue 
of Europe in general. This is more evidence to support the notion that extended experience 
in the Conservative politics is a significant predictor to ideological adherence to the party and 
Euroscepticism in this particular case. Furthermore, the fact that it is only significant to the 
overall level of Eurosceptic rebellions but failed to predict MPs’ decisions in the high profile 
votes suggests that while extended political experience in the national party among 
Conservative is an indicator of increased Euroscepticism, it might however discourage them 
to participate in high profile mass rebellions, most probably for the purpose of protecting the 
reputation of the party, and instead rebel on occasions which attracts less attention to 
themselves as well as the party.  
 
Secondly, similar to experience in the national party, although prior experience in finance did 
not affect MPs’ vote in the two high profile Eurosceptic rebellions, it does however discourage 
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MPs from participating in Eurosceptic rebellions in general. It is likely that, as shown 
previously on numerous occasion, MPs who worked in finance are, and have reasons to be, 
more ambitious than their colleagues; their hesitation to participate in a Eurosceptic rebellion 
could be for the purpose of not being seen as a nuisance in the eyes of the leadership in such 
a divisive issue, so as to protect their future political career. Alternatively, the reluctant of ex-
financiers to participate in Eurosceptic rebellion could also be explained by their professional 
links to the sector and material benefit of the industry. Since the success of Britain’s financial 
service sector is highly dependent on access to the European single market, it is no surprise 
that many in the industry do now wish to see Britain withdrawn from the EU or to disengage 
with European institution in some other way. Hence, it is possible that professional life in the 
financial service industry has highlighted the economic benefit of Britain’s membership of the 
EU, which in turn has shaped their political believes into one that is relatively less Eurosceptic 
among the Conservatives. 
 
Lastly, a pre-parliamentary career in the military has been also found to be a significant factor 
that encourages Eurosceptic rebellion, in general as well as in both high profile rebellions 
among new Conservative MPs. The amount of experience as a military officer has consistently 
been found to be a significant and positive factor across multiple models. Not only does it 
suggest that ex-military service personnel are more Eurosceptic, it could also be used to 
explain higher overall rebelliousness among them as observed in the previous section. 
Similarly to a pre-parliamentary career in finance, increase Euroscepticism among those who 
have served in the military could stem from their professional experience. It is possible that 
prior experience in the military may induce one with a world view that is more national-
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centric, turn one’s attention to loyalty to one’s country and patriotism, while being more 
dubious to the idea of shared sovereignty under the framework of a supranational 
organization, which leads them to be comparatively more Eurosceptic. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has clearly illustrated that MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers do indeed have a 
significant impact on their voting decisions in the division lobbies. Diverging patterns of prior 
experience affect MPs’ tendency to vote against their own party, both in general and on 
particular issues, such as Britain’s relationship with the European Union. The analysis suggests 
that the major reason for previous experience having an influence on MPs’ general tendency 
to rebel is that it affects their anticipation of ministerial promotion, which in turn reduces the 
effectiveness of promises of future promotion as a tool to maintain party cohesion on the 
backbenchs. MPs with the credential that are associated with swift promotion to the 
frontbench have increased anticipation and hence are more likely to express their frustration 
when those anticipations are not met by walking across the aisle into the opposition lobby. 
Contrary to the hypotheses, prior political experience, in particular that earned at the national 
party level, has been found to have an association with an increased tendency to rebel, in 
particular among the Conservative party. This is likely due to the fact that they were involved 
in a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, which led to policy compromise that 
frustrated those who were more attached to the political principle and ideology of the party 
and resented the policy compromise in the coalition negotiation. Analysis on Euroscepticism 
among new Conservative MPs has provided further evidence to this particular argument. 
Moreover, it has also been revealed that professional experience does facilitate the formation 
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of special preferences on particular issues. It has been found that prior experience in the 
military is associated with higher level of Euroscepticism as expressed through parliamentary 
rebellion, while previous employment in the financial sector has the opposite effect. The most 
plausible explanation to these observations is that MPs’ previous professional life helps 
inform and shape their political believes which is manifest into diverging voting pattern with 
respect to certain issues. In the end, evidence presented in this chapter has confirmed that 
MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers do affect their policy preferences as well as the effectiveness 
of party’s tools in maintaining cohesion, which gives rise to distinct patterns of rebellion and 
voting in divisions, as their prior experience varies. 
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Chapter Seven – Pre-parliamentary career and parliamentary 
speeches 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter I explored how MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers affect their voting 
behaviour, both in general and on specific policies. However, while the significance of 
understanding the way MPs vote is self-evident, their participation and performance in other 
responsibilities and activities is also of vital importance to the functioning of the parliament 
and representative democracy. In this chapter, I turn my attention to one of the MPs’ most 
publicized activities - parliamentary speeches. I demonstrate that diverging patterns of MPs’ 
pre-parliamentary careers, and the skills and knowledge they bring to the table, is a key 
determinant of how much time and effort they devote into parliamentary debates and 
speech-making. The results will further confirm the main hypothesis of this dissertation, that 
MPs’ pre-parliamentary career does affect their roles and performance in parliament because 
of the difference in skills and knowledge they have acquired prior to entering parliament. 
 
7.2 Why do legislators speak? 
Existing literature on legislative debates has given several motivations behind speechmaking 
among legislators. First and foremost is ‘persuasion’ - legislators engage in parliamentary 
debates because it is a way for them to persuade their colleagues or government ministers on 
policy changes by arguing for its merits. Yet speechmaking as a tool for persuasion and 
bringing forward policy changes is largely seen as ineffective (Proksch and Slapin 2012, 2015). 
It is only under exceptional conditions that legislative speeches decisively affect the position 
of government officials or a substantial portion of fellow legislators to induce any meaningful 
changes to policies.  
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Alternatively, instead of a means to persuade their colleagues, legislative speeches could be 
seen as a tool for legislators to fulfill their electoral needs. The need to secure voters’ support 
and reelection has been a powerful explanatory factor in the study of politicians’ behaviour. 
Legislative speeches can fulfill this need by providing the opportunity for legislators to 
cultivate their personal brand and reputation through practices such as ‘advertising’ and 
‘credit-claiming’, which can attract constituent support during reelection (Mayhew 1974, 
Maltzmann and Sigelman 1996). The pressure to secure electoral support for reelection would 
be mostly felt by those who are electorally less secure. Numerous studies have found that 
legislators who are elected on smaller margins are also likely to devote more of their effort 
developing personal votes through focusing on their constituencies (Benedetto and Hix 2007, 
Heishusen et al. 2005). However, although legislative speeches could be an important tool for 
the cultivation of personal votes for individual legislators, studies on how electoral 
circumstances affect participation in parliamentary debate have yielded mixed results. While 
it has been found that among British MPs during the late 19th and early 20th century, those 
who were elected by a smaller margin are delivering more speeches in parliamentary debates 
(Eggers and Spirling 2014b), results from studies on contemporary legislators in the US House 
of Representatives have shown no significant relationship between electoral security of 
congressmen and the number of line that they spoke in unconstrained floor speeches 
(Maltzmann and Sigelman 1996).  
 
The last motivation for legislators to speak in parliamentary debates is that of position-taking. 
While speeches are under most circumstances ineffective in bringing forward any immediate 
and substantial policy changes through persuasion, it nevertheless remains a valuable 
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opportunity for individual legislators to voice their concerns. According to this conception of 
legislative speeches, the purpose of speaking in parliamentary debate is to communicate the 
policy position of individual legislator with a mass audience. The position-taking motivation 
for speechmaking is by no mean independent of the electoral or policy consideration. While 
those who deliver position-taking speeches do not expect to bring forward immediate policy 
change by persuasion, they might hope to induce changes in public sentiment and hence 
policy change in the long term by making a stand during parliamentary debate. Kam (2009) 
suggested that position-taking in parliament is a way for legislators to cultivate personal 
support for electoral purposes. But nevertheless, the implication on the patterns of debate 
participation and allocation of floor time to individual legislators would be rather different if 
legislative speeches were indeed delivered to signal the personal positions of legislators 
instead of being purely electorally motivated. 
 
Proksch and Slapin (2012, 2015) analyzed German and British MPs participation in 
parliamentary debates under the context of partisan competition by looking at legislative 
speeches as position-taking motivated. Whilst political parties, in order to compete with each 
other for voters’ support in election, would prefer to present a coherent message to the 
electorate, individual MPs may want to signal dissent from party position when the opinion of 
themselves or their constituent deviates from that of the party. Party leaders are therefore 
put in a dilemma; that while the party would arguably benefit from presenting a united and 
coherent message for the purpose of reelection and governing, but on the other hand, 
allowing certain level of dissent during parliamentary debate might serve the purpose of 
managing rebellion among backbenchers or allowing electorally vulnerable MPs from districts 
that are ideologically at odds with the party to cultivate a personal following among 
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constituents. Their data have shown that among British MPs, self-reported ideological 
distance from party leaders appears to have a positive effect on the number of speeches that 
they delivered during parliamentary debate. Similarly, Maltzmann and Sigelman (1996) have 
also found that members of US House of Representatives who are more ideologically extreme 
speak more during unconstrained floor time. 
 
7.3 Pre-parliamentary career and speech making 
As discussed in Chapter One, one of the central hypotheses of this thesis is that MPs’ pre-
parliamentary careers would affect the skills and knowledge that they bring to Westminster, 
which would in turn affect the relative effectiveness and attractiveness of various legislative 
activities that would give rise to diverging patterns of behaviour. Therefore, in order to 
determine the kind of pre-parliamentary career and profession that would encourage or 
discourage the making of speeches, we would have to first determine what are the skills and 
experiences that affect the incentives for individual MPs to participate and speak in 
parliamentary debates? What sorts of experience would (dis)incentivize speech making? 
 
The most natural starting point would be prior legislative experience. Previous experience as 
a legislator in other legislative bodies would provide experiences that are most comparable to 
those in Westminster. MPs who have served in similar bodies would have participated in 
legislative debates and delivered speeches in them. They would be familiar with the procedure 
and setting of parliamentary debates and understand the pressure of public speaking and 
technique in getting their idea across to their colleagues in the chamber or a wider audience 
following the debate. In the context of the UK, prior membership of devolved assemblies 
(Including the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly of Wales, the Northern Ireland 
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Assembly and the London Assembly) as well as the European Parliament could be considered 
the bodies that are most similar to the setting of the House of Commons, hence: 
 
Hypothesis 7.1: MPs with more experience as members of devolved assemblies or the 
European Parliament deliver more speeches. 
 
Besides legislative experience, prior experiences in occupations that involve public speaking, 
or those that could provide MPs with skills in communication are also likely to make individual 
MPs better in delivering speeches in parliament. Occupations that fall under these categories 
include, but are not limited to, lawyers, teachers, mass media and public relations. These 
professions have been seen by many as a natural starting point of a career in politics and have 
indeed been heavily represented in previous parliaments (Cairney 2007, King 1981, Mellors 
1978). It has been suggested that one of the reasons why these professions are conducive to 
future political pursue is that they equip individuals with the ability to communicate with 
voters and deliver speeches both during electoral campaigns and in parliamentary debates. 
Moreover, these are also occupations that emphasize the use of words to communicate 
complex ideas to an audience. Experience in these professions ought to make individual more 
capable and confident in making speeches. Former speaker of US House of Representatives 
Newt Gingrich once said, “As a former college teacher, I find [unconstrained floor time] a very 
helpful time to explain complicated ideas and outline research on multifaceted topics” 
(Congressional Record, 4 November 1983, 30952). 
 
Hypothesis 7.2: MPs with more experience in occupations that improve their skills in public 
speaking and communication, such as lawyers, teachers, media and public relation, speak 
more often during parliamentary debates 
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Besides the experience and skills in delivering speeches, MPs would also need to have 
something to say in order to speak in parliamentary debates. Unless one is filibustering and 
reading from the Bible, MPs would need to fill their speeches with substantial contents. This 
would require certain understanding of the policy being discussed as well as relevant facts and 
figures. MPs who have more expertise on certain policies ought to speak more during 
parliamentary debates since it would require comparatively less time and effort in preparing 
for the speeches, their thorough understanding of the policy would make their argument 
more compelling and their status as expert would also make their speeches potentially more 
persuasive. Proksch and Slapin (2012) found that the number of committee assignment is a 
significant and positive explanatory factor on the number of speeches that German MPs 
deliver because committee work allows them to develop policy expertise, which makes them 
a more attractive spokesperson for their party during debate. 
 
However, measuring the level of policy expertise that has developed during pre-parliamentary 
times is much more difficult because it could be developed in an extensive variety of 
occupations. People who have worked in certain industry or economic sector could be thought 
of as experts in the said area. Since our attention is on MPs’ overall participation in 
parliamentary debate that cover a wide variety of policy subject matter, expertise in particular 
policy area ought to have a negligible effect on the total number of speeches delivered across 
all the debates.  
 
On the other hand, experience in policy formulation and research are going to equip MPs with 
the analytical skills as well as an understanding of the process of policy formulation that makes 
them more capable of discussing a wide variety of policies during parliamentary debates. 
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Hence, experience in policy research as well as ministerial or MPs’ advisors during MPs’ pre-
parliamentary career ought to provide them with the means to speak on a wide variety of 
subjects with a certain degree of expertise, therefore increasing their overall participation 
across all the debates in parliament. 
 
Hypothesis 7.3: MPs with more experience in occupations that facilitate the development of 
policy proficiency and expertise, such as policy research and ministerial/MPs advisors, speak 
more often during parliamentary debates. 
 
So far, we have focused on pre-parliamentary occupations that facilitate speechmaking during 
debates. However, attention should also be paid to experiences that would reduce MPs 
participation in debates. While there are unlikely to be occupations that hinder MPs’ abilities 
to deliver speeches, some pre-parliamentary experiences may nevertheless divert their focus 
from parliamentary debates onto other aspects of their responsibilities. If the kind of skills 
and knowledge that MPs have acquired make alternative legislative tools a more attractive 
course of action, then they are more likely to engage in those alternatives, hence decreasing 
their participation in parliamentary debates. 
 
One such possibility is that an alternative platform for communication is made available to 
MPs through their pre-parliamentary experiences. As discussed earlier, two of the main 
purposes of legislative speeches are to persuade others to change their position or simply 
signal the position of individual legislator to colleagues, party leaders or the general public. If 
MPs have access to channels other than parliamentary debates to communicate their 
message and make their position known to others, then they are more likely to utilize those 
channels rather than speaking in parliament. One such alternative platform would be mass 
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media. Van Aelst et al (2010) showed that legislators who employ professional communication 
staff also receive more media attention and coverage. It is therefore possible that MPs who 
have been professional media and communication workers would enjoy a similar degree of 
media attention. MPs with prior experiences in media or public relations might have better 
connections and contacts among journalist that could translate into more press coverage. This 
would make parliamentary debate a comparatively less attractive platform for them to get 
their message and position across, hence reducing the number of speeches that they made. 
They might also be more skilful in tuning their message to attract attention from the media, 
which means the amount of press coverage generated from a single speech might be higher 
among these individuals, further reducing the incentives for them to be a frequent speaker 
since they can substitute quantity with quality. 
 
Hypothesis 7.4: MPs with more experience in occupations that provide them with alternative 
platforms for communication and position taking, such as experience in media and public 
relations, speak less frequently during parliamentary debates. 
 
Besides mass media, the persuasion and position-taking purpose of legislative speeches could 
also be substituted by directly lobbying government ministers or party leaders. If MPs’ pre-
parliamentary careers provide them with extra access to these powerful individuals, they may 
attach a lower priority to attending parliamentary debates and making of speeches. Allen 
(2014) argued that prior experience in party politics, especially at the national level, would 
provide individuals with the opportunity to engage with powerful figures within the party and 
to cultivate a personal rapport with the leadership, which in turn could facilitate a future 
political career. Hence, MPs pre-parliamentary experience in national party politics ought to 
have a negative effect on their participation in debate and making of speeches. Moreover, 
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since government ministry and policy making are controlled by the governing party, we should 
expect the negative effect of national party experience on speeches to be comparatively more 
pronounced and salient among parties in government.  
 
Hypothesis 7.5: MPs with more experience in national party politics, in particular 
government MPs, speak less frequently during parliamentary debates. 
 
7.4 Data and methodology 
Besides prior experiences of MPs, there are several determinants of their participation in 
parliamentary debates that need to be accounted for in the models. First and foremost is the 
tendency that they rebel against their party. As previously discussed, one  motivation for MPs 
to speak in parliamentary debates is that of position taking, to communicate with either the 
party or the general public of their grievances with regards to the official position of their 
respective party and signal their ideological or policy differences. Besides highlighting 
individuals’ disagreement with their party, parliamentary speeches may also serve to qualify 
or explain the context for their rebellious votes, hence managing and limiting the potential 
backlash from the rebellion for themselves or the party. Hence, the rebelliousness of 
individual MPs ought to contribute to the number of occasions they speak during 
parliamentary debates. As discussed in the last chapter, MPs’ rebelliousness appears to be 
associated with the nature of their pre-parliamentary career. It is therefore necessary to 
discern the effect of rebelliousness on the making of parliamentary speeches in order to 
discover how pre-parliamentary experiences by itself affect MPs’ tendency to speak during 
debates. Hence, individual rate of rebellion during divisions will be treated as an intervening 
variable that is added to the final models in the subsequent analysis. 
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Another factor that contributes to the number of speeches that MPs deliver during debates is 
how ministerial and frontbench offices are distributed among MPs. A key function of ministers 
and party frontbench members is to represent their respective party in parliamentary 
debates, and make statements that iterate the official position of the party as well as 
responding to scrutiny and questioning from the bench opposite. It is therefore only natural 
that (shadow) ministers and frontbench members are more frequently featured in 
parliamentary debates than backbenchers. Similarly to MPs’ rebelliousness, it has been found 
in Chapter Five that promotion to the frontbench is at the very least partially related to the 
nature pre-parliamentary career. It is hence necessary in the analysis to take MPs’ frontbench 
status into account. There are several ways of achieving this. The most straightforward and 
ideal approach would be to exclude all speeches made by MPs in their capacity as frontbench 
members or members of the government. However, the dataset used does not allow such 
surgical removal of frontbencher contributions from the overall data. Instead, the following 
analysis uses two different strategies to isolate and control for the effect of MPs frontbench 
status. Firstly, two control variables that denote the number of years an MP has served as 
either a junior or senior frontbench member, which have also been used as control variables 
in the last chapter, will be introduced into the final models that estimate the total number of 
speeches MPs have made for the entirety of the last parliament. Secondly, to provide further 
robustness for the analysis, an alternative strategy will be used. Because the dataset of MPs 
speeches measures the number of speech each MPs made during each calendar year, it is 
therefore possible to construct a panel model that estimate the number of speeches an MP 
made in each year, which we can then use the frontbench status data to isolate the period 
each MP sat on the backbench and only looks at their participation in parliamentary debate 
as a backbencher. 
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The dependent variable is the total number of speeches each MP made during the 2010-2015 
parliament. The data were collected via the TheyWorkForYou.com API, which provides an 
accessible digitized version of the complete Hansard. Each speech recorded on the Hansard is 
matched with the identity of the speaker, which is then used to calculate the number of 
speeches each new MP has delivered in parliament in each calendar year. These are then used 
to calculate the aggregate number of speeches each MP has made for the entirety of the last 
parliament. 1 Because the distribution of the data is non-normal and highly skewed, most of 
the models will be analyzed using negative binomial regression. For the panel models, since it 
is necessary to cluster the standard deviation around individual MPs to avoid bias in measuring 
significance, the random-effect Poisson model will be used to estimate the number of 
speeches MPs made in each calendar year. 
 
The results are presented in two sections. Firstly, to explore the effect of pre-parliamentary 
career on MPs’ speech count among the entire cohort of new MPs, results of a set of full 
models that encompasses all new MPs across three major parties will be presented. Following 
that, a set of party models that only include new MPs representing either one of the two main 
parties will be used to understand how pre-parliamentary career affects MPs’ behaviour with 
respect to parliamentary speeches among the party cohort. Numerous research projects have 
shown that the status of the party within the chamber is an important determinant when 
legislators decide whether they would speak in parliamentary debates. (Killerman and Proksch 
2013, Maltzman and Sigelman 1996, Proksch and Salpin 2012, 2015) Moreover, Hypothesis 
                                                          
1I would like to express my gratitude to Jack Blumenau(LSE), who have collected the dataset of MPs speeches 
and graciously agreed to share his data. 
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Five suggests that its effect would be more salient among government MPs. Hence, analysis 
of within-party variation would further refine our understanding of how pre-parliamentary 
careers affect speech making as well as legislative behaviour in general. 
 
7.5 Results 
7.5.1 Full models 
Table 7.1 shows the results of models that include new MPs from all three major parties. All 
the coefficients are reported as incident-rate ratios, which indicates the estimated rate of 
change on the number of incidents occurring, in this case parliamentary speeches, from a unit 
change of the dependent variable. Model 1 is a baseline model without any pre-parliamentary 
career or intervening control variables. None of these variables are statistically significant. 
Model 2 introduces professional pre-parliamentary career variables into the specification. The 
only variable that is statistically significant is that of the legal profession. This model estimates 
that each year of an MPs’ pre-parliamentary experience as a solicitor or barrister would 
increase the total number of speeches they make during the entire parliament by 2.8%. This 
estimate is statistically significant at 0.01 level. This finding is as predicted from Hypothesis 
7.2, that occupations that promote MPs’ communication skills increase their participation in 
parliamentary speeches. However, it appears that lawyer is the only professional occupation 
that has the said effect among the number of occupations that have been thought to promote 
MPs’ communication skills, hence their tendency to speak in debates.  
 
Models 3 and 4 considered only MPs pre-parliamentary political experiences. Model 3 used 
the continuous variables that denote the amount of the type of political experience as 
denoted on individual MP’s profiles. It estimates that the amount of in-constituency 
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experience appears to discourage MPs’ participation in parliamentary debates while previous  
candidacy for parliamentary seats encourage speech making among MPs. It is estimated that 
each year of in-constituency local government experience would reduce the number of 
speeches MPs made during the entire parliament by 1.6%. On the other hand, prior 
parliamentary candidacy appears to have the opposite effect as this model estimate each prior 
failed attempt to gain a Westminster seat is associated with an 11.1% increase in the overall 
number of speeches delivered. Neither of these results were anticipated from the hypotheses. 
On the other hand, Model 3 found no evidence to support Hypothesis 7.1 as the coefficient 
for prior experience as member of devolved assemblies and European Parliament is not 
significant. Model 4 considers MPs’ prior political experience as political career type, 
estimated in Chapter Three. The baseline category used is Party Animals. Result from Model 
4 estimates that all the other types of MPs are more frequent speakers in parliamentary 
debates when compared with Party Animals, although only Carpetbaggers statistically deviate 
from the baseline. It is estimated that the number of speeches made by a Carpetbagger is 
24.2% more than a comparable Party Animal. These results lend some credence to Hypothesis 
7.5, which anticipates that those more involved in national party politics prior to entering 
parliament are also less likely to speak. Moreover, Models 3 and 4 indicate that after MPs’ 
political experience is taken into account, new Labour MPs appear to be more frequent 
contributors to parliamentary debate as the coefficient for Labour dummy being positive and 
becomes significant in both models. This result is consistent with the findings of Proksch and 
Salpin (2012), who found that opposition MPs speak more frequently during parliamentary 
debates. 
 
Models 5 and 6 take both MPs’ professional and political pre-parliamentary career into 
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consideration. The signs, magnitude and significance of the coefficient are fairly similar to 
what we have observed in Models 3 and 4 with two exceptions. Firstly, there is a notable 
increase magnitude of the coefficient for all three political career types in Model 6, which 
indicates that the negative effect of being a Party Animal on speech making is more 
pronounced after an MP’s professional career is taken into consideration. Secondly, the 
coefficient for in-constituency local government experience loses significance, which suggests 
after taking their professional experience into account, in-constituency local government 
experience is no longer a significant factor in discouraging speech-making among new MPs. 
 
Models 7 and 8 introduce the two intervening controls - MPs’ frontbench status and rebel 
rate, into the specification. Model 7 added the two variables that denoted the number of 
years MPs occupied the two tiers of frontbench positions. It showed that only senior 
frontbench positions are a significant in increasing the amount of speeches an individual 
delivers during the last parliament. It is estimated that each year an MP spends as government 
minister or member of shadow cabinet would increase their number of speeches made by 
17%. On the other hand, junior frontbench positions do not appear to have an effect on MPs’ 
participation in parliamentary debate. This distinction between the two tiers of frontbench 
positions is expected since junior frontbench positions, such as PPS, and assistant whips, do 
not impose the responsibility of speaking on behalf of the government or their party during 
parliamentary debate, hence having no effect on the number of occasion that they speak. 
 
Compared to Model 5, the most notable difference in Model 7 is that the magnitude of the 
coefficient for prior experience in the military and trade union increases and hence became 
statistically significant. The model estimated that each year of pre-parliamentary experience 
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in these two sectors would increase the overall number of speeches made during the last 
parliament by 3.3% and 4.1% respectively. As we discovered in Chapter Five, no MPs with 
these two kinds of pre-parliamentary experiences have ever been promoted to ministerial or 
shadow cabinet positions. Hence, without taking MPs’ frontbench status into account, 
previous models have underestimated the positive effect of these two occupations on the 
making of speeches. 
 
Model 8 added MPs’ division rebel rate into the specification used in Model 7. As expected, 
MPs’ rebelliousness is a significant contributing factor to speech-making. The model 
estimated that each percentage point increase in rebel rate increases the number of speeches 
made by the MP during the entire parliament by 5.33%. In comparison to Model 7, the 
coefficient for prior service in the military and failed candidacy for MPs decreases in 
magnitude and loses significance. This indicates that some of the positive effects on speech-
making of these two types of pre-parliamentary experience could be attributed to MPs’ 
tendency to rebel against their own party. As found in the last chapter, military experience is 
associated with an increased amount of rebellion. It was also found that ex-military officers 
are significantly more Eurosceptic compared to their fellow new Conservative MPs. It is 
therefore plausible to attribute the positive effect of military experience on speech-making 
found in Model 7 to their increased rebelliousness and Euroscepticism which led them to 
become more frequent contributors to parliamentary debates. On the other hand, the 
amount of prior experience in national party politics becomes statistically significant. It is 
estimated that each year of prior experience in national party politics is associated with 2.8% 
reduction in the overall number of speeches made by an individual MP. This is as anticipated 
by Hypothesis 7.5 which expects that MPs with experience in national party politics would 
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speak less due to increased access to party leaders or government ministers. 
 
Model 9 is a panel model that estimates the number of speeches individual MPs made during 
each calendar year using random-effect Poisson model with standard deviation clustered at 
individual MP level. Only the years that an MP has spent on the backbench were included in 
the analysis in order to isolate the effect of being a backbencher on their participation in 
parliamentary debate. There are noticeable differences between the results of Models 8 and 
9. Prior experience in national party politics and trade union lose their significance. On the 
other hand, there are several kinds of pre-parliamentary experience that have become 
significant with the use of a panel model and considering only the period where an MP was a 
backbencher, these include marketing and sales, social science research and membership of 
devolved assemblies or the European Parliament. The panel model estimates that prior 
experience in marketing and sales discourages new backbench MPs from making speeches, 
reducing the number of speeches they deliver on each year by 2.5%. On the other hand, just 
as Hypotheses 7.1 and 7.3 have anticipated, prior experience as a member of devolved 
assemblies or European Parliament as well as social science research is related to more 
frequent contribution to parliamentary debates, increasing the number of speeches new 
backbenchers made in each year by 3.4% and 4% respectively. 
 
7.5.2 Party models 
Table 7.2 shows the results after applying the specifications found in Table 7.1 on new MPs 
from the two main parties separately.2 Models 10 through 13 include only new Conservative 
                                                          
2Only results applying Model 5,7,8 and 9 on MPs from the two parties are shown, results from the remaining 
models can be found in Appendix 
Chapter Seven 
302 
 
MPs in the analysis. While the results of Conservative models are generally similar to what we 
have previously observed in the full models, there are also several notable differences. First, 
while the amount of experience in the legal profession has been shown to be a significant and 
positive predictor of MPs’ speech count across all the models in Table 7.2, it loses significance 
in the Conservative Models 12 and 13 after MPs’ frontbench status and tendency to rebel is 
taken into account. We have shown in previous chapters that experience in the legal 
profession is associated with an increased possibility of becoming government ministers, and 
a tendency to rebel among new Conservative MPs. These results suggest that the effect of 
legal experience on promotion prospects and rebelliousness are a better explanation for the 
higher speech count among new Conservative MPs with legal experience. Secondly, while 
contrary to the expectations from Hypotheses 7.2 and 7.4, prior experience in mass media has 
no observable significant effect on MPs’ speech count in the full models, Models 12 and 13 
have shown that among the new Conservative cohort, experience in mass media is a 
significant factor that discourages MPs from making speeches during parliamentary debates. 
The two models estimated that each year of pre-parliamentary experience in mass media 
would reduce MPs’ speech count by 3.5% and 2.7%. Lastly, while in-constituency local 
government experience and number of previous failed contests for Westminster seats have 
been shown to have no significance among full models, when professional experience and 
other intervening variables are introduced to the specifications, they been shown to be a 
consistently significant factor that affects MPs’ speech count across all the Conservative 
Models. 
 
We now turn our attention to the Labour models. As usual, given the small size of the new 
Labour cohort (n=63), all the results should be interpreted with a pinch of salt. It should first 
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be noted that there are several similarities between the Labour models and the full and  
Conservative models. Again, experience in the legal profession is found to be a significant and 
positive predictor on MPs’ speech count. The positive effect of legal experience is also more 
consistently significant with Labour MPs when compared to the Conservatives’, as the 
coefficient remains significant after the introduction of MPs’ frontbench status and rebel rate 
into the model. Also similar to the Conservative Models, prior experience in mass media is 
found to be a significant factor that leads to MPs making fewer speeches during parliamentary 
debate, as the coefficient for the profession is consistently significant and negative after the 
issues of frontbench promotion and rebelliousness are controlled for. As found in the full 
models, prior experience as a trade unionist appears to encourage Labour MPs to be more 
active speakers during parliamentary debates. Moreover, resembling the result found in the 
full models but unlike those observed among the Conservative, pre-parliamentary national 
party political experience is found to be a significant factor that is associated with lower 
speech count among new Labour MPs. Despite these similarities there are also stark 
differences between the Labour models and the others. Former career as NGO worker was 
found to be associated with higher speech count, which was not observed in any of the 
previous models, while the negative effect of in-constituency local government experience on 
participation in parliamentary debate does not appear to be present among Labour MPs. 
 
7.5.3 Predicted number of speeches 
With all these findings, how does diverging pre-parliamentary career among MPs affect the 
real number of speeches that MPs delivered during the last parliament? Figure 7.1 shows how 
the predicted number of speeches an MP would deliver throughout their first term varies with 
the number of years of experience as lawyers and media. The numbers shown in this figure 
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are predicted from Model 8. The baseline used in the prediction is a white, male Conservative 
MP at the mean age of the cohort, elected on a majority at mean, who rebels at a mean rate, 
has never served on the frontbench and has no other pre-parliamentary experience, 
professional or political, except for the one indicated. At year 0, or in other words the baseline 
of study, it is predicted that an MP would make 329 speeches during their entire first term in 
Westminster. However, as the number of years of pre-parliamentary experience as lawyer or 
in media increase, the speech count begins to diverge. It is estimated that every year of 
experience as lawyer would increase the total speech count by 2.2% while each year of 
experience in media would decrease the total speech count by 2.9%. The divergence in speech 
count among MPs working in these two sectors becomes significant at 90% confidence when 
the amount of experience reaches ten years. After twenty years pre-parliamentary career in 
these two professions, the model estimates that those who have been a lawyer would deliver 
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511 speeches during their first term while those who worked in media would only speak 185 
times during parliamentary debates. 
 
7.6 Discussion 
Taking the results from all models into consideration, the evidence partially supports all five 
hypotheses on how various kinds of pre-parliamentary careers affect MPs’ tendency to speak 
during parliamentary debates. The most notable result is that pre-parliamentary experience 
in the legal profession is consistently shown to be a significant factor that contributes to 
increased speech count among new MPs across multiple specifications. This indicates that the 
relationship between MPs’ prior experience as lawyer and frequent contribution during 
parliamentary debates is robust. The models estimate that the percentage effect of 
experience in the legal profession on MPs’ total speech count is between 2.8% to 2.2% per 
year of experience, depending on the specification of the model. Further investigation from 
party models suggests that this positive effect of legal experience on speech-making is more 
apparent among the Labour cohort, while increased rebelliousness and the prospect of 
promotion to ministerial rank appears to be a better explanation for this phenomena within 
the Conservative cohort. These results are consistent with the expectation from Hypothesis 
7.2 
 
However, as previously stated, the legal profession is the only occupation among those 
hypothesized as enhancing individuals’ communication skills to have a significant and positive 
effect on MPs’ speech count. Coefficients for prior experience in education, public relation 
and mass media have no significant positive impact on the number of speeches MPs delivered. 
In fact, the party models from both main parties have shown that previous careers in media 
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inhibit MPs participation in debates. This indicates that while legal experience undoubtedly 
encourages MPs to be active speakers during parliamentary debates and increases the 
number of speeches they made, it is plausible that this phenomena is not caused by better 
communication skills among ex-lawyers, but by other features of legal profession as an 
occupation. For example, their thorough knowledge of the law makes it easier to speak about 
specific detail of legislative bills and amendment. Hence, while it is safe to say that pre-
parliamentary experience in the legal profession does indeed encourage more frequent 
speaking in debates, the real cause behind this tendency merits further investigation. 
 
 
Similarly, as expected by Hypothesis 7.5, prior experience in national party politics has also 
been shown as a contributing factor to a decrease in speech count across multiple models. 
Results of the full models suggest that prior experience in national politics do have an overall 
discouraging effect on speech-making among new MPs from all major parties. Although the 
amount of prior experience in national party politics is only significant once both intervening 
variable is included in the specification in Model 8, and only moderately significant in that 
case (significant at 0.1 level), Models 4 and 6 have shown Party Animals among the cohort of 
new MPs are delivering significantly less speeches during parliamentary debates. Judging from 
these results, it is safe to say that while the amount of experience in national party is, at the 
very best, a moderately significant factor that kept MPs from speaking during parliamentary 
debates, results from Models 4 and 6 show that those who gain entrance to parliament 
through the national politics route are less involved in parliamentary debates as shown from 
their low speech count, which is consistent with the expectation from Hypothesis 7.5. 
However, party models from Table 7.2 shows that, contrary to what Hypothesis 7.5 have 
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expected, the amount of prior experience in national politics is a significant inhibitor of 
speech-making only among Labour MPs, but not among Conservatives, although the 
coefficients in the latter models are of the expected sign. It would appear that the negative 
effect of prior national political experience on speech making is more apparent among Labour 
MPs even though signaling individual position or dissent ought to be more of a concern among 
the governing Conservatives. 
 
In comparison, empirical support for Hypotheses 7.1 and 7.3 is more questionable. Among 
the full models, none of the coefficients corresponding to the respective variables for the two 
hypotheses achieve statistical significance in any of the models that use aggregated speech 
count of the entire parliament as the dependent variable, although they are generally with 
the same sign as predicted. It is only in the panel model when we measure MPs speech count 
by year and only taking their time on the backbench into consideration that MPs’ pre-
parliamentary legislative and social science research experience becomes a significant factor 
that is associated with increased number of speeches made. Party Models in Table 7.2 shows 
a similar story, that prior experience in social science research is only significant among the 
governing Conservative in the panel model and former membership of devolved assemblies 
or European Parliament does not affect MPs speech count among the new cohort of either 
main parties. These results indicate that while Hypotheses 7.1 and 7.3 are plausible and show 
some promise, that prior experience as parliamentarian or policy researcher might indeed 
facilitate MPs’ participation in parliamentary debates and delivery of speeches, more 
evidence would be needed in order to reach a definitive conclusion on the validity of these 
hypotheses. 
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Lastly, the analysis does provide some results that are consistent with Hypothesis 7.4. 
Although in none of the full models shown in Table 7.1 was mass media experience a 
significant factor that affected MPs’ speech count in parliamentary debates, the sign of the 
coefficient was consistently negative, which is exactly what Hypothesis 7.4 have expected. The 
p-value in some of the model is also small and borderlining significance (p = .0109 in Model 
8). Furthermore, as shown in Table 7.2, pre-parliamentary experience in mass media do have 
significant and negative impact on intra-party difference in MPs speech count within both 
Conservative and Labour cohort, especially when MPs frontbench status is taken into account. 
These results suggest that prior experience in media is a plausible factor that diverts MPs’ 
attention away from making speeches in debates, especially when MPs are serving on the 
backbench. 
 
There are also some significant results that were not expected by any of the hypotheses. Most 
notably, in-constituency local government experience was found to be a significant variable 
that decreases MPs’ speech count among new MPs across three major parties. Further 
investigation on party models in Table 7.2 indicated that in-constituency local government 
experience is only significant among new Conservative MPs’ speech count, while new Labour 
MPs’ participation in parliamentary debate do not appear to be affected by their in-
constituency local experience at all. This last finding is particularly intriguing since the 
coefficient for out-of-constituency local government experience has no effect on speech count 
whatsoever. This indicates it is constituency specific experience that is making Conservative 
MPs speak less during parliamentary debates. One explanation as to why constituency specific 
experience discourages MPs’ debate participation and why this effect is confined to 
Conservative MPs could be the difference on the focus of speeches among MPs from different 
Chapter Seven 
310 
 
parties. Killermann and Proksch (2013) have found that speeches from government MPs are 
more focused on constituency specific issues while opposition MPs’ speeches emphasize 
party competition. They suggested that this discrepancy in the focus of speeches is due to 
governing parties’ ability to control the legislative agenda in a parliamentary system, which 
allows government backbenchers to pay more attention to the concerns of their district during 
parliamentary debates. When an MP have prior experience in local government within their 
current constituency, it is likely that they are better connected with their community and 
electorate, which makes the need for cultivation of personal votes through constituency 
service comparatively lower, which in turn decreases their incentives to speak during 
parliamentary debates.  
 
Beside local experience, prior career in the military, NGOs and trade union have also been 
found to enhance MPs’ participation in parliamentary debates, especially in the party models. 
A plausible explanation of this phenomenon could be the particular focus on issues and policy 
that is related to interest in these sector. Defense and welfare spending cuts have been some 
of the most contentious policy foci of the last parliament. These are subjects that highly relate 
to the interest and experience of people working in the aforementioned sectors. Moreover, 
the issue of UK’s relationship with Europe has also became a priority once the Conservatives 
were back in government. As shown in the last chapter, ex-military personnel among new 
Conservative MPs are especially Eurosceptic in parliamentary divisions. Hence, a likely 
explanation for the increased speech count among MPs who worked as military, NGOs or trade 
union officers is the agenda and set of policies that have been dealt with by this particular 
parliament that has led to MPs with related expertise contributing more during debates. 
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7.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to observe if diverging patterns of MPs’ pre-parliamentary 
careers have any impact on their role and performance as a parliamentarian. The overarching 
hypothesis of this chapter, and indeed the entire dissertation, was that MPs with diverging 
pre-parliamentary careers would bring with them different sets of skills, knowledge and 
experience, which would in turn affect the costs and benefits of various legislative roles and 
activities which then lead to diverging patterns of legislative behaviour in accordance with 
their prior career. Using MPs’ participation in parliamentary debates and speech-making as an 
example, the results clearly show that MPs’ professional and political experiences prior to 
their entering parliament do play a significant role in determining the effort they devote to 
debates and speech-making. The effect of a particular kind of professional and political 
experience on MPs’ speeches is also mostly as expected and consistent with the hypotheses. 
Prior experience in the legal profession was found to be a significant factor associated with 
more speeches by MPs. Similarly a positive effect on speech-making has also been found with 
regards to previous experience as military officers, trade unionists and social science 
researchers, although these later results are less robust. On the other hand, a pre-
parliamentary career in the mass media and national party politics appears to discourage MPs 
from speaking during parliamentary debates. 
 
Despite these results that confirm the importance of pre-parliamentary career and MPs’ 
participation in parliamentary debate, there are several issues that merit further investigation. 
While the effect of some occupations are consistent with the hypotheses, more effort is 
required to understand the precise causal mechanisms that connect experience from a 
specific career and MPs’ decisions to concentrate on or refrain from making speeches. For 
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example - what is it about professional legal expertise that encourages MPs to speak more 
often? Is it really superior communication skills as suggested by some of the literature? Are 
there  some other features of the legal profession that makes MPs with this background  more 
frequent participants in parliamentary debates? 
 
Also, we have thus far only considered the quantity of MPs’ participation during debates, yet 
the quality of their contribution might arguably be more of a concern toward the effectiveness 
and representativeness of individual MPs as well as the parliament as a whole. A single well-
delivered speech from a seasoned orator could arguably have more impact on policy 
outcomes or public opinion than a series of speeches by an amateur speaker. The quality of 
MPs’ contributions during parliamentary debates might arguably be an even more 
appropriate measure of their communication skills or knowledge on policies than the number 
of speeches that they made. Recent development in text analysis to Parliamentary records 
might yield results that could further our understanding on how MPs’ pre-parliamentary affect 
not only the quantity, but also the quality of their contribution during parliamentary debates. 
 
Lastly, this chapter has only touched upon a single aspect of MPs’ activities. While 
parliamentary debates and speech-making is arguably of vital importance to the parliament 
and our political process and is one of the most iconic and well-known functions of MPs, it is 
nevertheless only one aspect of their responsibilities. A survey conducted by the Hansard 
Society among sitting MPs has found that over half of the respondent estimate that they 
spend less than five hours in the chamber every week (Hansard Society 2001). If we are to 
broaden our attention to the entirety of an MPs’ duties, It is intriguing how varying attention 
paid to speech-making among MPs with different pre-parliamentary experience translate into 
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different level of dedication and effort spent on other areas of their responsibilities. Indeed, 
how do MPs divide their time between various legislative activities in general - does the higher 
speech count among ex-lawyers reduce the presence of their expertise in bills committee? 
Are Local Heroes less involved in debates because they spend more time in their constituency? 
Moreover, if skills and knowledge earned during pre-parliamentary career affect their ability 
to deliver speeches and hence the number of speeches that they made, other expertise that 
they earn could also have an impact on different areas of a parliamentarian’s life - do MPs 
who have worked in mass media appear more frequently on television or newspaper? Do MPs 
who have worked as policy researchers spend more time on a select committee?  The 
implications of my findings here are therefore potentially enormous as they mean not only do 
pre-parliamentary careers affect MPs’ dedication to the making of speeches, but they may 
also translates into distinct patterns of behaviour that pay different levels of attention to the 
various tasks of being an MP. In the end, the occupational composition of the House as a whole 
could arguably affect the functioning and efficiency of the parliament as an institution.  
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Conclusion 
Throughout this thesis I have tried to demonstrate two things. First, I have aimed to 
demonstrate that MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers matter. Their careers matter in the political 
route MPs followed into parliament. Their careers matter in the allocation of safe seats to 
prospective MPs. Their careers matter in the appointment of frontbenchers and ministers. 
Their careers matter in the voting behaviour of MPs in divisions. Finally, their careers matter 
in their tendency to speak during parliamentary debates. These findings further our 
understanding of what ‘quality’ and ‘performance’ of representatives mean, as well as the 
definition, process and implication of professionalization in politics. I hope this thesis shows 
my own take on how MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers can and ought to be conceptualized, 
operationalized and studied. I have identified two dimension of MPs’ pre-parliamentary 
careers - professional and political. I have further shown that these two dimensions of pre-
parliamentary career exert independent and distinct effects on MPs political trajectory and 
behaviour in parliament. By highlighting the shortcomings of existing research and by 
presenting a new approach I hope to have indicated and enabled a new direction for future 
research on the prior experience of political leaders and how this affects political career and 
performance.  
 
Quality of representatives 
As predicted by my hypotheses, diverging pre-parliamentary careers among MPs do relate to 
their different political fortunes and behavioural patterns in parliament. Chapter Five showed 
that MPs’ professional credentials that may enhance individuals’ ability to discharge their 
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functions as frontbenchers, government ministers or shadow cabinet members, such as 
former media personnel, are more likely to be appointed to such positions. Chapter Six 
demonstrated how new MPs with different professional and political backgrounds differ in 
their voting behaviour during divisions. MPs’ prior experience does have empirical relation to 
their general tendency of rebellion toward their own party, as well as the level of 
Euroscepticism among new Conservative MPs. In Chapter Seven, I demonstrated that MPs’ 
prior experience is associated with the number of times that they speak during parliamentary 
debates. Moreover, I have shown that these relationships between pre-parliamentary careers 
and speech counts could be explained by MPs’ amount of experience in occupations that 
facilitate skills, knowledge and connections that either make parliamentary speech a more 
attractive or less necessary course of action for the individual, such as experiences in legal 
profession and mass media. 
 
Nevertheless, whether these findings signify that MPs’ who have certain professional or 
political backgrounds perform better or are of better quality than those who do not is subject 
to interpretation. I recognize that the dependent variables used in the empirical analysis of 
this thesis – electoral security, probability of frontbench promotion, division rebelliousness 
both in general as well as on a particular subject, and tendency to speak - are not equivalent 
to what we understand as ‘performance’ and ‘quality’ of representatives per se. Those 
promoted to the frontbench are not necessary better ministers than backbenchers. It is 
impossible to determine the quality and performance of an MP’s decision making via their 
voting pattern. It is not clear if an MP who speaks more often in debate is a better speaker or 
has made a larger contribution to the discussion, or is simply more talkative or longwinded. 
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As I have suggested at the beginning of this thesis, one of the key obstacles in understanding 
performance and quality of representatives lies in the multidimensional nature of these 
concepts when applied to the context of elected legislators. Furthermore, to definitively 
determine if an MP  genuinely performs better or is of better quality, we cannot merely rely 
on quantitative measures of their behaviour, but also the qualitative side of their work. For 
example, to what extent can individual ministers deliver public goods and policy changes and 
at what cost and timeframe? How do MPs arrive at their voting decision and to what extent 
is that informed by their pre-parliamentary experiences? To what extent does an MP’s speech 
contribute to the public debate or affect government policies? These might be more relevant 
measures of the genuine performance and quality of elected representatives. 
 
However, I believe that while findings from this analysis fall somewhere short of determining 
MPs’ performance and quality in accordance to their pre-parliamentary careers, they do 
provide some clues and signals for future research. First of all, how pre-parliamentary careers 
relate to MPs’ probability of earning nomination and promotion, their voting behaviour and 
their participation in debates are all meaningful findings. Secondly, the results from Chapters 
Four and Five indicate at the very least how ‘quality’ of parliamentary candidates and 
frontbenchers is conceptualized among recruiters and selectors of the respective positions. 
They are of course not infallible, and their conception of ‘quality’ and ‘performance’ may be 
very different from what we mean with those words, but we should bear in mind that these 
are people that are familiar with the demands and requirements of those positions and it is 
unlikely that they would appoint people who are utterly incapable in those capacities. 
Moreover, as some of the existing literature and I have repeatedly argued in this thesis, MPs 
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themselves might be in a better position to judge on their own capability and comparative 
advantages. These judgements ought to be reflected in how they choose their own role and 
priority among various aspects of their responsibilities in parliament. It would be rather 
extraordinary for an individual with the tendency of stage fright to spend a lot of time in the 
chamber making speeches, they may instead prefer a more low-key approach of politics and 
their time might be better spent in committee rooms or the corridors of the Palace of 
Westminster. The fact is that MPs’ pre-parliamentary occupations may affect their voting 
pattern on particular issues. While this may not be definitive proof, nevertheless it is a signal 
that MPs’ pre-parliamentary experience may serve to shape and inform their voting decision 
in divisions. 
 
All in all, barring further studies in the conceptualization and measurement of MPs’ quality 
and performance, it is difficult to determine definitively if MPs’ pre-parliamentary career 
determine their quality and performance as an elected representative. However, findings 
from this thesis are exploratory, it provide both the tools to answer those questions in the 
form of the theory and method in conceptualizing MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers; it shows 
that MPs’ patterns of behaviour do vary depending on their pre-parliamentary career, and it 
provides some clues and indications to the kinds of questions scholars ought to look at in 
future research with regards to the quality of representatives.  
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Professionalization of politics 
As I have suggested in the first chapter, existing research falls short in terms of understanding 
the definitions, causes and implications of professionalization of politics. Results given in this 
thesis have shed further light on these issues and further our understanding on 
professionalization of politics. Chapters Three, Four and Five have confirmed some of the 
argument found in existing literature with regards to professionalization. Chapter Three has 
reconciled literatures that defined professionalization in terms either professional or political 
aspect of MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers. Confirming my notion that professional and 
political dimension of MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers are conceptually distinct yet empirically 
related; the results have shown that experience in certain professional occupations are 
indeed associated with the amount and nature of MPs’ pre-parliamentary political 
engagement.  
 
Chapters Four and Five have indicated how MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers, both professional 
and political, have affected their career trajectory into and within parliament. Chapter Four 
further confirms the notion that applicants for parliamentary candidacy with political 
experience, especially at the national level, are favoured by either the institution or the 
selectors, resulting in them representing safer constituencies. Chapter Five shows that MPs 
with the political connection at the national level are indeed privileged in the process of 
frontbench and ministerial appointment. However, it also indicates that not all ‘political 
insiders’ are equally privileged, since those with professional experience that might promote 
performance and competence in ministerial office are more likely to be promoted even after 
their political experience is taken into consideration. Together with findings from Chapters 
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Six and Seven with regards to how MPs’ pre-parliamentary career affect their behaviour, 
especially among some of the occupations that have been described by some of the literature 
as ‘political related’, they further strengthen the argument that the increasing number of 
‘professional politicians’ being selected to run and elected to parliament could be explained 
by the fact that these are more capable individuals in terms of holding executive offices or 
participating in parliamentary deliberations. Professionalization is not necessary a process 
where the incestuous tendency among the political elite leads to bias against outsiders. 
Instead, it might be because those possessing the knowhow and ability to perform effectively 
as executive member of government or representatives are usually found among the ranks 
that have been deemed as ‘political professional’. 
 
These findings lead to some interesting implications. Firstly, is professionalization necessary 
a concern that needed to be addressed? In other words, is it really desirable to introduce 
more ‘amateurs’ into parliament? If those who worked in ‘politically related’ occupations are 
indeed more effective ministers,  more participatory in parliamentary deliberation and 
utilizing their knowledge and expertise in deciding their votes in divisions when compared 
with ‘amateurs’, then would increasing representation of the latter in fact hamper the 
effectiveness of the parliament as an institution? Alternatively, as shown by the results, the 
dominance of ‘politics professional’ in the executive and parliamentary deliberation is at least 
partially due to their superior capability in performing those functions given their extensive 
experience in related positions. Then, instead of increasing the numerical representation of 
‘amateurs’, an alternative is to boost their capability and readiness by enhancing training and 
induction programs given to prospective applicants and candidates by a party, as well as those 
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offered to newly elected to Westminster. By bridging the gap of skills and knowledge between 
‘professionals’ and ‘amateurs’, these measures may, to some extent, level the playing field 
between the two and enhance the substantive representation by the latter. 
 
Other novel findings 
Besides the effect of MPs pre-parliamentary careers on the performance of MPs and further 
focus on the issue of professionalization of politics, there are nevertheless some findings in 
this thesis that while not entirely relevant to the main research questions are  nevertheless 
worth reiterating.  
 
In Chapter Four, I have noted that there are signs indicating female and ethnic minority MPs 
are representing constituencies with higher electoral security. The lack of longitudinal 
comparison means however that it is impossible to contribute that to recent changes and 
reform in the nomination process of the major parties. These results at the very least indicate 
that the present system does seem to favour female and minority MPs in the sense that they 
are getting the nomination from safer seats, which may boost the longevity of their 
parliamentary careers. 
 
In Chapter Five, we have found that backbench rebel rate is a significant explanatory variable 
on MPs probability of being promoted to the frontbench. While this is by no means a new 
findings and there have been numerous research papers on the subject, I have noticed that 
this effect appears to be confined to new Conservative MPs as backbench rebel rate is only a 
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significant independent variable in Conservative models, not the full models nor Labour 
models. Given the limitations of cohort study, I am unable to deduce if this is a government 
effect or a Conservative effect. However, a plausible explanation to this phenomenon would 
be that since Labour in opposition use ballots among MPs to select members of shadow 
cabinet during part of the period, this means that loyalty to the leadership is less of a concern 
in the choosing of shadow cabinet members while the process of appointing frontbench 
members is largely dictated by the party leadership for the governing Conservative, which 
ought to take loyalty to the party in division lobbies a major factor when considering 
promotion, resulting in the pattern observed. 
 
The way forward 
In the end, I believe that my conceptual and methodological frameworks could lay a solid 
foundation for further research on the impact of political leaders’ pre-office careers, as well 
as the causes of changing occupational composition of parliament not only in Britain, but 
across countries. As I have noted previously, while there are benefits in strengthening the 
internal validity of the findings, the use of a cohort study hampers the external validity of the 
results, as we have no way of discerning any specificity that is confined to this parliament or 
this cohort of MP. Hence, the most straightforward way to proceed with this research is to 
expand the scope of the database to encompass firstly all MPs of the 2010-2015 parliament, 
and then to other parliaments in the past. Not only would the external validity be tested and 
strengthened, but also this could open the door for longitudinal study on the causes of 
changing occupational composition of parliament and its consequences on the functioning of 
parliament as a whole. For example, when exactly did ex-media personnel became an 
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increasing cabal within the parliament? Did that precede to the increased media scrutiny of 
parliament and mediation of politics? Or, was the former a response to the latter? 
 
Alternatively, besides expanding the database, the information already collected could be 
used to analyse aspect of MPs’ tasks and responsibilities that have not been studied. As noted 
in the first section of this concluding chapter, one of the pitfalls of the findings is that they 
only dealt with the quantitative measures of their career prospects and performance. More 
qualitative measures of their participation and contribution could improve the inference with 
regards to the quality of MPs. Applying the database to more substantive measure on the 
quality of their speeches or performance as ministers may provide further insight on the 
subject. Moreover, when I was planning for this thesis I envisioned expanding the study to 
several areas of MPs’ responsibilities beyond those explored here, which sadly have to be 
abandoned due to the problem of length. How often do individual MPs appear in newspapers 
and media? And to what extent was that a function of their experience in media or expertise 
in communication? How much effort do they spend in constituency work? Are local heroes 
more active in their constituencies because of their local roots? Or would they spend less time 
with their constituents because they are already well established locally and have nothing 
further to gain? How does prior experience affect their participation in select and bills 
committees? These are some of the other area of MPs’ responsibility that merit further 
enquiries. 
 
Besides testing new dependent variables, there are also more complex causal relations that 
were considered during the course of researching for this thesis, but abandoned due to 
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practical considerations. For example, most of the statistical models used in this thesis 
assume that the benefits from pre-parliamentary experiences are linear. However, it has been 
noted in the literature review that the relationship between accumulation of experience and 
effect on performance may be non-linear. As the amount of experience increase, the marginal 
benefit from further accumulation of experience may decrease. It is possible that beyond a 
certain point, one may have learnt everything one may learn on the job and further 
experience does not bring any tangible benefit. This research has also refrained from 
exploring how professional and political pre-parliamentary careers interact with each other 
in terms of their effect on MPs behaviour. While the statistic models have successfully 
discerned the effect between the two dimensions of pre-parliamentary careers, I have not 
tried to establish how they interact with each other. Lastly, in the first and second chapters, I 
have touched upon the issue of parliamentary socialization and how MPs may learn the ropes 
of being an MP as their tenure increase. I have suggested two hypotheses regarding how 
parliamentary socialization may affect the impact of MPs’ pre-parliamentary careers. On one 
hand, socialization may cause MPs’ behaviour to converge as parliamentary experience 
increases. However, it is also possible that diverging patterns of behaviour due to different 
pre-parliamentary experiences in the formative years of MPs’ parliamentary tenure may lead 
to accumulation of different experiences in parliament, further entrenching any initial 
behavioural differences. These issues all merit further investigation, yet given the limitation 
of the dataset and time, these are some of the paths that have appeared on the horizon but 
not travelled during the research for this thesis. 
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In the end, I envision this thesis as an exploratory research that may lead to a new type of 
research on the prior careers of political office holders and how these affect politicians’ 
competence and aptitude. With the conceptual and methodological framework I have 
proposed in this thesis, I believe I have laid a solid foundation for future research on the 
subject, both for the UK and other democratic parliaments. 
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